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FOREWORD
This inaugural publication reflects a growing interest in
international law among men and women of law and policy
science. Today, there are momentous changes and challenges
on the international scene with vast legal and policy implications. Man's probe of the frontier areas-outer space, and the
ocean depths-forces students of law and policy to rethink
traditional concepts of order. Protection of human rights, inherent in American law, has become a matter of legal and
policy concern on the international scene. Little wonder, then,
that scholarship in international law and policy has captured
the attention of some of the finest minds. Hopefully, the pages
of this publication shall provide a wider audience for the keen
thinking of these scholars.
The University of Denver has reacted affirmatively and
enthusiastically to the growing interest in international law
and policy. Its Graduate School of International Studies has
earned a deserved solid reputation for thoughtful research
and reflection about the changes and challenges internationally.
Concurrently, the College of Law has, within its orbit of interest, provided leadership in teaching, research, and community
involvement. With the appointment of Ved P. Nanda to the
College of Law faculty in 1964, its interests were given new
and exciting dimensions. Each year since 1965, the College
has been host to a regional conference of the American Society
of International Law. In 1969, the faculty began to require
the course in International Law for every first year student.
In 1970, the faculty established an International Legal Studies
Program here. And last spring, the College offered a course on
Transnational Business Transactions, as a part of the continuing legal educational program. Now, with this publication,
international law and policy has a voice and forum at the
College of Law: a valuable voice and forum for meaningful
dialogue on perplexing problems and for student training and
research. Indeed, the faculty recognizes the interdependent
nature of the world community; it accepts the challenge of
making a contribution toward clarifying international legal
problems.
It is especially appropriate that this first issue is dedicated
to Myres S. McDougal, undisputed authority in international
law and policy. With his lifelong devotion to legal teaching and

scholarship, his untiring efforts in promoting human dignity,
and his impact upon international legal thought, "Mac" has
rightly earned a warm and singularly unique place among
his colleagues-scholars, teachers, practioners, jurists-everywhere. Kudos, respect and gratitude go to him on his sixtyfifth birthday, through these pages.
The faculty of law and administration of the University
present, with congratulations to the staff and with pride, this
first issue to all concerned with international order in the expectation that it will be used not only as a forum of sharing
thoughtful scholarly writing and critical commentary on current international problems, but that it will also offer innovative ideas for promoting and strengthening international order.
ROBERT B. YEGGE
Dean and Professor
College of Law

The Association of The Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy wishes to express its deep gratitude to the
following.
JONATHON C. Cox
JEFFREY

0.

BROWN

VICTOR L. ABBO
ROBERT G. HEISERMAN

It was through their dedication that the Journal came into
existence. They laid the groundwork from which the present
Association grew and provided the Association with the concept
that they were to evolve a forum for the exchange of ideas
on the entire range of international activities for students, practitioneers and academics.
Messrs. Cox, Brown, Abbo and Heiserman were instrumental in overcoming the numerous obstacles to the establishment of this Journal. Their energy, dedication and hard work
in guiding the Journal through its infancy have earned them

the sincere appreciation of the entire Journal Associaton.

qgmledaa...
I once told Professor Nanda, in a moment of despair, that
it was unrealistic for the Univeristy of Denver to contemplate
publishing an international law journal. After all, we had no
money allocated for such a venture, we had one already established journal, we did not have a large law school population,
and, as we were land-locked for one thousand miles in every
direction, the only thing international in the entire state was
the airport. Professor Nanda responded by inquiring whether
there was an interest in publishing such a journal and whether
that interest was substantial enough to continue publishing in

the future. As to the former, the proof is evident. As to the
latter, who can tell yet? I can only say that since our initial
discussion we never doubted what the answers to both would
be.
One is tempted in an opportunity such as this to pay some
personal debts of gratitude to the people who make a journal a

reality. It somehow seems appropriate to lump everyone together and catch them all in a collective phrase of "thanks"
for their individual talents and contributions, but I am going
to succumb to the temptation to satisfy a few of those debts.
To the people who are inadvertently omitted, I apologize and
trust that each realizes how important his role was in producing this journal, whether mentioned here or not.
The other International Law Journals were of tremendous
help, information, and encouragement from the very beginning
of our endeavor as was the yearly ASILS' (Association of
Student International Law Societies) International Law Journal Workshop. Michael Massey, Michael Goldner, and John
Davidson, respective editor-in-chiefs of the Denver Law Journal
have been invaluable in their advice and cooperation. Many
pitfalls were avoided, due to the advice and information received from these gentlemen.
Two contemporary student organizations deserve special
note: the SBA (Student Bar Association) under Julian Graza
for giving us encouragement and funding at a critical time;
and the GSA (Graduate Student Association), under the guidance of Ralph Monteen, for assisting us with fundirig.
Of similar help and encouragement were a number of professional people in Denver. The Honorable Zack Chayet, John
A. Moore, Donald W. Hoagland, and William R. Ross have
always been interested in our project as was demonstrated by
their devoting time and expertise to us as we needed it. Needless to say, both their stature and their interest buttressed our
hopes in the early days of the journal. Frank and Gladys
Oppenheimer have been unceasing in their committment to
help in any and all ways, lending both skill and support. Without Edward Goodin this journal could not possibly have become
a reality. He provided support and encouragement that was
invaluable. Mrs. Genevieve Fiore provided a warmth and encouragement that was so welcome. Dean Robert C. Good of
the Graduate School of International Studies has also provided
valuable support and encouragement. All these people helped
us establish a strong base of professional community interest.
Without this kind of interest, I am convinced the ultimate
publication of the Journalwould have been much more difficult.
To Dean Robert Yegge we owe special gratitude. While it
is difficult to assess the contribution of the atmosphere of a
law school to a publication such as ours, Dean Yegge created
an academic environment in which as students we felt anything

was possible. We never faced problems of tradition or image as
obstacles to our progress toward publication - it was only a
question of whether we could produce the journal and whether
there was enough interest and dedication.
Professor Ved Nanda provided the basis for our entire
effort. We simply could not have done it without his help,
guidance, and support. We were and are grateful to have him
as our faculty advisor, and we only hope we will live up to his
expectations.
Finally, a brief word about Professor Myres McDougal
from a student's point of view. We searched for a way to distinguish both ourselves and this publication from all others.
It was only when we settled upon the idea of dedicating this
journal to a man of such awesome intellect and productivity
that everything jelled. From that moment our direction and
purpose were fixed, and I can honestly say that the rest has
been both easy and rewarding. Our hope is to try to do his
contribution to International Law justice with this contribution
to him and his field.

Former Editor-in-Chief

MYRES SMITH McDOUGAL
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MYRES SMITH McDOUGAL
The Journal feels it appropriate to initiate its existence
by honoring one of international law's most distinguished
authorities, Professor Myres S. McDougal. As students we have
been greatly influenced by him and his policy-oriented approach. This is reflected by our title, The Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy.
We can add little to what is said hereinafter; his colleagues
amply expound the reasons for our decision to dedicate this
issue to Professor McDougal. He exemplifies the innovation and
creativity which is part of international legal studies.
This issue is a tribute to Professor McDougal, containing
both comments on, and exhibits of, his influence on the work
of his students and colleagues. A formal acknowledgement
of his academic career follows as an introduction, illustrating
well the expanse of his personality and work.
A.B., A.M., LL.B., University of Mississippi, 1927; B.A.,
B.C.L., Oxford University, England, 1930; J.S.D., Yale University, 1931; Doctor of Humane Letters, Columbia University,
1954. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois, 19311934; Associate Professor of Law, Yale University, 1934-1939;
Professor of Law, Yale University 1939 ........ ; William K. Townsend, Professor of Law, Yale University, 1944-1958; Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University, 1958 ........ ; Visiting Professor of
Law, Cairo University, Egypt, 1959-1960. Lecturer, Fulbright Conference on American Studies, Cambridge University, 1952; First
John A. Sibley Lecturer, University of Georgia, 1964; occasional
lectures: The Hague Academy of International Law, The U.S.
Naval War College, The National War College, The Army War
College, The Air University. Assistant General Counsel, LendLease Administration, 1942; General Counsel, Office of Foreign
Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Department of State, 1943;
of counsel to the Government of Saudi Arabia in the Aramco
Arbitration, 1955-1956; Member, U.S. Panel, The Permanent
Court of Arbitration, 1963 ........ ; President, American Society of
International Law, 1958; President, Association of American
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Law Schools, 1966. Member of Board of Editors: The American
Journal of International Law; The American Journal of Comparative Law; The Natural Law Forum. Member: American
Bar Association, American Society of International Law. First
recipient of the Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar Award,
1966; LL.D. (Honorary), Northwestern University, 1966; LL.D.
(Honorary), York University, Canada, 1970.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WRITINGS
BY MYRES SMITH McDOUGAL
BOOKS
INTERPRETATION

THE

(with H.

(1967)
LAW

AND

VLASIC).

THE

PUBLIC

IN

ORDER

ORDER

LAW AND MINIMUM

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:

PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND:

THE

CASE FOR

NEW ENGLAND,

NING,

(with D.

ORDER

FELICIANO).

(with associates).

(1960)

ALLOCATION,

INTER-

THE LEGAL REGULA-

(with F.

(1961)

REGIONAL PLANNING

by the

LASSWELL

PLANNING AND DEVELOP-

HABER).
WITH

SPECIAL

REFERENCE

TO

DIRECTIVE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL PLAN-

YALE UNIVERSITY

with M.

(with H.

A CONTEMPORARY
(with W. BURKE).

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

(1948)

PUBLIC

OCEANS:

(1962)

TION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION

MENT

WORLD

(1963)

SPACE

THE

OF

NATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA

STUDIES IN

AND

AGREEMENTS

LASSWELL & J. MILLER).

PUBLIC

& I.

OF

(1947)

(Chairman of the Committee,

ROTIVAL).

ARTICLES
Criteria for a Theory about Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971)
(with Lasswell).
Legal Bases for Securing the Earth-Space Environment, in Proceedings

of International

Joint Conference of the

American

Geographical Society and the American Division of the World
Academy of Art and Science. (New York, 1970).
The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

R. Falk ed. 1969)

LEGAL ORDER

73 (C. Black &

(with Lasswell & Reisman).

Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for
Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237 (1969) (with
Lasswell & Chen).

MYRES S. McDOUGAL

Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968) (with Reisman).
Theories about InternationalLaw: Prologue to a Configurative
Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968) (with Lasswell &
Reisman).
In Dedication to Dean Dillard: Man of Depth and Style, 54 VA.
L. REV. 585 (1968) (with Lasswell).
Revision of the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea:
The Views of a Commentator, 1 NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER
No. 3 at 19 (1968).
International Law and the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE
SEA 3 (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
Jurisprudencein Policy Oriented Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L. REV.
486 (1967) (with Lasswell).
The InternationalLaw Commission's Draft Articles upon Interpretation: Textuality Redivivus, 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 992 (1967).
Authority to Use Force on the High Seas, 20 NAVAL WAR
LEGE REV. 19 (1967).

COL-

Act of State in Policy Perspective: The International Law of
an InternationalEconomy in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-STRUCTURES AND SAFEGUARDS (1966).
Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 1 GA. L. REV. 1 (1966).
Education for Professional Responsibility, 12 THE STUDENT LAWYER 6 (1966).
Chinese Participatonin the United Nations: The Legal Imperatives of A Negotiated Solution, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 671 (1966)
(with Goodman).
Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and Nationality of Ships,
52 AM. J. INT'L L. 25 (1960) (with Burke & Vlasic).
The Community Interest in a Narrow Territorial Sea: Inclusive
versus Exclusive Competence over the Oceans, 45 CORNELL L.
Q. 171 (1960) (with Burke).
The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959) (with Lasswell).
The Impact of International Law upon National Laws A Policyoriented Perspective, 4 S. DAKOTA L. REV. 25 (1959).
Current Controversies about Legal Education 8 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 199 (1959) (with Forrester, Green, et al).
Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L. J. 1057
(1959) (with Feliciano).
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Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity, 53
PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.

107 (1959).

Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives versus
National Egoism, 67 YALE L.J. 539 (1958) (with Burke).
International Coercion and World Public Order: The General
Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J. 771 (1958) (with
Feliciano).
The Initiation of Coercion: A Multi-Temporal Analysis, 52 AM.
J. INT'L L. 241 (1958) (with Feliciano).
Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 AM J. INT'L L. 407
(1958) (with Lipson).
Artificial Satellites: A Modest Proposal, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 74
(1957).
Jurisdiction, 9 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 1 (1957).
El Derecho International Como Ciencia Politica, III REVISTA DE
DERECHO Y CIENCIAS

SOCIALES

142 (1956).

Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy Oriented Approach to
Legal Study, 1 NATURAL L. FORUM 53 (1956).
Peace and War: Factual Continuum with Multiple Legal Consequences, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1955).
The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the
Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L 356 (1955).
The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for
Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955) (with Schlei).
The Impact of the Metropolis Upon Land Law, in THE METROPOLIS IN MODERN LIFE 212 (R. Fisher ed. 1955).
The Influence of the Metropolis on Concepts, Rules and Institutions Relating to Property, 4 J. PUB. L. 93 (1955).
The Realist Theory in Pyrrhic Victory, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 376
(1955).
The Treaty-Power and the Constitution: The Case against the
Amendment, 40 A.B.A.J. (1954) (with MacChesney, Mathews,
Oliver, and Ribble).
Dr. Schwarzenberger's Power Politics, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 115
(1953).
International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary ConceptioA, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137 (Hague Academy of International Law, 1953 with separate printing).
.Law and Power, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 102 (1952).
The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value
Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 61
YALE L.J. 915 (1952); 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 24 (1952).

MYRES S. McDOUGAL

The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60
(with Gardner).
YALE L.J. 268 (1951)
Planning and Development for Metropolitan Communities, in
AMERICAN PLANNING AND Civic ANNUAL 94 (1950).
The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REV.
683 (1950) (with Arens).
The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional
Illusions Versus Rational Action, 59 YALE L.J. 60 (1949) (with
Leighton); 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 490 (1949).
Land Title Transfer: a Regression, 48 YALE L.J. 1125 (1949)
(with Brabner-Smith).
The Role of Law in World Politics, 20 Miss. L.J. 253 (1949).
International Law and Contending World Orders, 34th Proceedings of the Institute of World Affairs 11 (Dec. 1948) (pub.
1960).
Forword to Regional Planning and Development: The Process
of Using Intelligence, Under Conditions of Resource and Institutional Interdependence, for Securing Community Values, 32
IOWA L. REV. 193 (1947).
The Law School of the Future; From Legal Realism to Policy
Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345 (1947).
Municipal Land Policy and Control 1 (New York, Practising
Law Institute, 1946).
Aims and Objectives of Legal Education, in Handbook of the
Association of American Law Schools 125 (1945).
Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE
L.J. 181 (1945) (with Lans).
Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, II,
54 YALE L.J. 534 (1945) (with Lans).
A Regional Development Administration, 264 New England War
Bulletin, No. 4, at 14 (June-July 1945).
Municipal Land Policy and Control 242 ANNALS 88 (1945).
Policy-Making as the Center of Emphasis, in Handbook of the
Association of American Law Schools 47 (1943).
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in
the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943) (with Lasswell).
Future Interests Restated: Tradition versus Clarification and
Reform, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (1942).
Public Purpose in Public Housing: An Anachronism Reburied,
52 YALE L.J. 42 (1942) (with Mueller).
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Summary and Criticism of Answers to Question 8 of the Property Questionnaire (Report of Sub-committee on Property,
Committee on Curriculum, Association of American Law
Schools, 1941), in Handbook of the Association of American
Law Schools 268 (1941).
Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50
YALE L.J. 827 (1941).

Title Registration and Land Law Reform: A Reply, 8 U. CHI.
L. REV. 63 (1940).
Bankruptcy, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA.

(14th rev. edition

1936) (with William 0. Douglas).
BOOK REVIEWS
Civil Rights in Immigration. By M. Konvitz, 40 AM. J. INT'L L.
335 (1954).
Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations.
By Q. Wright, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 680 (1954).
The International Court of Justice. By 0. Lissitzyn, 47 AM. J.
INT'L L. 340 (1953).
Foundations of World Organization. Edited by Lyman Bryson,
47 AM. J. INT'L L. 351 (1953).
International Law and Human Rights. By H. Lauterpacht, 60
YALE L.J. 1051 (1951).

Cases and Readings on Law and Society. By S. Simpson & J.
Stone, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 399 (1951).
Real Covenants and Other Interests which "Run with Land."
By C. Clark, 58 YALE L.J. 500 (1949).
The Law of Public Housing. By W. Ebenstein, 54 HARV. L. REV.
526 (1941).
Restatement of Torts, Vol. IV, Division 10, Chapter 41. The
American Law Institute, 49 YALE L.J. 1502 (1940).
The Law and Mr. Smith. By M. Radin, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 495
(1939).
Readings in Jurisprudence. By J. Hall, 34 ILL. L. REV. 109
(1939).
The Tyranny of Words. By S. Chase, 5 U. CHI. L.Q. 702 (1938).
A Treatise on the Law of Personal Property. By R. A. Brown,
47 YALE L.J. 514 (1938).

Restatement of the Law Property. The American Law Institute, 32 ILL. L. REV. 509 (1937).
The Higher Learning in America. By R. Hutchins, 46 YALE L.J.
1433 (1937).

MYRES S. McDOUGAL

The Promise of American Politics. By T. V. Smith, 46
L.J. 1269 (1937).

YALE

Cases and Materials on Creditors' Rights. By J. Hanna, 45 Yale
L.J. 1159 (1936).
Cases on the Law of Bankruptcy, Including the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances. By E. Holbrook and R. W. Aigler, 3d ed.,
edited by T. C. Billig, 45 Yale L.J. 1158 (1936).
A Treatise on Mortgages. By W. F. Walsh, 44
(1935).

YALE

L.J. 1278

SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES
Statement upon Interpretation, the Vienna Conference on the
Law of Treaties, 62 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1021 (1968).
Statement upon National Foundation for Social Sciences, Hearings on S. 836 Before the Subcomm. on Government Research
of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 508 (1967).
Legal Education for a Free Society: Our Collective Responsibility (Presidential Address), Association of American Law
Schools, Proceedings 1966, Pt. II, at 33 (Dec. 1966).
The Policy-Science Approach to International Legal Studies,
in Lectures on International Law and the United Nations delivered at the University of Michigan Law School, June 23-28,
1955 at 43-61, Summer Institute on International and Comparative Law, University of Michigan (1957).
The Treaty-Making Power, in Proceedings American Branch,
International Law Association for 1952, at 13-23; also in Hearings on S. J. 130 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
Remarks on Human Rights, 43 Paoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 65-68,
83-85 (1949).
The Codification of International Law, 41 PROc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. 47 (1947).
Outline of Talk on "Legal Questions" in The Problem of the
Cities and Towns: Report of the Conference on Urbanism,
Harvard University, March 5, 6, 1942, at 42-58 (1942).
MISCELLANEOUS
Brief for the Respondent, Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S.I. (Counsel
with others to the Attorney General).
Report of Committee on Planning, Rebuilding and Developing
Metropolitan Communities, Property Section, American Bar Association, 1946. 30 pp. (mimeographed) (Chairman of Committee).

MYRES S. McDOUGAL
VED

P. NANDA*

Myres McDougal is primarily known as a scholar. But
those who have actually worked with him are also keenly aware
of his qualities as a human being and a teacher, who has continuing concern and sincere interest in his students. I recall
that the entry-way to his office was constantly occupied by students anticipating and always sharing part of his otherwise
too busy and hectic schedule; indeed, I have learnt a great deal
from him about friendship and respect for individuals.
My experience with Professor McDougal as a scholar,
involved in interdisciplinary and collaborative methods, is also
memorable. For instance, my first course with him-Public
Order of the World Community-was taught by an impressive
list of scholars, including Harold Lasswell, Leon Lipson and
McDougal. In the International Organizations Seminar, Harold
Lasswell, Oscar Schachter, Egon Schwelb and McDougal marshalled their varied expertise and wit to the benefit of the
seminar group-an event unparalled in my scholastic career.
A similar approach that bears his personal stamp 'frequently
marked other courses; Law, Science and Policy; Sharable and
Strategic Resources; Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, to mention a few.
The impact of the "New Haven School", associated with
Professors McDougal and Lasswell, is as yet unmeasured. The
task of clarifying the problems of world public order and providing viable alternatives is a continuing one. Yet, within this
ongoing process Professor McDougal has had distinct and
unique impact, challenging, directing and shaping international
legal thought.
But perhaps as important, Professor McDougal has touched
the lives of so many as teacher, colleague and friend. In fact,
few others in legal education anywhere have enjoyed as much
affection from their students.
The comments that follow represent the feelings of those
close to him; they express some of the magnitude and depth of
McDougal's intellect and personality. They speak for themselves and for all who know him. In view of Professor McDougal's all pervasive influence, this Journal, as well as the
entire field, owes him a great debt.
*Professor, College of Law, University of Denver. Director, International
Legal Studies Program.

MYRES S. McDOUGAL
PROFOUND SCHOLAR, CREATIVE INNOVATOR,

GENIAL HUMANIST
HARDY

C.

DILLARD*

The vigour of civilized societies is
preserved by the widespread sense
that high aims are worthwhile.
Whitehead, The Adventure of Ideas (1932) 286.
The launching of the Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy is the occasion for rejoicing. As with older student
sponsored journals it demonstates first, that the modern American law student is keenly aware of the fact that many of the
critically important problems which require analytical treatment transcend national frontiers, and second, that space limitations prevent orthodox law reviews from coping with the multifaceted theoretical and practical dilemmas which these problems generate. A third point should also be mentioned. Aware
that our library shelves already groan with hundreds of journals, a skeptic may well ask, why add to the number? The
answer, it is submitted, is not difficult. The subject of international law is so vast and the wealth of student research now devoted to it in seminars across the nations is so extensive that
it is a pity to consign able student effort to some professor's
file or dusty alcove. The prospect of publication not only
heightens the incentive to do high quality work, it is likely also
to produce results that add significantly to our store of knowledge.' It need hardly be added, of course, that the incentive is
spurious and the accretion to knowledge is negligible unless
the student effort is measured and screened by exacting
standards of scholarly integrity.
The dedication of the "kick off" issue of this Journal to
Myres McDougal is particularly appropriate. What scholar of
Judge, International Court of Justice; former James Monroe Professor
and Dean, University of Virginia Law School.

have elaborated on this theme a little more extensively in the initial
issue of the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law,
which is, at this writing, in the process of being published. I recognize
that student journals are not confined to student contributions. This suggests that another source of available material lies in the many regional
meetings sponsored by the American Society of International Law such as
that held at the University of Denver Law School in May, 1969. See, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 158 (1970). •
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our time has done more to challenge conventional doctrine,
stimulate probing controversy, and generate constructive
thought? What man has done more as scholar, teacher, head of
professional bodies and lively disputant in professional meetings, to energize an entire discipline? To me the answer is too
clear to admit of doubt. And this seems true whether one
agrees, either in gross or in detail, with the policy oriented
approach, sometimes known as "the gospel according to Harold
'2
and Mac."
It was to be expected that the policy oriented approach
would arouse vigorous reactions, a consequence attending most
pioneering intellectual efforts. Its novelty, its comprehensively
syndetic quality, its insistence on the consistent use of many
terms unfamiliar to orthodoxy, its employment of insights
drawn from other disciplines (notably communication theories),
its explicit introduction of "values," its de-emphasis of rules in
favor of empirically revealed subjective expectations-these
and many other features elicited reactions ranging all the way
from dedicated espousal through restrained skepticism to active
opposition. And naturally even those who did not merely
"react" but who took the time to probe the assumptions underlying the approach and who might be considered sympathetic,
yet registered and continue to register reservations on specific
aspects. 3 This too was to be expected. The significant point lies
elsewhere.
The novelist John Steinbeck, speaking of critics, is credited
with the whimsical comment that the quality which best distinguishes a critic as a man of superior discernment and sincerity is his willingness to indulge in unqualified praise. But
2
3

Need it be said that the reference is to Professor Harold Lasswell?
Despite its formidable title, an able analysis and rebuttal of three prevalent criticisms is to be found in one of Professor Moore's well written and
comprehensively documented articles.

See, MOORE, PROLEGOMENON
AND HAROLD LASSWELL, 54

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MYRES McDOUGAL

TO

VA.

L. REV. 662 (1968). The three criticisms deal with: (a) the special rhetoric
employed by the approach, (b) its instrumental quality and value emphasis which may lead to chauvinistic manipulation of law and (c) its
allegedly practical unwieldiness. My own reservations are located at a
different level. They have to do with a too heavy emphasis on "decision
making" as a focus of inquiry and a too heavy reliance on empirically derived data as a clue to meaning and significance. It has been well said
that the significance of behavior is not exhausted by observing it. A too
heavy emphasis on empirically derived data may tend to suggest that the
manifestation of behavior tells its own story whereas the story may be
distorted unless subtle mental operations are brought to bear upon it and
unless the behavior is located in a frame of reference which may itself
elude observation. The problem bothers the historian as well as the jurist.
See PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS AND HISTORY 265-96 (Dray ed. 1966). But
all this takes us far afield and I am sure Professor McDcugal would have
a ready answer to any doubts of this kind. Several years ago I attempted
to search out some of the assumptions underlying the approach. Dillard,
The Policy Oriented Approach to Law, 40 VA. Q. REV. 626 (1964).
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unqualified praise, however pleasant, rarely serves as a reliable
index of influence. This is measured by, among other things,
the extent to which the author's ideas command sustained
attention, their capacity to help resolve complex problems and
ultimately the degree to which they tend to set fresh thought
in motion.
It is a tribute alike to the quality of Professor McDougal's
thought and the respect he commands to suggest that his monumental contributions to our discipline are so well known (even
when not altogether understood) that no one can claim to be
sophisticated who is not aware of them. In this sense he may
be bracketed with Williston or Corbin in the field of Contracts
or Scott on Trusts or Powell on Property but, in effect, the
comparison is not apt because Professor McDougal's contributions, as noted above, are in a more protean field and challenge accepted doctrine. Of how many 20th century legal
scholars can this be said? Taking the sweep of our own history,
Roscoe Pound comes to mind since early in the century he,
too, challenged conventional notions about law and the legal
and social order. Unfortunately he devoted little attention
to international law. Suffice it to suggest, in short, that Professor McDougal has, indeed-to use a trite but nevertheless
accurate phrase-become a legend in his own time.
Less well known than his books and articles are his qualities as an executive when called upon to act in that capacity.
So far as I can ascertain he is one of only two men (the other
being the late Professor Edwin Dickinson), in the long history
of both the American Society of International Law and the
Association of American Law Schools, to have been elected
president of each. This, in itself, is a testimonial to the respect
and regard held for him by his colleagues. More to the point,
however, is the fact, known especially to those who were then
in close association with him, that he brought to each office
a quality of energetic and imaginative leadership that was pervasively felt. This was manifested in many ways including his
ably articulated espousal of the needs of our discipline which
ultimately led to sustained and systematically organized research efforts backed by substantial foundation support. In
both his presidencies he exploded the myth that because renowned scholars do not seek executive power and may even
disdain it, they are thereby incapable of wielding it.
Shifting our focus, it is soon appreciated by those who do
intellectual battle with Professor McDougal, either in live dis-
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course or in writing, that they are not opposing a man who
takes lightly challenges to his ideas. Sometimes this may lead
to the conclusion that he is too forthright in his denunciation of
ideas with which he disagrees. But it is to be noted that his
rebuttals are never ad hominem but always buttressed by reasoned argument and a host of authorities. His strongly held
convictions about law as an instrument for human betterment
and his disdain for all forms of "black letter" approaches to
the solution of complex legal problems are not attended by any
kind of petty, personal animus directed against those who may
either ignore the true gospel or read it through distorted lenses.
This ushers in a final note which I shall sound even at the
risk of appearing too personal. To all who happily have come
within the more intimate circle of his influence it is well known
that, at the human level, it would be difficult to find a warmer,
more generous or more loyal friend. Genially coupled with this
quality is still another. Despite his vast contributions to our
literature and despite his forthright espousal of his own ideas,
there is nothing about him that bespeaks the heavy handed
pedant who may be best described as a man who fails to distinguish between taking his work seriously, which is always
necessary and taking himself seriously, which is never required.
As a non-Yale colleague who has shared with him many common experiences, such as lecturing in Egypt, at The Hague and
at Oxford, and who has spent many hours with him not only
in professional activities but also in friendly banter and pleasant revelry, I can vouch for the engaging fact that Professor
McDougal never equates being serious with being solemn. Not
only is he one of the great scholars of our time endowed with a
superior mind; he is a very jolly companion graced with a
light touch.
The University of Denver College of Law is to be saluted
on venturing to publish a new journal. And it does itself honor
by honoring Professor McDougal who has done so much to
spread the sense that high aims are worthwhile and can be

realized.

MYRES S. McDOUGAL:
PIONEER FOR THE YEAR 2010
RICHARD A.

FALK*

Writing against the bloody mainstream of our history,
Myres S. McDougal has dedicated his life to a demonstration of
how law might contribute to a more valuable human existence
at all levels of political organization. In this brief comment I
shall confine myself to his contributions to world order studies,
the area wherein Professor McDougal has concentrated his
efforts for more than twenty years and a subject matter
wherein the relevance of law seems to be persistently put in
question by the words and actions of statesmen.
The central endeavor of Professor McDougal, and the impressive array of first-rank scholars who have joined in the
enterprise form what might be designated "an intellectual collective" which I have labeled elsewhere as the "New Haven
approach,"' has been to demonstrate that international law is
useful if appropriately conceived 2 and that international law
is used, whether wittingly or not, by decision-makers trying
to balance assertions of self-interest against probable counterassertions in a way that is mutually satisfactory. In this respect, the case for normative relevance ultimately rests in our
historical period on the universal need to discourage the kind
of violence that might generate recourse to nuclear weapons.
McDougal's writings have been sensitive to this overriding consideration, as well as to the conflicting tendencies among principal states for world dominance. In this respect, McDougal's
writings presuppose the beneficial influence exerted by the
United States and allied liberal democracies upon foreign societies and the corespondingly detrimental influence exerted by
'3
the Sino-Soviet group of actors denominated as "totalitarian.
As such, the central tension in McDougal's thinking is between
the universalistic criteria of world order and the particularistic
criteria of American foreign policy. By historical circumstance,
* Milbank Professor of International Law, Princeton University.
I

See R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 342 (1970);

Gidon Gottlieb has reached the same kind of judgment under the rubric

of "the Yale approach". G. GOTTLIEB, The Conceptual World of the Yale
School of InternationalLaw, WORLD POLmCS 108 (1968).
2 It is more accurate to conclude that McDougal and his associates have
recast the traditional perspectives of "international law" in a more broadly
conceived framework of "world public order."
3 This element in McDougal's thinking is made particularly clear in McDougal and Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, in McDOUGAL et al. STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
3-41 (1960).
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in part, there is increasing evidence that the course of American foreign policy is not compatible with any adequate conception of world order, even one that is modest in its assertion of constraints. 4 America's involvement in the Indochina
War has exposed vividly-what was latent all along-that
international struggles could not be divided for normative purposes by reference to the ideological affinities of the contending
factions. For one thing, the anti-Communist faction might be
repressive and totalitarian; secondly, the Communist faction
may derive its strength from nationalism and socialism rather
than from the sort of bureaucratic totalism we associate with
the Soviet Union and its satellites; thirdly, if the ratio of forces
is strongly against the anti-Communist side it prompts highly
destructive reliance on a military strategy to reverse a political
defeat; fourthly, if the setting of struggle is a low-technology
society, then the intervention of high-technology weaponry almost necessarily ravages the country if the Communist-oriented
faction has a firm base of popular support. These factors are
all present in Indochina and have increasingly led international
law critics to shift the discussion from a debate on norms to an
inquiry into personal responsibility for the commission of war
crimes in a Nuremberg sense. Telford Taylor's book, NUREMBURG
AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY, represents a sober but
decisive acknowledgement that the American response to Communist challenges in Indochina culminated in a course of conduct, not isolated acts, that was criminal and that implicates
American decision-makers at the highest levels of civilian and
military command. 5 From an international lawyer's perspective
such criminality represents a decisive demonstration that American foreign policy-even if oriented toward resisting the expansion of Communist influence-is not necessarily compatible
with adherence to minimal imperatives of world order."
4

5

The most significant attempt to argue the contrary position has been
developed by Professor John Norton Moore, a scholar deeply and visibly
influenced by his association with McDougal, in an influential series of
articles. For a recent example of his approach see Moore, Legal Dimensions of the Decision to Intercede in Cambodia, 65 AM. J. INT'L L.
38 (1971).
Neil Sheehan, writing a long essay review in the Sunday New York Times
Review, concluded that "If you credit as factual only a fraction of the
information assembled here about what happened in Vietnam, and if you
apply the laws of war to American conduct there, then the leaders of
the United States for the past six years including the incumbent President Richard Milhous Nixon, may well be guilty of war crimes." N.Y.
Times, Mar. 28, 1971, § 7 (Magazine) at 1, col. 4; for an effort to apply
the war crimes reasoning succinctly to the issue of impeachment see

R. Falk, Why Impeachment, THE

NEW REPUBLIC,

May 1, 1971, at 13.

6 And may not, indeed sustain the integrity of legal process within the
domestic polity. The government reliance on vague conspiracy indictments to prosecute anti-war activities is one indication of domestic spillover from an international course of lawlessness.
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I hope that Professor McDougal will feel the need to reformulate some of his analysis in light of the Indochina experience, although it is of greater consequence for a potential biographer than for future students of world order. I find it remarkable that, despite my disagreements with McDougal on
levels of policy application, I find his basic orientation to the
7
subject matter of world order studies as valuable as ever.
The shortcomings of his analysis involve, in my judgment,
errors of historical interpretation both with respect to the values
actually animating American foreign policy and as to the world
setting, but these shortcomings do not undercut the effort to
achieve a comprehensive view of world order, oriented toward
the achievement of human dignity and conceived in the dynamic mood of process.8
In two crucial respects, I think recent developments have
proven McDougal even more correct than earlier: first, shifting attention from the traditional concern with "international
law" to the wider domain of "world public order;" secondly,
insisting for reasons of pragmatic and ideological necessity that
the foreign policy process be governed by a secure normative
framework. 9 Both of these achievements have, in my judgment,
great consequence for the survival potential of world civilization, and as such, rank among the prime successes of humanistic
studies in our times. Suppose we assume that by the year
2010 there exists a world system that has generally overcome
the fundamental challenges of war, poverty, pollution, and

7 In actuality, McDougal has devoted comparatively little of his scholarly

energy to supporting his interpretation of the current world political
scene. Among the mcre important examples of scholarship responding
to current issues are M. McDoUGAL & N. SCHLEI, The Hydrogen Bomb
Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, STUDIES, supra note
3, 763-843; McDoUGAL, The Soviet Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense,
57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963); McDOUGAL & GOODMAN, Chinese Participation in the United Nations: The Legal Imperatives of a Negotiaated Solution, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 671 (1966); McDOUGAL, Foreward in

R. HULL & J. NOVOGRAD, LAW AND VIETNAM vii-ix (1968).
s In contrast to the static mood cf structure; of course, a total understanding

partakes of both moods, and McDougal's thinking is sensitive to this

necessity.
this sense, McDougal confronts directly the Kennan-MorgenthauAcheson critique of legalism in international relations. For a recent instance of where this critique has been carried particularly far, presenting
an extreme set-off against normative-prescriptive ways of approaching
international relations, see M. COPELAND, THE GAME OF NATIONS 19-26

9 In

(1969).
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oppression.' 0 A biographer trying to recreate the intellectual
roots of such a positive outcome could hardly do better than
fo explicate the life and work of Professor McDougal, whose
clarity of vision, seriousness of commitment, and extent of
impact towered so far above his contemporaries as to be virtually invisible. In this sense, of norm-oriented thinking about
the future, without succumbing to the easy diversion of utopianism, 1 McDougal is without peers.

10 If these dramatic aspirations are not substantially realized by the year

2010, then it is highly likely that processes of decay and distegration will
culminate in some planetary catastrophe of an irreversible character long
before that date. In THIS ENDANGERED PLANET (1971) I argue that future
world order depends on the directions of dominant consciousness that
come to prevail in the next few decades, and that the outcome will result
in either dramatic improvement or failure. The alternative lines of
positive and negative development are outlined in plausible sequence in
Chapter IX, 415-437.
11 Note, however, that the design of credible utopias, especially if accompanied by implementing strategies, is a highly creative and constructive
intellectual exercise.

IN COLLABORATION WITH McDOUGAL
HAROLD D. LASSWELL*

Professor McDougal and I have been able to work together
for over thirty years in what must establish a record of sorts
for an interdisciplinary team whose members are not shackled
together by the love, hate, and duty bonds of matrimony. Collaborating with McDougal has been one of the chief sources
of intellectual and personal gratification in my professional
life, and I welcome the occasion to comment briefly on some
factors that have made it possible.
The essential point is common purpose and shared expectation about what is to be done. The purpose is not, and has
never been, modest. The aim is to show how a comprehensive
approach to the role of knowledge in society generates a jurisprudence that furthers self-appraisal and innovation in systems
of public and civic order. Part of the strategy is to provide a
provisional statement of a jurisprudence adequate to the task,
to exemplify the approach in selected matters, and to assist
in the development of colleagues able to carry on the enterprise.
In one sense our first meeting was "accidental." McDougal
read a review of a new book of mine in The New York Times
and sought me out when he was a visiting professor in the law
school of the University of Chicago. In another and deeper
sense we were almost certain to meet since both of us were
involved with interdisciplinary colleagues in the small world
of elite universities. For instance, my first participation in an
interdisciplinary seminar at Yale was in the early thirties on
an occasion organized by former colleagues (Edward Sapin,
anthropologist and linguist; John Dollard, psychologist).
As always, timing is a key. We came together at a moment
when we were in search of complementary associates. In my
case the desire to work with a legal scholar was acute. Political scientists were not at home in the study of "authority."
They were, however, adept at the empirical study of the other
component of power, or "control." The conventional legal
scholars were no better; but their technical know-how was
indispensable.
McDougal had a doubly negative orientation: he was dissatisfied with traditional jurisprudence; he was disenchanted
with American legal realists. He at once perceived the possibilities of a comprehensive, affirmative and empirical method.
* Ford Foundation Professor of Law and Social Sciences, Yale Law School.
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I doubt that in the beginning my colleague was fully cognizant of the time commitments involved. Having watched the
rargely ineffectual struggle of several legal scholars to get
ahead with a similar job, I was prepared for at least a twenty
year delay before major results could appear. Whatever his
initial expectations may have been, McDougal was not one to
be turned aside by an obstacle course. If a mountain persisted
in standing in the way, McDougal took his intellectual bulldozer and knocked it down. His furious tenacity left the bones
of many "irresistible" objects strewn among the footnotes.
A key to our collaboration was procedural: the interplay
of outlines, working papers and nearly final drafts. Scholars
differ markedly from one another in working habits. McDougal
operates best with exhaustive outlines, critiques of working
papers, and final drafts. I am satisfied with less detailed outlines, and find the drafting of working papers a congenial
exercise. After vast preparation McDougal writes for the ages.
Long premonitory rumblings erupt in dazzling illumination and
Homeric rhetoric that flows, cools and shapes a novel landscape.
The besetting problem in a truly configurative approach is
to keep the entire map in sight. Traditional methods encourage
and reward neglect of context. Neophytes in the law are disciplined to inspect a presumptively authoritative text and to let
their fantasies roam in dreaming up all the "meanings" that
might be imputed to "it." They are encouraged to move from
one "it"-a written text-to another "it"-another text-and to
speculate on how hypothetical meanings can be harmonized,
polarized or pushed to one side. They are not invited to go
beyond the "it" to the "who" in the classical questions of communication analysis: "Who" says "what" in which "channel"
to "whom" with what "effect." When these questions are interpolated into the analysis of statutes, decisions, or opinions,
they emphasize the empirical problem of how "expectations"
are to be inferred. A path is cleared for mobilizing all the
instruments of modern social scientific research.
We have found ourselves continually impressed by the grip
of traditional modes of thought. For McDougal this has been
particularly vivid. His initial specialty was legal history, and
his grasp of the detail is more profound than his contemporaries. He experienced the questions facing a scholar who tries
to become aware of, and to shake himself loose from, the grip
of old-style indoctrination. Only such a scholar can understand
the formidable ramifications of a novel map, and hack an
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escape trail for others to follow. In one perspective much of
what had to be done seems obsessively trivial. And yet, unless
"trivia" are dealt with, the reinterpretation of "tradition" is
deferred another generation.
Much of the fun of collaborating with McDougal comes
from his refreshing sense of the ridiculous. When a line of
analysis or argument seems unpromising, his inner monitor
sounds an alarm. He has learned to recognize the symptoms
of confusion and knows how to relieve uncertainty with a wisecrack that opens cracks for wisdom.
Luckily our preferred frames of thought, though complementary, are not the same. McDougal loves verbal combat,
especially in the frame of a prescriptive system and an apellate court. So far as I am concerned, most combat is boring
and time-wasting. My preference is for inquiry into factual
causes and consequences. We are aware of these differences
and deliberately exploit the intellectual tensions that result.
In some collaborations the partners keep together by multiplying side-activities. They cultivate big game fishing, yachting, karate, or opera. McDougal and I have been so absorbed
in the central tasks that re-inforcements have been superfluous.
Our collaboration has required no care and feeding after hours.
How long will our collaboration last? As long as we do.

MYRES McDOUGAL
BRUNSON

MACCHESNEY

0

It is an honor and a privilege to participate in this welldeserved tribute to Professor Myres McDougal in connection
with the launching of the Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy. There could not be a more appropriate dedication.
This is not the occasion to attempt to analyze and appraise
the theories, policy preferences, and methodology of one of the
most influential international legal scholars of our time. Suffice
it to say that he and his able collaborators have developed, in
a notable series of books and collected essays, a comprehensive
framework for dealing seriously with the crucial issues of world
order. Within that comprehensive framework is to be found a
wealth of valuable information indicative of the immense
industry of Professor McDougal and his co-authors.
Professor McDougal's approach is interdisciplinary, drawing
valuable insights from all relevant sources of learning, especially the social sciences. Although McDougal has collaborated
with a number of distinguished scholars, it is noteworthy that
the same approach is to be found in each work. There.can be no
question of the decisive impact of these works on the thought
of his time. All of us have been enriched and stimulated by
them.
Not having been one of his students, my knowledge of his
skills as a classroom teacher is necessarily second hand. But
the many devoted former students who are now making outstanding contributions of their own are eloquent testimony to
his effectiveness and widespread influence. I have, however,
had the opportunity to observe over many years the time,
attention, and interest he has taken in his graduate students,
who have similarly, through his help and counsel, taken their
place in the company of international lawyers. Finally, somewhat by chance, I learned the hard way of his "comprehensive"
approach to class assignments. In the summer of 1955, when
circumstances beyond his control prevented him from teaching
a course in international law at the University of Chicago, Dean
Levi persuaded me to take over Myres' course on 24 hours
notice. I found, to my consternation, that he had already assigned the first 200 pages for the first day! Needless to say, I
soon managed to adopt a less "comprehensive" approach!
* Edna B. and Ednyfed H. Williams Memorial Professor of Law, North-

western University School of Law.
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Nor should his contributions to professional meetings be
overlooked. Over the years, he has consistently enlivened the
discussions at every meeting which he attended. When there
appeared to be a lull, Myres would intervene with his characteristic vigor, usually commencing by characterizing what had
previously been said as "unorganized nonsense." He would
then proceed to redefine the problem within his own methodology and provide a "proper" answer. His interventions were
invariably provocative and stimulating and although, at first
blush, might seem somewhat overwhelming and intimidating,
were always offered in a friendly spirit and with good humor.
Last but by no means least is his capacity for friendship.
His warmth and kindness have won him a host of friends. He
once recounted the saying that if you had a Bulgarian as a
friend, you didn't need any enemies. To turn the saying around
somewhat, if one has Myres as a friend, one learns what friendship can mean.
In closing, may I say that it has been a rare privilege to
claim Myres as a friend, and it is a great pleasure to acknowledge my gratitude and express my admiration and affection
for him as a scholar and as a man.

MYRES McDOUGAL

-

AN APPRECIATION

OSCAR SCHACHTER*

What a happy thought - though not at all surprising
for a new student journal of international law to dedicate its
inaugural issue to Professor Myres McDougal. As one who has
benefited immensely from an intellectual and personal association of long standing with Professor McDougal, I am delighted
to find new evidence of the esteem in which he is held and,
especially, of the influence of his ideas on students interested
in international law.
These ideas are not easy to sum up in a few words - they
are, as befits the subjects, complex, subtle and wide-ranging.
They incorporate concepts and insights from many disciplines
and they demand close and serious study. But one need not
master the complexities to appreciate the grand scale of McDougal's and Lasswell's intellectual conception of international
law as a powerful and realistic instrument for human betterment and to realize why it has stimulated so many international lawyers, of varying background and outlook, to break
new ground in their approach to the concrete subjects of the
profession.
It has been remarked by Kierkegaard that builders of great
systems are like men who erect a great castle and live in a
small hut next door. But one cannot think of McDougal as
living in a small hut. On the contrary, he has occupied the
great castle, rallying to his cause those who share his profound
moral concerns and his belief in rational disciplined inquiry.
He has invited intellectual battle by vigorously assaulting rival
theories and by puncturing the platitudes and undermining the
assumptions of established doctrine. His scorn has been meted
out equally to the learned technicians who lose sight of important goals and to the idealists who remain on the level of
generality and pious hopes.
Appealing as this may seem, it cannot be said that his
cause has swept all before it. There are more than a few both in and outside the profession - who regard his central
conception of a "policy oriented" international law as profoundly
mistaken, indeed as 'vain' and 'arrogant'. In their view, neither
the qualifications of the lawyer nor the structure of international society warrant placing the jurist in a significant and
explicit political role. They fear that by stepping outside of a
rule-oriented approach and the sanctioned sources of interna*Deputy Director United Nations Institute for Training and Research.
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tional law, the way is opened for arbitrary or partisan decisions
which express the preferences of the decision-maker rather
than the policy of the revelant community.
What is most persuasive in McDougal's response to the
criticism is his impressive unmasking of the pretensions of traditional rule-oriented analysis as objective and value-free. His
voluminous works demonstrate with characteristic vigor and
abundant examples the extent to which the jurist in one capacity or another, faces inescapable choices involving alternative
'policy' preferences. To purport to resolve such issues on the
basis of semantic analysis or historical precedent is a snare and
a delusion. It obscures and often confuses the questions of
central concern and it permits arbitrary or subjective preferences to be presented as mandatory objective conclusions. That
this may serve, in some measure, professional interests or sustain authority is acknowledged by McDougal but he regards
such pseudo-objectivity as transparently misleading and, more
important, as obfuscating the process of rational inquiry that
should be the essential feature of international decision-making.
The more difficult and challenging task faced by McDougal
is to demonstrate in a positive way that the jurist can resolve
conflicts of interest and ideology on the basis of manifest
"policy" of the community grounded in the expectations and
common interests of all of the relevant participants. McDougal
is of course aware of the complexity of this task. He knows, as
Lasswell has put it, that one cannot assume that universalized
rhetoric means universalized conduct or expectations. To determine international policy in the face of conflicting demands
and ideologies, one needs to look beyond and beneath the generalities of international rhetoric and the self-serving declarations of national states. Easy formulas are not available but
McDougal and Lasswell have done much to show that the process of ascertaining common interests and policy can be pursued
realistically through systematic examination of goals, conditions,
strategies and consequences. Their massive studies on the oceans,
outer space, the use of force, and others show how this might
be done. Whether or not one is persuaded by their conclusions
in particular cases, the significant aspect is the method of disciplined inquiry and explicit rationality for reaching conclusions.
As one who has in his professional life as an international
official been especially sensitive to the dangers of partisan positions being presented as legally objective conclusions, I can
warmly applaud the effort to eliminate a covert subjectivism
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and to develop a disciplined approach to ascertaining as objectively as possible the priorities and policies of the community
of states. The fact that this may not always be possible to do
is not a sufficient reason to abandon the effort and resort to
hocus-pocus of verbal incantation.
One of the liberating and exhilarating features of the McDougal-Lasswell approach has been the systematic way in
which it has related law, social phenomena and basic values.
It has moved international law away (on the one side) from
verbal dialectic, and (on the other) from the 'ad hoc' case by
case approach which passes for pragmatism. It is an approach
which requires relating events to their causes and consequences, the particular case to the general goal, the part to the
whole, the rule to its function, the whole process to the basic
purposes and values of mankind. This is in sharp contrast to
the thinness of legal positivism with its essentially 'status quo'
orientation. The McDougal approach enables one to see international legal processes among the major instruments of change,
even of fundamental change, and to employ law purposively
and rationally to eliminate the constricting effects of a narrow
parochialism in the interests of a more just and decent world
order.
This, stated far too briefly and crudely, is what I find in
the contribution of Myres McDougal and it suggests why I
regard him as a towering and inspirational figure in international law. The editors of The Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy have every reason to congratulate themselves
on their selection.

MYRES McDOUGAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
EGON SCHWELB*

On an occasion like the present, when an outstanding
member of the profession of international law is honored by the
dedication of the first issue of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, it is, perhaps, permitted to introduce
one's contribution by a personal note.
One evening in the late forties, my wife and I were traveling by train from London to a beautiful suburb in Hertfordshire to have dinner with a well-known London teacher of
international law. Although the Second World War was already over, something akin to a blackout was still a feature
of British trains. A gentleman entered our compartment and
when we had adjusted to the prevailing darkness we could
perceive that the newcomer was a round-faced, youngish,
friendly-looking American. We started to talk and found that
we were traveling to the same destination. I was then working
and have continued to work in the field of the international
protection of human rights. When I learned that our fellow
traveler was Professor McDougal, I was particularly thrilled
and delighted, as he had just published what was then one of
the most outstanding pieces of writing in my field, the essay,
The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional
Illusions Versus Rational Action.'
The chance meeting in a dark railroad compartment was
the beginning of a binding friendship with McDougal which I
treasure highly and from which I have derived inspiration and
encouragement through all these years.
To a superficial observer who is inclined to overestimate
geographical factors in the development of a person's social,
political and philosophical views, it might be a surprise to
learn that a man who is among the country's greatest scholarly champions of human rights and human dignity was born
in Burtons, Mississippi and grew up in a small farming town,
Booneville, Mississippi. He started his academic career by working as an instructor in Greek at the University of Mississippi
during his college years and during part of the time he studied
for his Master's degree and for his LL.B. at the same Univer*
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sity. From 1927 to 1930 he was a Rhodes scholar at the University of Oxford. This event was an important one in his
intellectual life. He studied in Oxford under the great historian of English law, Sir William Holdsworth, who is on
record as having stated that Myres McDougal had been his
best student. McDouga] was greatly influenced by the then
Oxford professor of International Law, Brierly, and, later at
Yale, by Professor Wesley Sturges.
From 1931 to 1934 McDougal was Assistant Professor of
Law at the University of Illinois. Since 1934, he has been on
the faculty of the Yale Law School; being named Sterling
Professor of Law in 1958. He has also taught as a visiting professor in many parts of the world.
During World War II he served as assistant general counsel
of the Lend Lease Administration and as general counsel of
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations of the
Department of State. The profession has conferred high honors
on him, such as the presidency of the American Society of International Law (1958), and the presidency of the Association
of American Law Schools (1966).
In his early career McDougal addressed his scholarship
and teaching to municipal law, particularly the law of property; later he became one of the leading scholars in the field
of international law. He and Harold D. Lasswell co-founded
the New Haven school, a group which adheres to a "policy
oriented jurisprudence, postulating as its overriding goal the
dignity of man in an increasingly universal public order."
In the present note, I do not propose to deal with the
whole system of world public order as propounded by McDougal, but to mention only that part of his work which is
devoted directly to the question of human rights. I have
already referred to the essay, The Rights of Man in the World
Community.2 McDougal and the co-author, Gertrude C. K.
Leighton, were among the first scholars to investigate, contemporarily with Lauterpacht's writings on the subject, the potential of the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter. They assembled the arguments for more vigorous participating and leadership by the United States in the human
rights program of the United Nations. In a period which was
to become characterized by the move for the Bricker amendments to the United States Constitution, McDougal and Leighton demolished the arguments presented by spokesmen for the
2
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American Bar Association against the United States becoming
a party to international human rights instruments. Theirs was
both a work of brilliant scholarship and a call to arms. Well
documented and argued pleas by McDougal for "an international law of human dignity" became a substantial part of his
comprehensive writings in the fifties and sixties. Recently,
McDougal, Lasswell and Lung-chu-Chen prepared "a framework
for policy-oriented inquiry" on the subject of human rights
and world public order. I have no doubt that the "framework"
will be filled in the near future, and a great standard work
will be placed at the disposal of the profession of international
law.
The profession's best wishes to Myres S. McDougal, personally and for his future work, are more than justified.
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RESPONSES TO CRIMES OF DISCRIMINATION
AND GENOCIDE: AN APPRAISAL OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
W. M. REISMAN*

It is only in the most astigmatic of definitions that international law is considered as the law between states.' Viewed
comprehensively and realistically it is the process of authoritative decision for events which transcend discrete groups,
involving the intense interaction of members of more than one
of them. 2 These transgroup events may entail the deprivations
which the municipal lawyer would characterize as criminal
delicts were they to occur within the group parameters to which
he has been conditioned. If the disengaged observer is inclined
to use the conventional characterizations of criminal law, he
might well label these events as intergroup or international
crimes insofar as their commission threatened either the continuing minimum value interchange between the groups or
contravened common or coordinated policies of the groups
concerned.
From the observer's perspective, a basic indicator of transgroup integration would be the extent to which members of
different groups (1) concur over time in the characterization of certain intergroup or intragroup deprivations as crimes;
* Associate Professor, Yale Law School. Drafts of this article were read
critically by Professor Myres S. McDougal, and Dr. Lung-chu Chen of the
Yale Law School, by Dr. Egon Schwelb of the United Nations Secretariat
and by Professor Michael Libonati of the University of Alabama School
of Law. A number of their suggestions have been incorporated, but they
share no responsibility for the views put forward here. Copyright is
retained by the author.
1 For a general survey of views, see H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 93-98

(2d ed. 1952). Some quasi-official movement away from the classical definition is found in 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1

(1963).
2 For an initial systematic investigation of the rich range of participants in
international decision, see McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman, The World
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 263-67
(1967). To my knowledge no comparable model has been developed in

regard to the international criminal process, in particular, the role of
transnational gangs remains comparatively unexamined.
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and (2) share an intensity of demand for the imposition of
ganctions beyond the mere characterizatioh of these events
as criminal. If these patterns of concurrence were arranged on
a world map, they would delineate many interlocking communities in dimensional schemes considerably more complex than
the conventional political boundaries by which the globe is believed to be divided. Indeed, the premises of political boundaries
3
would be thrown into doubt by such an exercise.
Consider three wholly mundane examples of events: in
the southern Sudan, on the south side of Chicago and in the
City, in London. In the Sudan, a Nuer youth steals two cows
from a Dinka tribesman. Although the Nilotic political cultures
of Dinka and Nuer both have detailed notions of crime, 4 neither
would characterize this event as criminal. It is more an act of
"war" or intergroup conflict, i.e., an unexceptional event in a
relation of continuing but limited hostility, for which certain
traditional strategies are customarily employed. 5 Yet the same
3
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4 For a brief treatment, see E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, THE NUER 162-72 (1940).
Cross cultural comparisons through space and through time require, of
course, a search not for analogies but for functional and contextual
equivalents. A primitive treatment of crime often emphasizes compensation rather than punitive components; in western civilization the priorities are reversed, implying, as it were, that it is not the victim who has
suffered but rather the "community" or its abstract set of principles. In
this respect, Malinowski is more than vindicated; primitive society is far
more "individualistic" than is the soi disant "developed" political culture
of the West: B. MAL1NOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 28-

32, 39-62 (1926). Malinowski did not direct his attention to the origins of
this difference. In some cases, it seems to have derived from a pattern of
elite exploitation; by identifying the community as the major "victim"
in cases of delict, specific elites as representatives of the community
accepted compensation on behalf of the collectivity. There may also be
psychosocial causes; see generally S. RANULF, MORAL INDIGNATION AND
MIDDLE CLASS PSYCHOLOGY (1964).

5 "The Dinka people are the immemorial enemies of the Nuer.... Almost
always the Nuer have been the aggressors, and raiding of the Dinka is
conceived by them to be a normal state of affairs and a duty, for they
have a myth, like that of Esau and Jacob, which explains and justifies it."
E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 5, at 125. Intergroup conflict may often
be an accepted feature of life, supported rather than condemned by group
norms. Anthropological literature is rich in documenting this phenomenon.
But one need go no further than any contemporary pluralistic community
to perceive the often bizarre coexistence of doctrines of "peace" and
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event occurring between only Nuer (or only Dinka) would
be characterized as the crime of theft for which specific customary sanctions would be invoked.
If, however, a northern, let us say Moslem, Sudanese, an
official of the government in Khartoum who was charged with
the administration of a region in which both Dinka and Nuer
live, were informed of the event, he would characterize it as
a "crime" and invoke the criminal process to which he has
been conditioned. A police or para-military force would return
the cows to the Dinka herdsman and the Nuer youth would
be tried and perhaps imprisoned for a period of time. The
Khartoum officials who are responsible for imposing this heteronomic criminal code on the customary conflict between
Dinka and Nuer are well aware of the fact that neither of the
Nilotic subgroups views the incident as "criminal." The goal
of the Khartoum official is to create a new, integrated pattern
in which, in this case, respect for property will be transtribal
as well as intratribal. It is highly probable that the strategy of
trial and imprisonment of offenders will not succeedY
The theft of a bicycle by an Irish youth from an Italian
youth, or by a black youth from a white youth on the South
side of Chicago, may occasion identical official responses, even
though the taker and the victim may not be viewing the events
doctrines of tolerable and limited conflict with members of other groups.
Because each community is itself heterogeneous, such conflict may continue even when it engenders net losses because the palpable losses fall
only on certain members of the community. Where, for example, intergroup conflict is an avenue through which poor but enterprising youths
may acquire property, wives, or prestige and power within the tribe,
they may insist on the continuation of group conflict, even though older,
enfranchised tribal members who will be the targets of inevitable reprisals
stand to lose in continuing conflict. The point is discussed in detail in J.
EWERS, THE BLACKFEET, ch. 7 (1958). Specialists in violence have a similar
interest in the continuation of those conditions which make their skills
indispensable to the group which they serve or wish to serve. Examples
such as these emphasize that group conflict is often an integral cultural
trait and that the limitation or eradication of group strife will require
radical social changes in many cultural sectors.
6A comparable phenomenon is found in white gangs. See Mueller, White
Gangs in MODERN CRIMINALS 45, 60-62 (J. D. SHORT ed. 1970). See also
D. MAURER, WHIZ MOB: A CORRELATION OF THE TECHNICAL ARGOT OF
PICKPOCKETS WITH THEIR BEHAVIOR PATTERN 9-18 (1964). Maurer's observations relate to professional criminals whose subculture perspective holds
imprisonment as an occupational hazard rather than as the imposed
shame which the dominant culture would like to see it viewed. These
observations apply a fortiori to members of different groups which view
themselves as discrete and either coarchical or superarchical with other
groups; whereas these groups share few or no perspectives with adversary or victim groups, the professional criminal's self-perception is, as
Maurer notes, more complex. He shares perspectives with the "suckers"
and in certain circumstances or on certain levels of consciousness may
identify or wish to be identified with them. The point to be emphasized
is that the dominant culture which applies a range of criminal sanctions
invariably views the projected effects of these sanctions as if they were
applied to individuals who share their own perspectives.
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as "crimes." In the American context, as in the African context,
there is evidence suggesting that the strategy of the criminal
sanction may not succeed in expanding the identifications of
the parties and integrating the contending groups to which
they belong. 7 In certain circumstances the application of sanctions may have important if not primary functions as catharsis
for the sanctioning group itself; it may vindicate the appropriateness of the exercise of authority by that specific exercise of
authority itself.
A third example involves embezzlement by an English executive who thereafter flees to the United States. The peculation
took place entirely in England, the company whose funds were
taken was entirely English owned, and it was, in turn, insured
entirely by an English company. It is obvious that American
authorities will aid in the ensuing apprehension and request for
extradition of the embezzler. The wholly expected patterns of
de facto cooperation and de jure extradition indicate an
intensely shared demand by the governmental elites of both
the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the public
protection of certain types of property and preferred practices
as well as an intense concurrence in the characterization of deviations from those demanded standards as "crimes"." In terms
of the multidimensional world criminal law map, there may be a
much more intense and effective community between certain
socio-economic and even ethnic strata in the United States and
the United Kingdom than there is between different socioeconomic strata in a single sector of Chicago.
These examples point up a number of features. First, some,
and in certain circumstances, much of what is conventionally
called criminal behavior is simply intergroup conflict in an
arena which an ascendant group wishes to view as homogenous.
Second, calling such behavior "crime" may reinforce the exclusivist and parochial tendencies in each group; these tenden7 It has been asserted that the inhabitants of America's penal systems do

not view themselves as convicts,
CLEAVER, SOUL ON

ICE

but rather as prisoners of war. E.

58 (1968). Insofar as this is true, application of

the penal sanction will reinforce rather than weaken the sense of disidentification. Other integrative sanction programs should be formulated.
It is probable that Cleaver's statement describes only one identificatory
trend; coexisting with it may be tendencies of identification of varying
intensity, with groups in the dominant culture and consequent autopunitive responses within the personality system. The plurality of tendencies takes different forms according to circumstance, and suggests
different techniques for personality change. We are not, it should be
emphasized, addressing ourselves here to the question of whether and
toward what value set personalities should be formed or changed.
s The point is discussed and illustrated in Nayak, Act of State: Exclusion
of Penal and Revenue Law, 1967 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale
Law School).
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cies themselves may be the substratum of intergroup conflict.
Third, applying the conventional criminal sanctions to such behavior may further reinforce it.
One challenge to the policy-oriented lawyer is the identification of those areas which should be viewed as intergroup
crimes and the formulation of community responses which integrate rather than separate groups and individuals. 9 The
integration of individuals and of groups requires a minimum
concurrence in the characterization of "criminal behavior."
Indeed one uses the incipient sanction of characterizing as
"crime" in order to achieve some degree of social integration.
(As has been pointed out, the result is often dysfunctional.)
This minimum must include a toleration of the right of existence of the other group and its members. Where this minimum
is promulgated in some authoritative form, we encounter the
authoritative characterization of crimes of genocide and discrimination. Insofar as policy calls for a continuing balance
between integration and the maintenance of discrete group identity, "peace," between groups and between individuals of different groups becomes a process of controlled tension. 10
Training individuals to live in such a system of peace requires that they be equipped with the capacity to identify and
recognize this tension in themselves and others without diminishing their own personality systems. It is the sense of self of
the individual personality in such a system which is the potential core of group discrimination and genocide. There are numerous examples of international prescriptions-customary and
conventional-which insist upon the self-policing of precisely
this sort of tension. The demands for minimum standards of
humanity during warfare, for example, obviously increase the
physical risks of belligerents;" nonetheless, they are peremptory
norms in international law.
9

See, in this regard H. SILVING, CONSTITUENT ELMENTS OF CRIME 29-31
(1967).
10 As long as intergroup peace remains a verbal quest undertaken sporadically for symbolic purposes it can, without harm or benefit, continue to
be treated as a fantasy unpoliced by reality. For those, however, who are
deeply concerned with minimizing intergroup conflict, it is urgent that
the implications of peace be clearly understood. Intergroup peace is not
a static situation which, once achieved, continues ad infinitum. It is a
process which is sustained by human beings regularly making policy
choices. And it is a process which may well involve enormous tensions.
The psycho-personal implications of peace were probably never more
pithily stated than in the 15th century Gayaneshagowa or Great Law of

the Iroquois Confederacy. It admonished its officers to develop a skin
"seven spans thick" so that they could withstand criticism and control
anger. Cited in F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 222 (1960).
11 A discussion of this aspect of the laws of war is found in M. McDOUGAL
& F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 521-30 (1961).
See also M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 313-16 (1959).
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RESPONSE

TO UNDESIRABLE BEHAVIOR

There is a broad spectrum of techniques by which organized groups characterize and respond to patterns of behavior
deemed incompatible with social life. The spectrum runs from
mild civic order sanctions, such as social disapprobation of
''manners" or "etiquette," to intense public order sanctions
of behavior characterized as criminal.' 2 Many factors enter into
the choice of the characterization of undesired behavior, for
characterization depends not only on the degree of damage
which the undesired behavior causes the community, but also
on the extent to which the type of characterization chosen itself
contributes to deterrence and even rehabilitation.
On the symbolic level, the characterization "crime" should
convey maximum deterrence. Hence it is no surprise that the
word "crime" is reserved for that pattern of behavior which is
considered either the greatest challenge to elite objectives or
most deleterious to group life. Characterizations also depend
upon the extent of organized power for dealing with certain
behavior patterns. The characterization "crime" implies a public
power to deal with it. Where the characterization is made
without a power buttress, the potential deterrent power of the
symbol is depreciated.' 3 This is not the place to trace the intricate interchanges between symbols and the material bases of
effective power. It will suffice to note that there is such an
interchange and that, when exploited with a full appreciation
of the context, effective power is economically augmented. The
point to emphasize is that characterization is itself a potentially
effective technique for the control of deviant behavior. Characterizations involve and commit power. If applied with contextual accuracy, they increase community power; if applied
poorly, they expend it.
Because of the emotive power of symbols, there is always
a tendency to use words such as "crime" as a rhetorical device
in private and quasi-official political discourse. But since 1945,
there has been increasing international official resort to the
strategy of characterizing certain types of transnational behavior as criminal. In particular, the word is now used officially
12 See generally H. LASSWELL & R. ARENS, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER
(1961); W. M. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT
13

OF INTERNATIONAL

JUDGMENTS

AND

[hereinafter cited as NULLITY AND REVISION].
NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 12, at 637.

AWARDS

252-58 (1971)
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in regard to aggression 4 and to human rights matters. 5 This
trend seems to be caused both by a "spill-over" from national
communities as well as by certain dynamics in transnational
interaction. The student of international law is almost constantly confronted with a spill-over phenomenon: implicit political models which are normally associated with a national community are gradually projected onto the international plane as
the norm toward which international law is expected to strive.
Popular thinking tends to be analogical rather than functional
and contextual; as one's attention span broadens, it seems almost
natural to project what has worked in the past into new and as
Articles 227 and 228 of the Versailles Treaty provided for the trial of the
Kaiser but were not implemented. The Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal Article 6 (a) included crimes against the peace-"[T]he planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties..."; "Agreement by the Government of the
United States of America. the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis" 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 222, 224 (1945). These were,
of course, implemented. In 1947, the General Assembly referred codification of the Nuremberg principles to the International Law Commission:
Res. 177 (II). The result, a Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, is at Ch. IV, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 10-14, U.N.
Doc. A/1858 (1951). Some critics have argued that this innovation in
international law was frustrated by the cold war, in that all sides regularly accused each other of crimes against the peace. In fact, the intensity
and frequency of the invocation of these symbols may well indicate how
deeply they have struck roots in the vocabulary of contemporary politics.
On the other hand, this development may be dysfunctional in a number
of contexts. It was promulgated on the assumption that there was
sufficient global integration to support a universal characterization of a
crime and that deviations would be rare enough to reinforce this conviction. In fact, group conflict, as will be seen, continues and is often facilitated by a variety of cultural processes. Where war is regularly characterized as a moral and legal defection, it is harder to secure accommodations and integrative solutions between belligerents.
15 The third substantive ground of jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Charter
concerned "Crimes against Humanity." They were "... [M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions
on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated." 13
DEP'T STATE BULL. 224 (1945). See generally, Schwelb, Crimes Against
Humanity, 23 BRrr. Y. B. INT'L. L. 178, 212 (1946). The prescription was
reconfirmed in Article I of the Genocide Convention: "[G]enocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish"; The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Art.
3(1) U.N. GAOR 21 Sept. 12-Dec. 1948, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
This provision may, I believe, be considered universal customary international law, because of the General Assembly's Resolution 96 (I) of
December 11, 1946; YEARBOOK OF THE U.N., 1946-47, at 255. In the discussions of the International Law Commission regarding jus cogens, Dr.
14

Shabtai Rosenne argued that the crime of genocide had been rendered an

international jus cogens in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention
Opinion of the International Court, 1963 I.C.C. Yearbook (I) 74, cited in
Schwelb, Some Aspects of Internaional Jus Cogens as formulated by
the International Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 954-55.

36

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 1

yet unexplored sectors of experience. Hence a spill-over of
domestic patterns into international law.
A.

Historical Perspective on the Concept of Human Dignity

There have been periods of human history in which the
dignity of the individual was a fundamental cultural postulate,"i
but it was not until the Enlightenment that the essentially
Renaissance formulations of the inherent dignity of all human
beings became firmly embedded in legitimate social and political myth.1 7 Thereafter, whatever content an internal public
order system might actually have, the symbols of human dignity
were a sine qua non of ruling elites. There is, little incongruity
in the fact that the despotism fashioned by Bismarck boasted
of the most advanced social welfare program of its times. He,
as one of the shrewdest elite figures of Europe, clearly perceived that power was most effective in a satisfied polity in
which all component members were committed to the order.
But the spill-over of bourgeois demands for human dignity
into international law was retarded by a number of factors.
Foremost, of course, was the continuing parochialism of European myth systems. The relatively low level of interaction with
the non-Western world encouraged the European to think of
civilization in terms of white Christendom. This was a pervasive aspect of European order and even Marx and Engels,
while attacking colonial capitalism, revealed the strong imprint
of racial and ethnic bias characteristic of the world in which
they lived.
A second contributing factor was the economics of colonialism. Europe was rapidly transforming itself into bourgeois
nation-states, in which the middle classes believed themselves
to be the primary beneficiaries of a colonial trade monopoly
and of the now enhanced opportunities to acquire elite privileges through the colonial bureaucracies. The prospects of great
economic and social gains which they entertained tended to
retard their consideration of non-Europeans in terms of human
dignity.
A third retarding factor was the continuing notion of the
separation of foreign and domestic policy. While a specific issue
16

See for example, W. WAGAR, THE CITY OF MAN (1940) for a survey of
visions of a world culture. See also McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman,
Theories about International Lau), 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188, 215 (1968).

17

See H. C.

BAKER, THE IMAGE OF MAN:

A

STUDY OF THE IDEA OF HUMAN

DIGNITY IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY, THE MIDDLE AGES, AND THE RENAISSANCE
(1947); E. KAHLER, MAN, THE MEASURE (1943).
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might become a transient cause c0l6bre, the burghers of Western Europe were content, for the most part, to view foreign
affairs and the prescription and application of international law
as a relatively aristocratic game in which they had no interest.
With foreign affairs powers in the hands of an elite and midelite group which rather disdained the bourgeois democracy
of its own polity, it was not surprising that anachronistic notions
of sovereignty and absolute domestic jurisdiction continued.
Of striking significance, however, is the fact that the practioners of realpolitik so frequently appreciated the relation of
peace and human rights. The Peace of Westphalia and the
numerous humanitarian interventions of the 19th century were
based on the premise that in many circumstances, stability
could only be purchased by international guarantees of human
rights. The leading example of this recurring phenomenon was
the collective intervention in Greece resulting in the formation
of an independent Greek state.ls
The breakdown of this old order, insulating international
affairs and domestic jurisdiction, was hastened by a number
of factors. One of the more dramatic and prominent was the
emergence of the "Peace Movement." In the latter half of the
19th century, a variety of pacifistic pressure groups in Europe
and the United States began agitating for a more stable system
of international peace. Motivated in part by high ideals and in
part by a crisis mentality, these groups, directing pressure at
their respective governments, demanded international prescriptions in favor of peace and human rights. 9 A further impetus
was provided by the entrance of the United States, from its
relative hemispheric isolation, into the arena of world affairs.
American political myth had been strongly characterized by
notions of human dignity and individual liberty and these symbols were forged into American foreign policy. The idiosyncratically American rhetoric of Root, Bryan and Wilson became
common parlance in international law.
The increase of economic interdependence hastened the
process. As economic colonialism ceased to pay, its committed
as well as tacit supporters began to reconsider the entire phet8 The documents of this intervention are found in 14 BRITISH AND FOREIGN
STATE PAPERS 633 (1826-27). For a detailed study of this and other 19th
century interventions, see M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF Hu-

MAN RIGHTS (1962). A survey of 20th century interventions is found in
Reisman, Memorandum upon Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the
Ibos (1968).

19 Historical studies of the peace movement may be found in C. DAVIS, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE (1962), and D.
FLEMING, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT, 1920-1966 (rev. 1968).
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nomenon.2 0 Western trade union movements began to appreiate that low pay and low workers' standards in other countries could drag their own hard-earned standards down. Entrepreneurial groups understood the implications of sharp competition precipitated by radically uneven commercial environments.
Finally, the Russian Revolution, itself a result of and a further
impetus to this process, challenged the old order by promising
"the workers of the world" the dignity which the oppressed
sought and which, Lenin alleged, they could never receive in a
liberal democracy. The Russian challenge, in turn, impelled the
democracies of the West to hasten to the position towards which
they had slowly been moving.
The convergence of these many factors after the First World
War contributed to the creation of the League of Nations and
the formulation of policies supporting minority rights.2 1 The
League spanned a twilight period, in which notions of state
sovereignty were still forwarded, but in which increasing demand was made in the name of international protection of
human rights. The League was particularly active in attempting to control slavery, prostitution, and drugs, and the International Labor Organization laid the groundwork of a process
22
for policing international standards for labor.
The multivalue deprivatory conditions which spawned the
bizarre political creations leading to the Second World War
were the ultimate demonstration of the nexus between peace
and an international system of human rights. In response, the
United Nations Charter, in its Preamble, stated with clarity
the interdependence of peace and human rights2 3 and imposed
obligations upon all member-states to act jointly and severally
20 The illusory economic benefits of colcnialism to the metropolitan power
were emphasized, of course, long before the 20th century. In 1793, for
example, Jeremy Bentham in his address to the National Convention of
France said "Emancipate your Colonies... because you get nothing by
governing them, because you cannot keep them, because the expense
of trying to keep them would be ruinous...." 4 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 417 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). The major contemporary impetus came
from such works as N. ANGELL, THE GREAT ILLUSION (1908).
21 See generally, J. STONE, INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF MINORITY RIGHTS:
PROCEDURE OF THE COUNCIL

OF THE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN

THEORY AND

PRACTICE (1932); Feinberg, La Jurisdictionet la jurisprudence de la cour

permanente de justice en matiere de mandat et de minorities, 59 R.A.D.I.
587 (1931); J. Robinson et al, WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE?
(1943).
22

E.

HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE (1964); E. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS OF ILO EXPERIENCE

(1966).

23 Thus, the first preambular paragraph states a determination "[T]o save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . ." and then follows
with the determination "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small .... "
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to achieve realization of those rights as integral to the common
pursuit of minimum world order.2 4 The point was made again
in the Preamble to the Univrsal Declaration of Human Rights2 5
and is implicit in the Genocide Convention. Nor is the "domestic jurisdiction" clause of the Charter a bar preventing the
26
Organization from effecting its mandate in human rights,
for the Charter conception is premised on a link between peace
and minimum security and human rights. A persistent deprivation of human rights is a threat to the peace and hence a matter
2 7
of international concern transcending domestic jurisdiction.
Thus, in the Rhodesian case, the Security Council specified the
nexus between the violation of minimum human rights and
28
a threat to the peace.
Nexus Between Human Rights and Peace
There is, then, a profound logic in the prominence which
has been given to the international protection of human rights
in the contemporary international organizational structure. The
United Nations is primarily a security organization, committed
to maintaining minimum world public order. But the maintenance of order in an economic and sustained manner is not a
police operation; it involves rather the structuring of a system
of public order which promises its individual citizens the protection and development of their most intense personal demands
and, as a result, arouses a spontaneous loyalty. A civilized
community maintains itself by the commitment of its citizens to
it, and not by policing and terror and, as we shall see, the
promise of basic human rights is crucial to the security of any
pluralistic community.
B.

Early commentators of the Charter criticized that
ment as a confusing hybrid, which indiscriminately
essential security matters with provisions guaranteeing
and economic and social rights. They were in error.
24
25

2

instrumixed
human
Peace,

See U.N.

CHARTER arts. 55 and 56.
The first preambular paragraph cf the Universal Declaration (General
Assembly Resolution 217A (III), December 10, 1948) provides that "...
[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
; YEARBOOK OF THE U.N., 1948-49, at
justice and peace in the world.
535.

6 U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
27 Thus, the late Judge Lauterpacht:

[H]uman rights and freedoms
"...
having become the subject of a solemn international obligation and of
one of the fundamental purposes of the Charter, are no longer a matter
which is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Members of

the United Nations ....

." H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 178 (1950); see also footnote 33 infra.
28

LAW AND

Security Council Resolution 217 (1965), Nov. 20, 1965: Resolutions and
Decisions of the Security Council, 20 U.N. SCOR, 1265th meeting 8 (1965).
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in the sense of continuing expectations shared by all peoples
that public order will be maintained by noncoercive means and
that the structures of public order will be responsive to the
legitimate demands of human beings, necessarily rests on a
coordinate expectation: that public order structures seek the
inherent worth and dignity of all men and are animated to
secure the realization of these values. The conditions of peace
require a lofty conception of civilized comportment. This comportment can be forthcoming only if the processes to which
individuals are asked to commit themselves are unequivocally
devoted to a comparably high conception of humanity. Human
rights are the necessary condition of peace.
There is an equally profound if considerably more subtle
nexus between human rights deprivations and international
crimes: delicta juris gentium. The conception of "crimes against
humanity" as international crimes, established by the framers
of the London Charter, 29 was more logical than the framers
themselves may have realized. In any group, elites will characterize certain types of behavior as delictual or criminal and,
hence, subject to community supervision or sanctipn, insofar
as they believe that such characterizations maximize their own
aims. Many such characterizations may have some coherence
and logic in terms of the cultural calculus of that system. But
objectively, the only characterizations of crime which are
rational are those which do, in fact, sustain order and improve
group life.30 Because of the inseverable link between the establishment of human rights and the maintenance of minimum
world order, it is now much more urgent to characterize human
rights deprivations as international crimes than, for example,
piracy as a delictum juris gentium.
C.

Racial Discriminationand Genocide
The first human rights declaration after the framing of the
Charter was the General Assembly's Resolution 96(I) of 194631
on genocide. The resolution was stimulated by the Nazi holocaust; significantly it was the recrudescense of antisemitism in
the winter of 1959 in Europe and especially Latin America which
moved the General Assembly to an urgent consideration of the
international prevention of racial discrimination. The Genocide
Resolution is of crucial importance to an understanding of the
The Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Article 6(c), 13 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 224 (1945). For historical parallels see 1 DROST, THE CRIME OF
STATE 223 (1959).
30 H. SILVING, supra note 3, at 6.
31 G.A. Res. 96, YEARBOOK OF THE U.N., 1946-47 at 255 (1947).
29

RESPONSES TO CRIMES

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, for genocide is not only the ultimate denial of human
rights, it is, in the deepest sense, the logical outcome of discrimination. As such the United Nations' authoritative condemnation of genocide forms the subliminal basis and essential
authority for the Convention on Discrimination. The 1946 Resolution stated in part that
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of the right of existence
shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to
humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law
and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. . . . The punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of international

concern.

32

Genocide does not just happen. It is the destructive outcome of a process which may have begun in seemingly innocent and mundane attitudes and behavior. Part of it is normal
personality development in which the individual ego distinguishes itself from the "other." This process is facilitated by
ritualized community indications of the legitimate "other." But
once the "other," an alien group, is identified, the precondition
of genocide has been fulfilled; for genocide cannot even be
conceived without a cultural definition of the target group. 33
One of the more terrifying revelations of the most cursory
examination of the problem of genocide is how frequently this
precondition is fulfilled.
When we examine the world historical scene, we may note
that many times, in many countries, bureaucracies have
32

Id.

83 A predominantly sociological rather than psychosocial explanation of the
etiology of intolerance is fcund in E. RAAB & S. LPsET, PE.JUDICE AND
SOCIETY 28 (1959). Lipset seems to incline to the view that patterns of
prejudice are simply learned from social models, without any crucial
regard to the psychological development of the individual. A different
approach may be found in T. AaoRNo, FRANKEL et al, THE AUTHORTARIAN
PERSONALITY (1950) and B. BETTELHEIM & JANOWITZ, DYNA-mncs OF PEJ-

A
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF VETERANS (1950).
useful comparative survey of theories of the nature of prejudice is found
in G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954). His conclusions of the
etiology of prejudice are generously tolerant, for he views prejudice as a
complex phenomenon which is caused by different stimuli in different
DICE: A

contexts. Hence all theories-sociocultural, situational, psychodyamic
and phenomenological-are right some of the time. The view developed

here is that these diverse theories relate to exacerbating events rather
than to the cause or, perhaps more accurately, to the capacity for prejudicial discrimination. Discrimination is a malignancy of that process
which our culture is pleased to call normal personality development.
Insofar as we continue to demand this form of personality development,
we will produce individuals who are prejudice-prone. Short of reevaluating preferred personality models, there is no "cure" for prejudice, but
only a stabilization through self-understanding. This analysis reveals a
number of implications about the treatment of prejudice as a crime.
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launched the opening phases of a destruction process ...
Very often, seemingly harmless bureaucratic activities-such
as the definition of a particular group and the exclusion of its
members from office-contain the seeds of administrative continuity. Potentially, these measures are stepping stones to a
killing operation, but as a rule insurmountable barriers from
without and within arrest and disrupt the destructive development. Externally, the opposition of the victims may bring the
process to a halt: internally, administrative and psychological
obstacles may bar the way. The discriminatory systems of
are the leftovers of such disrupted destruction
many countries
34
processes.

Where the genocide process stops short of group destruction,
we encounter discrimination, a form of intense human deprivation. It does not necessarily follow from this that the normal
processes of ego formation must be suppressed. It does mean
that any pluralistic community must set bounds of legitimacy
to the identification and cultural characterization of other
groups. And not only when the juggernaut is spinning to conclusion, when the threat of genocide against a specific group
has materialized, but as an integral part of the legal toleration
of cultural differentiation.
Striking a balance between a sense of discrete individuality
and the sense of integral identity with increasingly inclusive
groups and ultimately with a single ecosocial process is, of
course, an ongoing problem in organized group life and a continuing concern for the policy scientist. Our species characterizes itself by the inculcation of a tendency toward self-awareness which we currently style "ego"; our civilization is quite
inconceivable without such conditioning. Yet when self-awareness extends to a sense of discreteness, the individual may
act in such a way as to precipitate grievous damage on others
and on the biosphere without appreciating the very real selfdestruction which is involved. While specific historical cases
of racial discrimination may be a response to a variety of
unique stimuli, the latent capacity for such discrimination is
a part of personality growth - at least, as we currently nurture
it. Like most recurrent crime, the international crimes of racial
discrimination and genocide must be treated, not in retrospective sequences of punishment, but in prospective sequences of
identification and prevention. Like most recurrent crime, this,
in turn, involves a careful appraisal of ourselves and our own
value-institutions, the very coordinate points by which we characterize the behavior of others as deviant and delictual.
34 R. HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 639 (1961).
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The reasons for the characterization of racial discrimination as a form of deviance from an international norm can thus
be seen as both the culmination of historical trends and,
equally, as a rather logical response to the needs of an organizing global community. Historically, a variety of metaphysical and
divine-transempirical ethical systems in almost all cultures and
civilizations have posited the fundamental human dignity of the
individual. As a matter of logical response to environmental
conditions, it has become increasingly clear that an interdependent global community cannot sustain itself tolerably once it has
acquired the technological capacity to destroy itself, if the coin
of common exchange is genocide and discrimination. Hence the
unequivocal statements of international principle outlawing
genocide and discrimination. A question for the policy scientist
is whether the techniques adopted in the Convention, to date,
are the optimum approach to this type of social control problem. For the answer, we must consider the pending international response to racial discrimination.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL

DISCRIMINATION

The history of the Convention can be recounted briefly.
In January of 1960, the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities condemned renewed
manifestations of antisemitism in Europe and Latin America
and delegated the collection of factual information on the etiology of racial discrimination. 35 On the basis of this information, the Subcommission recommended that the General Assembly prepare an international convention. 36 At the 17th session
of the General Assembly in 1962, plans for much broader
conventions were formulated; one on racial discrimination,
which was to be given priority, and one on religious intolerance.
The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was adopted in November, 196331 and the Economic
35 A detailed history of the background of the convention and travaux is
found in Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & CoMw. L. Q. 996 (1966).
For a survey of the work of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, see Humphrey, The
United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discriminationand
the Protection of Minorities, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 869 (1968).
36

Report of the 12th Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention
crimination and Protection cf Minorities to the Commission on
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/800, para. 163 (1960).
37 Report of the 13th Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention
crimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/815, para. 176 (1961).

of DisHuman
of DisHuman
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and Social Council's Commission on Human Rights began the
formulation of a convention. The draft was completed in 1964,
was considered by the Third Committee of the General Assembly in 1965, and was adopted, on December 21 by the plenary
General Assembly.-" The Convention has been acceded to by
five states and ratified by 44 states as of April 30, 1971. 3 1 It went
into effect on March 31, 1969. 4 1 The United States has signed
but has not ratified the Convention.
The convention is structured in three parts: substantive,
procedural and technical, and jurisdictional matters. Let us
review each of these parts briefly, relating them to the totality
conceived by the drafters. Practice may fall short of this comprehensive picture, for states may adhere to the Convention
but make reservations in regard to specific sections. 4' Article
20 obliges the Secretary General of the United Nations to circulate reservations at the time of accession or ratification. Any
state which has already adhered may inform the Secretary
General that it does not accept the reservation. Article 20(2)
provides that
A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this
Convention shall not be permitted nor shall a reservation the
effect of which would inhibit the operation of any of the
bodies established by this Convention be allowed. A reservation shall be considered incompatible or inhibitive if at least
two-thirds of the States Parties to this Convention object to it.

On its face, this provision seems to import that no reservation
to the enforcement procedures of Part II of the Convention will
be tolerated, with the exception of the secondary jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice. Reservations may, however, be made to the substantive provisions of Part I, if they
are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Con4
vention and if less than two-thirds of the other parties object. 2
G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 35-37, U.N. Doc.
A/5515 (1964).
39 G.A. Res. 2106A (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1966).
40 The Convention was in force as of January 4, 1969, thirty days after
deposit of the 27th ratification. But because a number of states had attached reservations to their accessions or ratifications, a ninety-day protest period had to elapse during which other signatories might object to
the reservations which had been submitted. When this article was written, the procedures of implementation called for by the Convention had
been formulated, but not yet promulgated.
41 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art. 20, para. 2, 1965, YEARBOOK OF THE U.N., at 440, 44546.
42 The basic principles regarding reservations are found in the International
Court's Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide. [1951] I.C.J. Report 15. The principles have
been codified in Articles 19-23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, A/Conf. 39/27, 23 May 1969.
38
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A.

The Substantive Provisions

Article 1(1)
nation" as

of the Convention defines "racial discrimi-

• ..any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, ehjoyment or exercise, cn an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any
other field of public life.

The range of this seemingly broad provision points up immediately a conceptual defect of the Convention. The threat to
minimum global order and the challenge to an emerging world
community is not racial discrimination, but discrimination in
general. Discrimination on the basis of criteria such as class,
sex, interest or skill group affiliation, personality, mode of
sexual expression, or physical or psychic "abnormality" may, in
some contexts, be as threatening to world order and just as
contrary to human dignity as is racial discrimination. Because
the empirical reference, of "race" is so ambiguous, many instances of social discrimination which are generally referred
to as racial in character have actually entailed discrimination
on the basis of many of these other factors. The erroneous
assumption that racial discrimination is de maximis and urgently requires political consideration runs, unfortunately,
43
throughout the Convention.
Even within the self-determined purview of Article 1, there
are some peculiar and politically significant gaps. The specific
rights guaranteed and protected by the Convention are set out
in detail in Article 5. The basic policy of Article 1 applies to
noncitizens with ambiguity (paragraph 2), nor does it affect
domestic provisions of nationality, citizenship, or naturalization
as long as they do not discriminate aaginst a particular nationality (paragraph 3).
Article 1(4), an extremely significant provision, reads:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in
order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not
43 As noted earlier, the framers of the Convention purposely shifted the

focus from religious to racial discrimination, assuming that other forms
of discrimination would be treated in other instruments. The problem of
religious discrimination is on the General Assembly's agenda; the Declaration on the Eliminaticn of Discrimination against Women was adopted
by the General Assembly in Res. 2263 (XXII). This writer discerns a
trend in international organizational affairs to give these other discriminatory practices less attention and less innovative procedural routes for
implementation.
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be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such
measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of
separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall
not be continued after the objectives for which they were
taken have been achieved.

This developmental exclusion, which is reiterated in Article
2(1) (e), Article 2(2), and Article 7, is a crucial and realistic
part of the program; it seeks to go beyond the outward
manifestations of racial discrimination and to create a society of
genuine equality for all individuals. It is one of the most
important and problematical parts of the Convention and will
be treated in greater detail below.
When Article 1(1) is balanced with Article 1(4), the predominant conception of racial discrimination continues to be
one of severe repression of the vigorous demands of a subjugated group. Discrimination may start in this manner, but at
some point it becomes a reciprocal process. The great wound
of continuing discrimination is its internalization in the target;
the discriminated person who has, after years and perhaps genenations of alien acculturation, begun to adopt the image the
discriminators hold of him and to doubt his own and -his group's
worth will always lack sufficient self-awareness and self-confidence to avail himself of the formal rights and prerogatives
which the law purports to offer him. 44 One of the most arduous and delicate challenges of the elimination of racial discrimination will be the elimination of internalized or selfdiscrimination. This process may well involve violence to established structures and cultural values within the discriminated
group, for the elite of a discriminated group has often reached
an accommodation with the surrounding society of discrimination and may view any change as a threat to its own, limited
ascendancy. 45 The various claims which will inevitably be
44The apparently suicidal doctrines of violence of a number of minority
groups which are attempting to emancipate themselves from self-discrimination can only be understood in this framework. Fanon's counsel
of violence and Gandhi's counsel of non-violence (and violence!) are
essentially strategies by which members of suppressed groups challenge
the encompassing authority perspectives which they have internalized
within themselves and which they must necessarily repudiate on the
psycho-personal level in order to achieve a greater degree of freedom. "In
rebel groups not strong enough to overthrow a state, terrorism may be a
technique-in some cases a ritual-which is part of their strategy to repudiate and remain independent of the authority system." E. WALTER,
See
TERROR AND RESISTANCE: A STUDY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 7 (1969).

also B.

CROZIER,

THE REBELS:

A

STUDY

OF POST-WAR

INSURRECTIONS

(1960).
45 Consider, for example, the apparent enthusiasm with which tribal chieftains in Rhodesia have supported the Smith regime despite its gross racist
character. In these circumstances, the active political awakening of tribal
members will involve destruction of traditional tribal structures of
authority. If models of social alternatives are not readily available, grave
personal disintegration may ensue. Comparable struggles may be ob-
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raised in a program of elimination of racial discrimination
under international auspices will be much more realistically
handled if those authorized to apply the Convention operate
with a grasp of the enormity and complexity of the problems
confronting them.
There are other more specific drafting and policy problems.
The language of Article 1(2) opens the way for discrimination
against noncitizens, which in some contexts may constitute
de facto racial discrimination. If the noncitizens are stateless
and without hope of diplomatic protection, they are the most
helpless creatures in international law. Much of East African
racial discrimination against Indians is probably not covered by
the Convention. On the other hand, Article 1(3), which excludes from the convention domestic provisions of nationality,
citizenship, or naturalization as long as they do not discriminate
against a particular nationality, may be formulated too broadly.
A significant number of ethnic states practice preferential immigration and naturalization as a means of maintaining their
existence, and it is not clear whether the intention of paragraph
4
3 was to challenge the lawfulness of this practice. 6
Articles 2 to 7 of the Convention set out the substantive
obligations of contracting parties. This section is not tightly
organized and close examination reveals some redundancy.
Three basic undertakings which are scattered through the five
articles emerge. These are, first, a governmental obligation to
served in the American Negro community between militants and conservatives. It is urgent that social planners accept the fact of the intense
integration of socially dysfunctional and even suicidal behavioral patterns
and appreciate, as a result, that change will require more than the promulgation of a single law or resort to a single type of strategy. Dr.
Karsten observes on the suicidal warfare among the Jibaro Indians:
"The wars, the blood feuds within the tribes, and the wars of extermination between the different tribes are continuous, being nourished by their
superstitious belief in witchcraft. These wars are the greatest curse of
the Jibaros and are felt to be so even by themselves, at least so far as
the feuds within the tribes are concerned. On the other hand, the wars
are to such a degree one with their whole life and essence that only
powerful pressure from outside or radical change of their whole character
and moral views could make them abstain from them." Karsten, Blood
Revenge and War Among the Jibaro Indians of Eastern Ecuador in P.
BOHANNAN,

WAR AND WARFARE:

FLICT 304 (1967).
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STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY

OF CON-

One paradox of the contemporary program for the extension of the international protection of human rights is that it is carried out under the
auspices of nation-states; yet a plenary international regime of human
rights imports a drastic diminution of the power of state elites. Full
human rights, for example, involve the freedom of the individual to
identify with as many territorial communities as he wishes; on the
macrogroup level, it involves the free movement of people, without
political impediment, to those global sectors in which they can maximize the values which they pursue. Many of the ambivalences which
are observable in human rights conventions can be traced to elite desires
(or accession to the desires of others) to acquire control over the symbols
of human rights, but not to grant so many that they thereby attenuate or
obliterate their own political power.
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eliminate, within official processes, all racial discrimination;
second, a governmental obligation .to eliminate discrimination by
individuals and organizations within the state; and, finally, an
obligation to undertake a developmental program. Let us consider each of them briefly.
The first undertaking is a formal obligation of parties to the
Convention to prohibit discrimination by public authorities and
institutions at all levels of government. It is introduced in
Article 2(1) (a). In implementation, parties are obliged to bring
domestic legislation into line with the international standards
of the Convention.
Each State Party shall take effective measures to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind
or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of

creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it
exists.
The so-called "federal clause" doctrine of treaty laws is
clearly excluded from these undertakings. 41 If a federated state
adheres to the convention and one of the public authorities or
institutions of its component states or provinces does not enforce the basic rights guaranteed by the convention, the central
or federal government is responsible to the deprived citizen
under international law. Thus, when the United States ratifies
the Convention, if the courts or executives of Mississippi or
Alabama persist in practicing segregation (a complex of human
rights deprivations), Negroes in these states could petition the
federal government for remedies. The federal government
would be obliged under international law to supply them, for
Article 6 of the Convention states that
States parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the competent
national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts
of racial discrimination which violate his human rights and
fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as
the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate
reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result

of such discrimination.
Article 4 sets out the ramifications of the protection and
remedies available:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations
which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race

or group of persons of one color or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in
any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of,
47

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27; A/conf. 39/27,
May 23, 1969.
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such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the rights expressly set forth in Article 5 of this
Convention .....
The Article proceeds to spell out these obligations in three
subsections of which the first and second are most important.

States Parties
(a) Shall declare an offense punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement
to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or
incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons
of another color or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any
assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof.
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations and also
organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote
and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offense punishable by law.

U.S. Apprehensions
The specter of a conflict of these provisions with U.S. constitutional liberties has been raised in certain quarters. The
words "with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" in the opening paragraph
of Article 4 were inserted in order to permit an accommodation
of the obligations of the Convention with the constitutional
principle of freedom of expression.48 There may be a very serious evasion involved here. One can read Articles 2 and 4 as
obliging states to do everything permitted within their constitutional structures to combat discrimination. But this interpretation tends to suppress the fact that in many cases the elimination may require elemental constitutional changes. Or one
can read these provisions as obliging states to change their
constitutional structures in order to achieve a more effective
balance between the freedom of expression and the freedom to
live in a society without racial discrimination.
The U.S. Government has tried to balance the competing
policies in ratifying other treaties. In some of the peace treaties
after the Second World War, the U.S. inserted provisions guaranteeing freedom of expression, but outlawing fascist or neofascist groups. 9 On the other hand, when the world has looked
toward the U.S. in regard to violently racist organizations, we
have pleaded constitutional incapacity.
Schwelb, supra note 35, at 1024.
49 See for example, Peace Treaty with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, arts. 2, 4,
41 U.N.T.S. 168, 172, 174; for other treaties, with comparable provisions,
48

see Schwelb supra note 35, at 1022.
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Without slighting the worth of free speech nor gainsaying
the fragility of the doctrine, our constitutional lawyers must
face the problem squarely. Liberty of speech is no more dear
a freedom than the liberty to be a member of a group without
shame and without constant insecurity. And this is especially
so in a society composed of many diverse groups. 50 This is not
to suggest the spasmodic enactment of statutes automatically
outlawing verbal racism. No policy should be applied without
considering the manifold effects its implementation may precipitate in present and projected contexts. Indeed, ill-considered
application of such statutes in the past seems to have done little
more than provide a platform and opportunity for increased
dissemination of racism. 51
The thrust of the Convention seems to require the re-establishment of a balance between the liberty of expression and
responsibility for the effects of that expression. This balance in
turn will involve a new evaluation of the normative distinction
between expression and action, on which the judicial develop52
ment of the First Amendment seems to have been premised.
When the United States ratifies the Convention, a 'number of
institutional changes will follow. This should not cause consternation. In urging ratification of the Genocide Convention,
Chief Justice Warren said: ". . . men and their institutions do
not stand still in the face of great changes. We are not so
uncertain of ourselves and our future that we cannot make our
53
institutions conform to our needs as a progressive people."
Libertarian movements in the West have frequently ranged
themselves against official governmental processes; this recurring adversarial posture has led many to identify official power
per se as a threat to liberty. The real question is, however, who
uses power, for what purposes and with what effects. Power
can be used to establish the conditions of freedom. Clearly the
reduction of discrimination and the attendant threat to mini50 A candid and illuminating discussion of these problems is found in Fer-

guson, The United Nations Convention on Racial Discrimination: Civil
Rights by Treaty, I LAW IN TRANSITION Q. 61 (1964). Working with
an earlier draft of the Convention, Dean Ferguson concludes that incitement to racial discrimination which might lead to cvert acts could possibly fall under the classic Holmesian doctrines and be lawfully proscribed in conformity with Justice Holmes' notion of the First Amendment. The article is extremely useful in pointing up the difficulties
involved in applying the Convention in the American constitutional
context.
51 See generally Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group
Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 727 (1942).
52 T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16
(1966).
53 Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Conference on Continuing Action
for Human Rights, Dec. 4, 1963, Washington, D.C. at 5.
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mum and optimum public order will require the judicious use
of power.
The second undertaking obliges each adherent "not to sponsor, defend or support racial discrimination by any persons or
organizations." Coordinate with this undertaking is the obligation set out in Article 2(1) (d) to "prohibit and bring to an end,
by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by
circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or
organization." Article 4, which we have considered, spells this
out in greater detail.
What comprises "sponsorship, defense or support"? In its
narrowest reading, the provision prohibits governmental sponsorship of an S.S. or S.A. type of organization, but this phenomenon would be covered by Article 2(1)(a) and it is more
reasonable to suppose that the words refer to a broader range
of governmental support and succor. The granting of tax
exempt status to an organization which preached or practiced
discrimination would, to my mind, be prohibited by this section
of the Convention. One might, for example, enjoin IRS from
allowing tax exemption to a Church or nonprofit school or camp
which practiced discrimination or the Department of Agriculture from giving such organizations food and so on. In short,
Article 2 conceals a broad sanction potential, whose effective
realization will depend upon accommodation of the provision
with other domestic constitutional policies.
The Developmental Program
The third major undertaking of Part I of the Convention is
what we have referred to as the developmental program. The
elimination of discrimination is not an end in itself, but is a
means to an end. That end- the establishment of a world
public order of human dignity- is emphasized in the preambular statement of the Convention, as well as in numerous places
in the Charter. Racial discrimination is a major bar to the
achievement of such a world system. Discrimination, as we
have noted, does not just happen; it is the product of a complex
process in which discriminator and discriminatee are affected.
Specific programs to combat discrimination must ultimately
conform to a preferred conception of the total human being, or,
in the conventional legal formulation, to a comprehensive conception of human rights.
The term "human rights" manifests the circularity so characteristic of legal formulation. It imports that certain privileges
attach as of right to human beings, but does not indicate
B.
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their notional content, procedures for their ascertainment, procedures for their application, or the type of context which must
be fostered if they are to flourish. It is necessary to clarify the
goal image of the human being which we wish to develop as
the optimum realization of his own potential and the individual
most capable of participating in and sustaining world peace
54
and the strategies by which this can be accomplished.
Given a conception of the inherent worth and dignity of
every individual, a feasible configurative approach to the problem of international human rights requires an extended temporal conception of man from birth through his various life
cycles, interacting in a variety of groups from the most inclusive
to the nuclear, and an extended value conception of man as a
creature pursuing all values in all institutional processes. There
can be, then, no artificial starting point for the law of human
rights. It begins with birth and possibly even with the prenatal
conditions necessary for the development of a healthy fetus, includes the critical "socialization" procedures of the infant and
the child, includes education of the young, inculcation of the
capacity to adapt to new environmental demands as 3an passes
through his congeries of life cycles, and concludes with the
social protection of the old.
The temporal span of human rights must be emphasized,
for it is insufficiently appreciated. The most elaborate system of
human rights protection cannot avail fetal man in Biafra, Bengal
or Appalachia whose undernourished mother produces a physically or psychologically damaged child. The most elaborate
system of human rights protection cannot avail the respectdeprived child in Mississippi or Rhodesia who will never develop
sufficient ego to make demands in his own name as an autonomous human being. The most elaborate system of human rights
protection will not avail the child in the urban slums reproduced throughout the globe who grows in a distintegrating
family circle and who emerges as an irreparable cripple in the
process of giving and receiving affection. The most elaborate
system of human rights cannot avail the youth who has never
acquired sufficient enlightenment and skill to participate fully
in power, wealth, and other value processes. The most elaborate
system of human rights protection will neither avail nor command the loyalty of the worker who, in a changing environment,
54

A brilliant programmatic outline of such a conception may be found in
McDougal, Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World
Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 Am. J.
INT'L L. 237 (1969). See also M. MOSKOWITZ, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 98-100

(1968).
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knows that he will be abandoned once his hard-acquired skills
and his health have obsolesced. In short, the conception of
human rights, if it is to be effective, must be coterminous with
the life of man.
Similarly, an effective system of human rights protection
must extend to every value process. Living within a peace
rather than a war system requires a totally integrated personality capable of resolving personal and inter-personal conflicts
without the easy recourse to rage and violence. A human rights
system able to create and sustain such individuals must be one
which, through its noncoercive structures, promises and effectively secures the conditions of unimpeded self-realization in
every institutional process. Human rights, then, must be understood in terms of full participation in the shaping and sharing of
power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, respect
and rectitude. The persistent deprivation of any of these values
for any group or any individual cannot only be recorded as an
infringement of human rights: by generating the frustrations
that drive men to violence, it is a direct threat to global peace.
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination is
quite clearly committed to this comprehensive conception of
human rights. Articles 1(4), 2(1)(e) and 2(2) make detailed
references to an ongoing program aimed at the elimination of
discrimination. These provisions could not, of course, specify
content. The implementation of the development program
will be a complex task, carried out for the most part on the
municipal and local level and varying enormously from state to
state and even from region to region and city to city within
one state. It will incorporate what have traditionally been considered criminal and civil techniques. Influenced as it will be
by local conditions, one can, nevertheless, indicate certain general patterns. First, programs must be directed at both the
discriminated and the discriminators. Article 7 is directed primarily to the latter group.
States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective
measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education,
culture, and information, with a view to combating prejudices
which lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial
or ethnical groups, as well as to propagating the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and this Convention.

Discrimination is not, of course, a one-way flow. Where stereotypic racial identifications are culturally tolerated, it is a recip-
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rocal process. Many of the Chinese minority in Indonesia
despise the Indonesian majority with an intensity equal to that
directed at them, as do many Indians in East Africa and Negroes
in America. Racism is emotionally maiming, under any circumstances, but the urgent target for education in each case is
the majority.
The success of a campaign to eliminate racial discrimination
will turn ultimately upon programs for those groups which
have traditionally been deprived. Selective preferences aimed
at giving these groups opportunities of which they have been
deprived are not considered discriminatory under the Convention. They are an express obligation. Articles 2(2) provides
States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take,
in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and
concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and
protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to
them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These
measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups
after the objectives for which they were taken have been
achieved.

Programs under this provision must not aim at the mere
elimination or assimilation of races or groups, but rather at
countering the conditions which have held individuals in subjection and have ultimately eroded their own ego systems. Assimilation is a patronizing term, negating the legitimacy of
minority groups and minority cultures and implying an inferiority in the cultural potential of a group. It is a term which
reflects a discriminatory cast of mind and its application can
only engender more discrimination. Majority groups must grasp,
as Camus would put it, the essential equality of all human
experience 55 and must supply the opportunities for members
of discriminated groups to clarify, value and appreciate, without
apology, the uniqueness of their own cultural experience.
What is involved is not guidelines, but the environmental conditions which have been the natural birthright of many a
majority group child. In the final analysis, there is no emancipation other than autoemancipation; the possibility for genuine
integration exists only among emancipated individuals.
55 If social pluralism is a recurring feature of interaction, its acceptance as

policy preference does not involve a value neutralism. Those committed
to a pluralistic order may readily concede that all available models of
social order are choices, yet insist that orders which seriously affect them
take account of their own preferences. The existential insight which is
at the core of a pluralistic conception must, thus, continue to animate it
at every moment.
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JurisdictionalPossibilities
Because of the enormous variations in the conditions and
types of discrimination throughout the world, the primary
instance of implementation of the Convention, is at the state
and the national level. Problems such as implementing legislation, insofar as it is necessary, policy choices of how to deal
with particular problems and especially to what extent to allocate jurisdiction to public or civic order processes will be dealt
with initially on a national basis. Presumably, the principle of
exhaustion of local remedies will apply. 5" Persistent deviations
on the national level will, however, be susceptible to invocation
in a series of organized international processes.
The Convention incorporates five potential jurisdictions,
only one of which is a new creation. It does not expressly
incorporate private organizations. The new creation, a Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, may prove
to be a remarkably flexible instrument, not only for eliminating
discrimination, but also as an impetus for adherence to theConvention and formal recognition of its standards. Because of
the complexity of the Committee's composition and procedure,
it will be considered last, after a brief survey of the existing
decision processes which have been incorporated.
1. The Security Council. Insofar as a persistent deprivation of human rights constitutes a threat to the peace, the
plenary jurisdiction and sanctioning powers of the Security
Council are activated. The Rhodesian case is a sound precedent
for the principle that racial discrimination may, under certain
circumstances, constitute a threat to the peace and bring the
57
enforcement powers of Charter Chapter VII into operation.
Hence persistent deviations from the standards set in the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination as well as
peremptory rights assured in other international documents may
permit invocation of the Security Council. In the light of the
Rhodesian case, note should be taken of the fact that the offending state need not be a member of the United Nations nor party
to the Convention in question in order to perfect the jurisdiction of the Council.
2. The General Assembly. Under the Uniting for Peace
Resolution,;, the Assembly has a secondary, contingent juris56 For a detailed discussion, see NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 12, at
C.

359-75.
For a detailed discussion of this point and a consideration of doctrinal
views, see McDougal and Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations:
The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968).
5S G.A. Res. 337 (V); 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 10-12, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950).
5T
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diction for security matters: it comes into operation when the
Security Council is unable to function because of its unique
and often paralyzing decision dynamics. Additionally, the Assembly enjoys a primary jurisdiction in regard to many matters
covered by the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination. Charter Article 11(2) provides in part that
The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security brought
before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the
Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member and
[with some restrictions] . . . may make recommendations

with regard to any such questions to the state or states
concerned ....

Article 13 authorizes the Assembly to initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of
promoting international cooperation in the
cultural, educational, and health fields, and
realization of human rights and fundamental
without distinction as to race, sex, language,

economic, social,
assisting in the
freedoms for all
or religion.

Article 14 authorizes the Assembly, if the Security Council is
not seized of the matter, to
...recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any
situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair
the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions
of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Prin-

ciples of the United Nations.
Although the Assembly may encounter budgetary problems in
mounting a large-scale program, it has nonetheless authorized
concrete actions and they have, at times, been significant determinants in international relations. Each of these jurisdictional
bases of the Assembly has direct application to the substantive
provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination.
3. The International Court. The Council, the Assembly,
and any other agency which has been accorded a general right
pursuant to Article 96(2) of the Charter may request an advisory opinion of the Court on a matter pertaining to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination, if the requesting
agency itself enjoys a jurisdiction over the matter. 59 As early
as the Eastern Carelia case, 60 the Permanent Court of International Justice made it clear that it would not entertain under
its advisory jurisdiction cases which were actually contentious.
Yet it is tactically possible to abstract a claim of nonapplication of standards set in the Convention and to request an advisory opinion, thereby adding to the compulsion of a general
59 Current advisory jurisdiction is set out in [1966-1967] I.C.J.Y.B. 39.
60 Status of Eastern Carelia [1921-1926] P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 5 at 7 (1923).
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international decision the authority of the International Court.
In addition to this pervasive ground of jurisdiction, the Court
may also acquire full contentious jurisdiction in regard to a
matter covered by the Convention, if the defendant and the
claimant state have adhered to Article 36 of the Statute of the
Court without regardto any formal incorporationof the Convention in their general adherence. Since activation of the implementative machinery of the Convention may be an actio popularis, the crucial question will often actually be whether the
defendant has adhered; any other party to the Convention may
bring the case. Much of the effectiveness of this strategy will
depend upon how the Court interprets "interest" in Article 62
of its Statute. In the South West Africa Cases,' the Court deprived itself of jurisdiction by innovating an extremely narrow
definition of this term.
In addition to the Court's jurisdiction which derives from
general international law, the Convention also creates a second
ground of jurisdiction in Article 22.
Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect
to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which
is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly
provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any
of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International
Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to
another mode of settlement.
Ordinarily, one would expect reservations to drain a jurisdictional clause such as this of all relevance. But in the case of
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
other factors may counteract the persistent reluctance of states
to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. The diversity of jurisdictions offered by the
Convention, eaeh of which manifests a different decision structure in which different groups and ideologies may be paramount, opens the way for forum shopping. For many states,
the International Court, structured as it is, may be preferred
over the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
Although the doctrine of lis alibi pendens is still somewhat
ambiguous in international law, adherence to the Statute of the
Court may allow states the option of moving a claim under the
62
Convention directly to The Hague.
Southwest African cases, [1966] I.C.J. See also, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1971,
at 1, col. 6.
62 Insofar as the Connally Amendment is interpreted as extending across
the board to all U.S. general adherences to the Court (Declaration of 14
August 1946; deposited 26 August 1946), the United States is precluded
from participating in this strategy. The point underscores the real defect
of the United States' reservation: insofar as the reservation operates, it
61
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4. A number of other United Nations organs and agencies
may exercise a jurisdiction which assimilates the standards of
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to
the web of instruments composing their own jurisdictional base.
The Economic and Social Council and, in particular, the Commission on Human Rights, have a general jurisdiction in this
area, even without the substantive particularizations of the Discrimination Convention; the norms of highest generality from
which the Convention's provisions are drawn are stated in the
United Nations' Charter and, at a lower level of generality, in
the specification of the Charter's principles found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." The human rights programs of the International Labor Organization may overlap the
Convention in certain circumstances." 4 In addition to these instances, the Discrimination Convention, in Article 15, explicitly
incorporates the United Nations processes available to the peoples of colonial countries which have not yet achieved independence. Conversely, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination established by the Convention may refer data
which it has collected to other bodies of the United Nations
which may have a firmer jurisdiction or readier access to the
relevant parties.
5. The unique creation of the Convention is the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; its composition
and procedure are detailed in Part II of the Convention, in
Articles 8 to 16. The Committee is to be composed of 18 members, representing a broad international diversity, nominated
and elected by the parties to the Convention; the members are
to serve four-year terms. The complex schizophrenic character
of these members follows the usual international pattern; they
are obliged to be impartial, yet they are state members in the
sense that if a member should resign or die his state appoints
a succeeding member. The Committee will adopt its own rules
prevents the United States from resorting to a potentially effective
diplomatic instrument.
,3 In this regard, mention must be made of the Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, a subcommission of the Commission on Human Rights of the Economic and
Social Council. Sec Claude, The Nature and Status of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminationand Protection of Minorities 5 INT'L
ORG. 300 (1951); Hiscocks, The Work of the United Nations for the Prevention of Discrimination,DIE MODERNE DEMOKRATIE UND IHR RECHT 713
(1966); Humphrey, The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discriminationand the Protection of Minorities, 62 AM. J. INT'L
L. 869 (1968).
64 For one rather clear example, see International Labor Organization Governing Body, Report of the Ccmmittee on Discrimination, GB 154/4/29
(1963) at p. 3. See also E. HAAS, supra note 22, at 353-55.
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of procedure,'" elect its own officers and meet at the United
Nations headquarters. The Secretary-General will provide Secretariat personnel for the Committee, a procedure which may
raise some operational difficulties. The communication of administrative and legislative details, which is mandatory upon
parties to the Convention, is made through the SecretaryGeneral.
The first function of the Committee is continuous appraisal
of "the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures"
which have been adopted within states to give effect to the
Convention. Each party is obliged to render a biannual report
and the Committee is authorized to request further information
if necessary. The Committee's reports, conclusions and recommendations are transmitted to the Secretary-General who reports them to the General Assembly annually. This Committee
function of appraisal and recommendation should not be underestimated. If it is carried forward impartially, a total public
picture of trends in regard to the elimination of racial discrimination will be available. Trouble spots will be highlighted
and publicized and priorities and tactics for action can be determined by official and private international organizations
operating beyond the formal confines of the Committee. The
threat of international exposure may stimulate some states to
take more active measures to combat racial discrimination.
Much, of course, will depend upon the composition of the Committee and the independence of its members. If there is political
horse-trading within the Committee and the Committee itself
manifests a racial bias or a selective geographical blindness, its
purpose will be frustrated.
The second function of the Committee involves decision (in
its broadest sense) in regard to a claim brought by one state
party that another state is not giving effect to the provisions
of the Convention. Article 11 authorizes any state party to do
this. When the claim has been lodged, the Committee transmits
it to the "defendant" state, which must submit, within three
months, written explanations clarifying the matter and the
remedy (if any) taken. If the matter has not been satisfactorily
adjusted within six months, either state may refer the matter
to the Committee once again. The Committee then perfects its
jurisdiction by ascertaining either exhaustion of domestic reme65 A proposed draft of rules for the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination has been prepared at the Boalt Hall School of Law. See,
Rules of Procedure for the New Tribunal: A Proposed Draft, 56 CALIF.
L. REv. 1569 (1968). Since this article was written, rules of procedure
have been put into effect.
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dies or the inapplicability of the rule. It may also request
further information. The actual procedure of the Committee
will depend upon the formulation of its own rules. But Article
11, in providing for agents, suggests the possibility that an adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative procedure may evolve.
Once the information is collected, the Chairman of the Committee appoints an ad hoc Conciliation Commission of five members. Its personnel need not be members of the Committee,
but they must receive the unanimous consent of the parties to
the dispute and, deviating from arbitral procedure, they may
not be nationals of the disputants. If the parties are unable to
choose five members for the Commission, the Committee will
elect them by secret ballot. Through its good offices, the Commission is to seek to secure an amicable solution of the dispute
in conformity with the standards of the Convention. The expenses of the Commission will ultimately rest upon the disputants, but while the matter is pending, the Commission members will be paid by the Secretary-General.
If the Commission is unable to arrange an amicable solution, it transmits its factual conclusions and recommendations
to the Committee. The chairman then communicates the report
to the disputants. Within three months, the disputants must
report whether or not they accept the conclusion. Finally the
chairman notifies all parties to the Convention of the final
outcome of the matter.
There are many obvious weaknesses and defects in this
involved procedure. But given the contemporary international
context, the magnitude of the achievement must be appreciated.
The nucleus of an enforcement system has been created, and
it has been done in a way which may extend realization of the
Convention. Because a decision organ of some authority has
been created and because it will play a decisive role in the
clarification of the general substantive provisions of the Convention, there is an impetus to states to adhere to the Convention in order to play some role in the illumination of
international standards of racial equality through the process
of customary prescription. When the bare minimum of 27 states
adhered to the Convention, international law regarding discrimination for every state in the world began to be prescribed
6
by these 27 states.
The actio popularis character of Article 11 is susceptible to
abuse. Given the prevalence of racial discrimination and the
6 See, in this regard, Newman, The New International Tribunal, 56 CALIM.
L. REv. 1559 (1968).
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possibilities for retaliatory invocation of the Convention, there
may be a strong motive to "judge not that ye be not judged"
Invocation of the Committee may also be used as a diplomatic
instrument to secure other ends. The creation of a United
Nations Commissioner on Human Rights and his integration
within the Convention's implementive machinery may resolve
this problem. On the other hand, we need not fear "escalation",
if it involves bringing more and more cases of discrimination
before international jurisdictions.
The fact that neither the Committee nor the Commission
are authorized to take "binding decisions" is a relatively minor
point. The compulsive consequences of any decision do not rest
upon a piece of paper but upon the conjunction of authority
and control upon which the decision process in question operates. Authority and control are matters which must be manipulated by the Committee with full regard to the context of each
67
case which comes before it.
Article 14 of the Convention provides a final optional jurisdictional ground. A party to the Convention may declare that
it recognizes the competence of the Committee to hear petitions
from individuals within its jurisdiction who claim to be victims
of discrimination as set forth in the Convention. It may also
create a special instance within its jurisdiction to hear claims
which have gone through the conventional domestic processes,
before the claim moves to the international level. The Committee will then bring these claims anonymously to the attention of the State in question. The state must reply within three
months and indicate what remedy, if any, it has taken. The
Committee's competence to entertain individual petitions will
come into effect only when 10 states have made voluntary
declarations.
6. Private Organizations: Traditional theories of international law have tended to overlook the very real participation
of non-official and non-state entities in authoritative transnational decisions. Private entities have been particularly critical
participants in the international protection of human rights and
insofar as the peculiar structuring of the global power arena
continues, the effectiveness of international human rights, particularly in crisis, may well depend on them. At a number of
points, the United Nations structure permits the participation of
non-state entities. It is particularly unfortunate that the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has not
87 For discussion of this point, see Reisman, The Enforcement of International Judgments, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1969).
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followed that precedent and made express provision for direct
non-official participation in the Convention's regime.
Evaluation of Jurisdictional Diversity
From the municipal criminal law standpoint, the array of
available and in many cases coarchical instances for supervision
of the Convention and for policing infractions of it may seem
perplexing and problematical. On the municipal level, competing jurisdictions are usually associated with conflicts of law
and keen forum shopping; preferred jurisdiction in conventional
textbook terms, is exclusive and effective. In fact, the range
of instances for the Convention is probably beneficial from the
standpoint of the integration of the global community. There
are, moreover, contextual equivalencies for this sort of spectrum of application agencies in municipal systems.
In any complex territorial community, the problems of securing conformity with social norms and policing deviation
are seldom the province of a single agency. The courts and the
implementing machinery which they initiate and supervise loom
largest in the perspective of the lawyer. In fact, the family,
the school, the church, the employer or trade union, the army
are involved, at different stages, in inculcating predispositions
to comply and in policing them. In many instances, court enforcement integrates these other social institutions. A parole or
conditional release may integrate school authorities, parents or
siblings, employers and so on. In other instances, authoritative
agencies of the community enforce the criminal law by a complete bypass of the courts. Charges will not be pressed if X
"leaves town" or joins the army and so on. Thus the systematic
presentation of international instances for the control of discrimination indicates no qualitative difference between international and national law.
D.

The availability of diverse instances of coarchical jurisdiction means that choices are available and are often necessary.
While guiding principles for jurisdictional choices have been
developed in detail elsewhere, ' a number of guidelines can be
made specific in this context. (1) Effectiveness: the choice of
an international arena should be based on considerations of
the maximum effectiveness of the projected decision. Since no
single arena can be maximally effective for all cases, instantial
choice will always require detailed contextual analysis including
contextual projections of alternate responses to desired decisions. (2) Maximal Authority: where effectiveness is assured,
us

NULLITY AND REVISION,

stpra note 12, at 241-62, 277.
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choose arenas which represent the maximal authority for all
participants concerned. (3) Optimal Participation: give preference to arenas which are structured to allow for widest
participation. (4) Integration: where possible, forge instantial
combinations which themselves represent prescriptions for the
international protection of human rights.
CONCLUSIONS

Recent history has emphasized that no nation, no region,
no city can flourish, perhaps even survive, unless it fashions an
equitable solution to racial conflict and, more generally, to discrimination. Because the technological revolution has shrunk
the world, the entire community of man is presented with the
same challenge. Discrimination is a matter of international
concern; its elimination is intertwined with the prospects of
international survival. New creations in international law are
often invested with an extreme promise which they cannot
fulfill. It is important to emphasize the magnitude of the problem with which we are faced. The tendencies toward racism or
ethnicism or any other form of social choice predicated on identifiation with a particular group run deep in the socializing
procedures of the young and they are reinforced by a continuing
sense of global crisis.
Until we are willing to undertake radical revision of the
preferred conception of the human person and personality, and
are willing to socialize our young to a perception of their equal
integrality with, rather than superior discreteness from, the
environment, the learned technique of disidentifying with
others in order to increase self-identification will continously
pave the way for variant forms of discrimination. For extended
periods there may be no examples of discrimination but the
tendencies will be activated by crises in which the integrality
of the extended or nuclear self is perceived as threatend. The
cultural artifact as opposed to the biological reference of race
which was originally used to create a certain type of personality system and a group political system is then reinvoked to
secure its continuation.
Because tacitly authorized discrimination is such a powerful
instrument of personal and group organization, those power
elites who are the primary beneficiaries of this organization can
be expected to be somewhat ambivalent about its eradication.
There is no reason to affect surprise over the Convention's
equation of discrimination with racial discrimination or over
the fine legal exclusions of certain national practices which
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were traded, balanced and carefully written into the Convention. For most of the elite groups involved 'in framing the Convention, a public stand in terms of these symbols promised the
greatest political dividend. The phenomenon of elites concerning themselves first with matters of their own special interest
is, of course, an inseparable aspect of elite systems. The dynamics of this system are such that an intense myth of human
dignity can be extended and exploited without being put into
effective and sustained practice. This may be the fate of the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
It requires no stretch of the imagination to conceive of a
global or near global system in which contending territorial
elites stabilize their common public order at "tolerable" levels
of oppression. Each elite allows the other a relatively unimpeded prerogative of discrimination over certain internal groups.
Claims of unlawful discrimination on the international level are
ritualized in rhetoric, serving a stabilizing function within
domestic public order systems by distracting local attention
from abuses at home and, at the same time, sustaining an expectation of global crisis which justifies in the public mind
an otherwise intolerable level of discrimination and oppression.
The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
makes no attempt to attack discrimination at its roots and,
indeed, the thrust of the entire Convention is toward the symptoms rather than the etiology of racism. Symptomatic treatment can be beneficial in alerting members of the world community to the prevalence of racism, to its incompatibility with
a common conception of humanity and, ultimately, to its threat
to world security.
The express identification and denigration of racism can aid
the target group of racism in a number of ways. It communicates to the object of racism that his lowered position is not
the result of his own inferiority, as he himself often comes to
believe, but to external influences which are imposed on him;
with this realization, the first step toward combatting the pathological condition is possible. The aggregating effect of these
different trends may facilitate a radical reappraisal of some
of our most basic cultural postulates, but the machinery proposed by the Convention is hardly capable of itself undertaking
such a massive intellectually challenging and emotionally volatile program. The conditions for crimes of discrimination and
genocide will unfortunately continue; with the Convention, the
opportunities for anticipating the crimes and preventing or
limiting them may increase.

OLD ORTHODOXIES AMID NEW EXPERIENCES:
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) LITIGATION
AND THE UNCERTAIN JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
EDWARD GoRDON*

The obscurity into which the International Court of Justice
seems to have languished brings to mind an observation made
not long ago by Richard C. Hottelet, C. B. S. news correspondent writing in mitigation of charges that the United Nations
was yielding its destiny by default. Wrote Hottelet:
If the organization and its efforts seem
than real - even ridiculous or contemptible
ing for dramatic successthat is because
light of what it could have tried and should
have been.'

pale, somewhat less
to those with a cravit is regarded in the
have done and might

Applied to any institutional decision process, such subjunctive
criteria presume that there exist relatively stable expectations
concerning the nature of the institution, the objectives it ought
to be pursuing, and the limits of its capacity to pursue them.
Specifically, with respect to the World Court, they presume
some qualitative identification of the institution as an adjudicative process, one that derives from an empirically-oriented understanding of the bases of its authority to decide disputes, the
sources of decisional criteria it applies, and the interaction constantly taking place between the Court and other institutionalized decision processes, especially the larger political process
by which the Court's judgments are transformed into social
2
action.
Yet, in assessing the Court's apparent predicament, one is
struck by the prominence in its jurisprudence of an assumption
that courts of law are essentially homogeneous, that the Court
is cast in substantially the same mold as courts of law are
everywhere, inevitably cast. Arguably, this attitude serves to
accommodate the diverse jurisprudential predispositions which
the Court as an ecumenical judiciary collects. It does so, however, at the extravagant price of ignoring contextual and phenomenological differences.
1. Dimensions of the Utility of International Adjudication
In the Conditions of Admission case, the late Judge Alvarez
wrote that:
*Member, New York Bar. Copyright is retained by the author.
I Book review, Washington Post, October 25, 1970, at 5.
2 This transformation is the focus of inquiry in W. M. REISMAN, NULLITY
AND REVISION (1970).
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[T]he fact should be stressed that an institution, once established,
acquires a life of its own, independent of the elements which have
given birth to it, and it must develop, not in accordance with the
views of those who created it, but in accordance with the require3
ments of international life.

The life of the Court, too, is an ongoing process. Neither the
the United Nations Charter nor the Court's own Statute4 reveals
any eternal verities about international courts. 5 Each describes
the latter in greater detail - the formal structure of the
Court, the more or less technical characteristics of its procedures and proceedings: for all purposes relevant to the present
inquiry, its institutional shell. For its substantive character,
indeed for that of any adjudicative institution, one must look
not only to its conceptual and structural origins, but also to
the internal commerce of people and ideas which are its lifeblood and to the interaction with contending social processes
which identify its social experiences.
This is not to suggest that courts of law are invariably
spontaneous exercises in political imagination, much less that
diversity for its own sake is an institutional virtue. Rather, it
is to suggest that courts of law are by their very nature social
experiments, heterogeneous even when apparently isomorphic,
which become and remain justifiable allocations of social decision prerogatives only to the extent that the cumulative effects
of their judgments and the values6 they comprehend conform
to the needs and goal-objectives of the communities they serve.7
It follows that perceptions of the Court as an institution
which are based for the most part upon its terminological identification as a "court," or even as the "principal judicial organ"
of the U.N., are mistaken in assuming that its retention of what
are thought to be traditional juridical conventions assures its
worth to the world community. Seemingly constant or fundamental similarities among dispute settlement modalities identified as judicial ones can establish useful enough starting points
or generalized parameters for distinguishing a particular process
or its techniques from others. However, it becomes ironic and
3 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations,
[1947-48] I.C.J. Rep. at 68 (separate opinion). See generally E. Gordon,
The World Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties, 59
AM. J. INT'L L. 794, 826-32 (1965).
4 Hereinafter the "Charter" and the "Statute," respectively.
5 See Goldie, The Connally Reservation: A Shield for an Adversary, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 277, 280 (1962).
6 The term "value" is used herein to refer to -preferred events as a class.
See H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 56-73 (1950); and
M. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 31-36 (1960).

Compare REISMAN, supra note 2, at 221.
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self-defeating when such identifying generalities- themselves
no more than the sum or average of past and current institua
tional adaptations to social and political conditions -deprive
contemporary institution such as the Court of the capacity to
adapt to the unique social and political conditions with which
it is empirically confronted.
The Court's capacity so to adapt depends upon the extent
to which its jurisprudential values refer in rational, empirical
terms to the needs and goal-objectives of the world community.
To that extent, mere conformity to past or supposedly perfect
models of juridical performance runs the risk of interfering
with the development of a socially useful jurisprudence or, at
best, of being no more than coincidental to it.
Jenks," Reisman" and Rosenne, 0 each according to his own
analytical style, have surveyed the elements of adjudication
which have accorded it certain advantages over other decision
modalities in the international arena. From their several approaches and notwithstanding differences in emphasis among
them, four summary categories of advantageous qualities seem
to emerge: (1) the relative fairness of the process (e.g., disputants tend to be equalized, decision determinants tend to
be generalized and applied consistently in like circumstances);
(2) its substitution of persuasive strategies for those of raw or
coercive force; (3) its restriction of the conflict to a largely
symbolic adversarial battleground; and (4) the cathartic effects
of its ritualized form of combat. Clearly, these categories are
not parallel. Virtually all international litigation achieves the
second and third, before it becomes certain whether the first
and fourth have also been accomplished. For the Court, achieving all four outcomes appears to be desirable in terms of reacquiring popular acceptance.
Popular expectations about both the techniques of adjudication and their consequences do not always correspond to the
essentials of institutional social utility. For instance, adjudication has now proved its case, so to speak, in so many societal
settings that it is sometimes assumed to be an indispensable
element of societal development' 1 Rosenne notes that the inteS C. W. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION

(1964).

9 REISMAN, supra note 2, especially ch. 8.
10 S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1965).

1 Professor Reisman argues that "It is historically untenable to contend
that some sort of adjudicative system is an invariable manifestation of
community organization cr that no community, as such, has ever existed
without such a process." REISMAN, supra note 2, at 228. But he adds:
"Historical studies and anthropological data do, however, suggest that
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gration of the Court into the United Nations political system
proceeded from an analogous assumption "that the world organization, already possessed of executive, deliberative and administrative organs, would be incomplete unless it possessed a
fully integrated judicial system of its own."' 2 Whether or not
this assumption is supportable historically appears to depend
upon the degree of generality with which one defines "judicial
system." ' From a contemporary vantage point, if one adheres
to the formulation of social utility herein presented, the indispensability of adjudication to the development of an international public order certainly has yet to be proved.
This seems equally true of a host of other assumptions
about and popular attitudes towards adjudication, notwithstanding the rear guard contention that the sum of all popular expectations about adjudication, regardless of the empirical validity of each of them, has contributed to the durability of adjudication as a social decision process. Illustrating popular enchantment with non-vital aspects of adjudication, Professor
Reisman alludes to the "compelling romanticism attached to a
dramatic arena (with an audience) in which individual champions match skills in a duel for high stakes;" with the assumption that "truth will tell" in an adversarial process; and with the
depiction of adjudication as the acme of civilized dispute resolution.15 One might add, as a further illustration, the contagious
illusion that the rigorous constraints of strict reason, faithfully
observed by judges, assures absolutely their neutrality and
that of the judgment criteria (i.e., the law) they invoke. 16
In terms of consciously enhancing the contemporary worth
of the Court, reliance upon essentially irrational attitudes towards adjudication is a doubtful strategy. The spread of scientific inquiry to the social sciences is exposing all of our social
institutions to the intolerant glare of systematic, rational scrutiny, exposure to which our legal institutions, for the most part,
have not previously been subjected to such a degree. As Rosenne
14
attention to realities, harsh though they may be,
observes,'
as the interaction rate of a society increased, and some structural specialization developed, institutionalized and ritualized decision processes
emerged." Id. at 229.
S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 36 (1962).
13See Schwartz & Miller, Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity, 70
AM. J. Soc. 159, 168 (1964).
14 Supra note 10, at 6.
15 REISMAN, supra note 2, at 7. As to the last-mentioned of these, compare
JENKS, supra note 8, especially ch. 11.
16 Discussed recently in Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition,
and the Supreme Court 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
12
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cannot spoil an institution of proved and accepted worth. It
can, to the contrary, help to rid it of impediments to its continuing social merit.
It is not essential to a rejection of irrationality as a strategy
for enhancing the social worth of the Court that one reject all
expectations of dubious empirical validity, or even outright
misconceptions of the nature of adjudicative techniques, are
bound to compromise the integrity of the process or lead to its
disintegration once exposed. To begin with, this simply is not
the case. It is no longer a novel proposition that bell, book and
candle have as legitimate a claim to the history of adjudication
as a social decision process as do, say, reason and social justice.
Indeed, in our own country's judicial history the generous allocation of decision-making prerogatives to courts of law, although owing in part to the Supreme Court's early and successful appropriation of the power to review the acts of other
branches of government for their constitutionality,1" seems to
have its ultimate source in some essentially emotional attitudes
toward authority and decisiveness which in our society are transferred in a collective way to judicial tribunals, especially our
highest ones. Whether this generosity would have been as
lavish if popular attitudes towards adjudication were required
to undergo some test of empirical validity is problematical.
Nonetheless, if social influence is a proper measure of institutional vigor, then one cannot help but observe, in the spirit of
de Tocqueville, that we have become highly accustomed to reducing to legal value symbols and to resolving in judicial
combat an imposing variety of social conflicts embracing contending social values.'"
The point, in any event, is not that all irrational attitudes
must be swept away in the name of institutional integrity, regardless of whether the institution expires in the process. It is
that any inquiry whose purpose is the redirection of institutional energies to more empirically relevant ends cannot be
oblivious to transempirical directives when these are apparent
or implicit in the institution's work product. It is, moreover,
that such redirection of energies must proceed rationally to be
worthwhile.

Cf. A. M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), especially ch. 1.
IS A circumstance not al.ways regarded as wholesome, e.g., D. Acheson,
The Purloined Papers, New York Times, July 7, 1971 at 37, col. 1.
17
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Dangers Inherent in Reified
Identity

2.

Concepts of
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Institutional

Reified concepts of the Court's identity, often concepts
which assume fixed characteristics about the institution on
the basis of its terminological identity alone, usually appear
in the form of statements that the Court, because it is a court
of law-or the judges, because they are juridical beingsmust adhere to some line of reasoning or, in the negative, must
not undertake some proposed inquiry or follow some proposed
line of reasoning. To do otherwise, so the logic suggests, is to
deprive the resulting judgment of its judicial character. Taken
literally, the norm appears to prohibit inquiry into the decision
to which it leads, let alone its policy content. It runs, to borrow
Karl Llewellyn's phrase, in deductive form with an air or expression of single-line inevitability.'" Thus, in the Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons, Preliminary Objections, the Court
observed:
There are inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial
function which the Court, as a Court of Justice, can never ignore.
There may thus be an incompatibility between the desires of an
applicant, or, indeed, of both parties to a case, on the one hand,
and on the other hand the duty of the Court to maintain its judiparties, must be the
cial character. The Court itself, and not the
20
guardian of the Court's judicial integrity.

Because the consequences of "losing" the presumed judicial
character are often, as here, left ominously vague, and because
that character tends to be identified on an ad hoc, rather than
a systematic basis, the sentiment expressed in Northern Cameroons by the Court easily lends itself to service as euphemistic
rationale for decisional preferences which result, consciously
or unconsciously, from unidentified policy considerations. One
recalls in this vein a comment of the late Judge Lauterpachtindicative of his judicial perspective although in fact written
in 1949 prior to his election to the Court-in which he noted ...
that judicial rules of construction are:
not the determining cause of judicial decision, but the form in
which the judge cloaks a result arrived at by other means . . .
[T]he very choice of any single rule or of a combination . . .
of them is the result of a judgment arrived at independently of
any rules of construction, by reference 21to considerations of good
faith, of justice, and of public policy.
19K.

20
21

LLEWELLYN,

THE

COMMON

LAW

TRADrnION-DECIDING

APPEALS

38

(1960).
[1963] I.C.J. Rep. at 29.
Restrictive Interpretationand the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 48, 52 (1949).
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Accordingly, there is cause for suspicion when the Court appears to resign itself to purportedly unalterable rules of inquiry.
No doubt, there are practical limits beyond which the Court
itself, operating within its distinctive political environment,
ought to pursue the resolution of a question before it. It is
when presumed limits are pronounced in the name of judicial
verities, without reference to empirical distinctions among
courts, that the Court's submission to the fates of adjudication
tends to become illusory self-denial of the existence of judicial
choice. The more ambiguous the source or reference of the
presumed imperatives, naturally, the more likely it is that a
denial of judicial choice serves to conceal-even from the
judges themselves-the fact that the judges, not the imperatives, are actually responsible for the results which follow.
The presence of imperatives which conceal judicial volition
is most apparent in cases whose outcome promises to be controversial, where the nature of the dispute before them leaves
the judges with no real alternative to performing transparently
coordinate political functions. Especially for an undecided
judge, the illusion of preordained passivity serves to soothe an
uneasy conscience and, perhaps, to persuade him to accede to
what is apt to be the more unpopular of several possible
rulings. Willy-nilly, a judge may reason (or instinctively feel),
in merely being a judge he is not doing anything for which it
would be proper to hold him personally accountable.
This calls to mind an observation of Justice Holmes, viz:
I think it is important to remember whenever a doubtful case
arises, with analogies on one side and other analogies on the other,

that what is really before us is a conflict between two social
desires, each of which seeks to extend its dominion over the case,
and which cannot both have their way.... When there is doubt
the simple tool of logic does not suffice, and even if it is disguised
or unconscious, the judges are called upon to exercise the sov22
ereign prerogative of choice.

In the tradition of legal realism, Justice Holmes' insights
seem self-evident. Yet, when competition between social ideas
finds its way into the courtroom, courts come under attack for
venturing beyond their rightful limits and efforts are made to
distinguish judicial functions from political ones. Where constitutional guidelines distribute authority among various branches
of government, typically the case in national political systems,
the distinction concentrates on the branch of government whose
authority the courts are allegedly usurping. However, the U.N.
22

"Law in Science and Science in Law," in Collected Legal Papers 229
(1920), cited in E.

RoSTOW, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE

(1962), at xiii.
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political system is not possessed of an analogous distribution
of political authority and, as Rosenne points out, "while it is
frequently possible in the Charter to differentiate between
[particular] functions, it is quite another matter when it comes
to differentiating either the organs, or the applicable techniques. '23 Often, when the Court itself considers whether or
not to deal with a particular issue because the issue is intertwined with political considerations, its frame of reference is
a reified concept of the Court as a judicial - which is sometimes to say, non-political - institution. 24 Justiciability tends to
be regarded as an unchanging quality, reified along with the
Court's institutional identity.
3.

The South West Africa Litigation

What brings these thoughts to mind is the prolonged South
West Africa litigation, particularly its two most recent episodes. The litigation, it will be recalled, grew out of the extension by the Republic of South Africa of its domestic racial
policies into territory - "South West Africa" or, as it is now
called in the U.N., "Namibia" - it administers as the result
of a League of Nations mandate (hereinafter the "Mandate").
The original gravamen of the complaint against South Africa
was that its administration of the Mandate has been inconsistent
with applicable international standards and a violation of its
obligations under Article 2 of the Mandate "to promote to the
utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory." South Africa has
denied the charges and has maintained that, in any event, with
the dissolution of the League of Nations the League's supervisory rights over the administration of the Mandate have
lapsed and neither the U.N. nor former members of the League
have succeeded to the League's legal rights or interests therein.
The legal issues to which the dispute has been reduced have
been overshadowed, by and large, by its political, indeed ideological, content. Legality, as dispensed by the Court, has been
a symbol for social propriety, for conformity with the Charter
23 ROSENNE,
24

supra note 10, at 3.

The present writer has previously had occasion to describe the distinction
between judicial and political tasks appearing in the Court's own jurisprudence. GORDON, supra note 3, at 800. He concluded then, as he does
now that the Court would one day be drawn to the conclusion that legal
and political tasks are not mutually exclusive, that adjudication is a social
process which rightly and inherently interacts with all other important
institutions and processes of organized society, and that especially for
the Court, given its hybrid judicial-diplomatic character -little is accomplished and much is concealed from analysis by any attempt to
place the two functional areas in dialectical opposition.
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or, to the extent that general principles of international law
circumscribe the goal-objectives of the Charter, for conformity
with general international law. However, for the Court, the
matter has also evoked root questions of its competence to hear
and decide a dispute which has been social and political, as
well as, above all, controversial.
By 1966 the matter had come before the Court in one context or another on five occasions. In 1950, responding to a request from the General Assembly, the Court handed down an
advisory opinion2 5 to the effect that the Territory was still
under international mandate; that South Africa retained her
international obligations under the Mandate; that the supervisory powers, particularly the right to receive and examine
annual reports from South Africa, previously exercised by the
League, were to be exercised by the U.N.; and that South
Africa was not competent to modify the international status
of the Territory without the U.N.'s consent. In 195526 and
1956,27 in each instance at the request of the General Assembly,
the Court handed down further opinions confirming the supervisory role of the U.N. over South Africa's administration of
the Mandate.
(a)

The South West Africa Cases

The parties to the Statute do not undertake to be bound by
the Court's advisory opinions, however, and South Africa not
unexpectedly refused to accept the three opinions pertaining
to the Mandate. In reaction, the Empire of Ethiopia and the
Republic of Liberia, the only African States other than South
Africa which had been members of the League, initiated contentious proceedings against South Africa in 1960, attempting
thereby to transform the Court's previous opinions into a "binding" judgment which might be enforced by the Security Council under Article 94 of the Charter. 2s The applicants asked the
Court to confirm its earlier rulings and to declare, in so many
25 International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128.
26 Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South West Africa, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 67.
27 Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West
Africa, [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 23.
28 Article 94 of the Charter provides as follows:
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with the decisicn of the International Court of Justice in any case to
which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party
may have recourse to the Security Council which may, if it deems
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the judgment.

74

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 1

words, that South Africa had violated its obligations under
the Mandate.
In 1961, South Africa raised certain preliminary objections29 which, under the Court's procedural rules, had the effect
of suspending the proceedings on the merits. The objections
were based upon the language of Article 7(2) of the Mandate,
which provides that:
if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory
and another member of the League of Nations relating to the
interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate,
such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

and Article 37 of the Statute, which states that:
whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of
a matter . . . to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
matter shall be referred to the International Court of Justice.

South Africa contended that the Mandate was not a "treaty
or convention in force" within the meaning of Article 37;
neither of the applicants could be described as "another member of the League of Nations" as required for locis standi by
Article 7(2) of the Mandate; there was no dispute as envisaged
by Article 7(2) in that no material interests of the applicants
or of their nationals were involved; and the applicants had
made no attempt to negotiate a settlement of the dispute with
South Africa.
By a vote of eight to seven, the Court dismissed these objections, remarking at one point that:
[T]he manifest scope and purport of the provisions of [Article 7]
indicate that the Members of the League were understood to have
a legal right or interest in the observance by the Mandatory of
its obligations both toward the inhabitants of the Mandated Territory, and toward the League of Nations and its members.30

However, in 1966, in the proceedings on the merits- the socalled Second Phase,31 -the
Court in effect reversed itself,
this time when a seven to seven tie vote was broken, pursuant
to the Statute, 32 by the casting vote of the President of the
Court, Sir Percy Spender. The Court decided that the applicants had not established any legal right or interest in the subject matter of their claim, that is, in the observance by South
Africa of its obligations under the Mandate.
To reach this conclusion, the Court chose to review the
South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 319.
Id. at 343.
31 South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, [1966] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
3
2 Art. 55(2).
29
30
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entire mandate system, not just the Mandate itself, for it felt
that the Mandate enjoyed certain features in common with the
other mandates. The substantive provisions of mandates, the
Court found, could be divided into two categories: first, those
articles defining the mandatory's obligations in respect of the
inhabitants of the territory and toward the League (which the
Court labelled "conduct" provisions); and second, articles conferring rights relative to the mandated territory directly upon
members of the League as individual States, or in favor of
their nationals (which the Court called "special interests" provisions). The Court determined that the dispute before it related solely to the conduct provisions of the Mandate and that
these provisions did not confer any legal right or interest in
individual members of the League. Not even the subsequent
dissolution of the League could have invested its members
with legal rights or interests in the conduct provisions, the
Court said, inasmuch as the mandatories were agents of the
League, not of its members individually, so that it followed
that the applicants could not possess after the League's dissolution rights of intervention they had not possessed while it
was still in existence. Therefore, case dismissed.
Professor Dugard subsequently summarized the Court's explanation of its different treatment in 1966 of the issue, apparently resolved in applicants' favor in 1962, of their standing
to sue:
In brief the Court held that in 1962 it had been faced solely
with a question of jurisprudence and that it had not been called
upon to decide whether the applicants had an interest in the due
performance by South Africa of her obligations under the Mandate (even if it had done so in a 'provisional' way). This was a
question for determination at the merits stage, irrespective of
whether it was classified as a question relating to the merits
but of an 'antecedent character' or as a question relating to the
33
admissibility of the claim.

The "antecedent character" of the question demanded its resolution at the outset of the Court's consideration of the merits of
the rival claims, the Court held. To say the least, this priority
struck some observers as contrived, result-oriented, and in any
event the result of, not the reason for, the majority's decision
to deny applicants' claim. At the same time, incidentally or
not, treating the question as antecedent and deciding it against
33

The reader's attention is drawn to this concise and lucid summary of the
South West Africa litigation through 1966 by Professor John Dugard of
the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, which appears under the
title, The South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, 1966, 83 S. AFR. L. J.

429, 440 (1966).
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the applicants at the outset enabled the court to avoid the
gravamen of their complaint.
One auxiliary participant in the litigation, recalling its
planned and inadvertent strategies, has likened litigation to a
two-person zero-sum game in which plaintiff and defendant
stand to win or lose the same precisely defined amount.34 Even
assuming there are only two litigants, matters often do not
work out so neatly in practice, especially if one is inclined
to regard the court as a third participant in any litigation and
the relevant community as a fourth. Yet, to the extent that
what were at stake in the South West Africa Cases were, first,
a value symbol and, second, an effort to transform a previous
judicial allocation of that value symbol into effective social
action, South Africa may be said to have "won" and the applicants, for the time being at least, to have "lost." For this to
have happened it was not essential that the Court decide the
substantive issues in South Africa's favor. Even without deciding these issues, the Court left the impression that international
law does not forbid what South Africa is doing in the Territory.
That this impression is not strictly justified by the logic or
specific holding of the decision does not alter the fact that it
was widely enough held for South Africa thereafter to adopt
a posture of legality for its administration of South West
Africa.3 5
It could hardly have escaped notice that one practical explanation for the Court's change of heart between 1962 and
1966 was the intervening change in the composition of the
bench. Judges Badawi and Bustamente, each of whom had
voted against South Africa's preliminary objections, were unable to participate in the merits phase because of ill health
(Judge Badawi died during the pendency of the proceedings).
Judge Zafrullah Khan, apparently against his own wishes, was
persuaded to recuse himself, perhaps because of the partisanship
implicit in his having been appointed ad hoc judge by the applicants prior to being elected to the Court as a regular member.
Such shifts in the Court's ideological center of gravity, not surprising in view of the length of the litigation,36 serve to remind
its critics that the Court is not as utterly depoliticized a process
:14 D'Amato, Legal and Political Strategies of the South West Africa Liti-

gation, 4 L. IN TRANs. Q. 8 (1967).
When the Security Council later came to reintroduce the matter to the
judicial arena, infra, one factor bearing on its decision to do so was a
desire to deny this posture to South Africa. See S.W. Africa Plea to
World Court, The Times (London), July 31, 1970.
:1 Dugard, supra note 33, at 434.
35
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as some abstract theory would have it. Indeed, judicial history
everywhere testifies to its interplay with social tensions, however abrasive they may be, however momentous the interests
at stake, however reluctant courts may be to become involved
in what appears as open competition with other decision-making
institutions. If Professor Falk is correct in describing as carelessness the failure of Afro-Asian countries to oppose the election of judges to the Court who held views antithetical to their
main concerns, 3 perhaps a contributing factor was a mistaken
assumption that courts of law are by their very nature insulated from social and political tensions.
It should be kept in mind that the 1966 decision did not
specifically disturb the Court's previous findings, in 1950, to the
effect that the U.N. had succeeded to the supervisory functions
of the League. 3 The general thrust of the Court's holding in
1966 was that the Court itself was not suited to resolve the
question before it, because it is just a court of law. The reasoning was foreshadowed in 1962 in the joint dissenting opinion
of Judges Fitzmaurice and Spender, their voice later becoming
that of the majority in the Second Phase:
The proper forum for the appreciation and application of a
provision of this kind [i.e., Article 2 of the Mandate] is unques-

tionably a technical or political one, such as (formerly) the Permanent Mandate Commission, or the Council of the League of

Nations-or today (as regards Trusteeships), the Trusteeship
Council and the Assembly of the United Nations.
added.) 39

(Emphasis

Unquestionably? But then what is the source of an unquestionable directive for the Court to eschew the interpretation of an
instrument which allegedly gives rise to international legal
obligations, a task, the Court regularly declares, which is a
40
distinctly judicial one?
American courts have found that whether or not they are
ideally suited in each instance to deal with the disputes they
are asked to resolve, there is little likelihood that they will
readily be forgiven for attempting to excuse themselves from
the task, particularly if in doing so they appear to be deciding
the dispute obliquely and arbitrarily, according to some implicit
37 Falk, Realistic Horizons for International Adjudication, 11 VA. J. INT'L L.
314, 319 (1971).
38
See Dugard, The Revocation of the Mandate for South West Africa, 62
AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 82 (1968).
:s [1962] I.C.J. Rep. at 467.
40

E.g., P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 10, at 17; P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 13, at 23; Conditions
of Admission case, supra note 3, at 61; Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. at 155-56; and the Namibia opinion, infra at 24.
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partisanship. Courts tend to be judged less by the niceties of
their internal logic than by the social consequences of their
decisions; 41 thus, for the Court to declare itself unfit to decide
a matter which had been before it for five years is to raise
grave doubts abouts its capacity to deal empirically with the
content of contemporary international legal disputes.
In citing an unquestionable state of judicial propriety, the
Court might have been expected to refer to the Charter, its
ultimate constitutive instrument, but it did not. In its Awards
of the Administrative Tribunal Opinion,42 the Court had taken
the position that it would be inconsistent with the Charter's
expressed aim of advancing the cause of freedom and justice
for individuals, and with the preoccupation of the U.N. to promote this aim, for there to be no judicial or arbitral remedy.
available for the claims of the U.N.'s own staff. In its selfdenial of the propriety of a judicial remedy for the inhabitants
of the Territory, however, the Court seemed to be unaware
or unwilling to concede that it, too, derives its institutional
objectives from the Charter. Certainly, the charge that the
Territory's inhabitants were being systematically deprived of
their individual freedom and justice is as deserving of judicial
attention as the grievances which the U.N.'s administrative
tribunal is likely to hear.
In fact, the case's humanitarian aspects were so pronounced
that the Court felt obliged to explain its refusal to consider
them, viz:
Throughout this case it has been suggested, directly or indirectly,
that humanitarian considerations are sufficient in themselves to
generate legal rights and obligations, and that the Court can and
should proceed accordingly. The Court does not think so. It is
a court of law, and can take account of moral principles only in
so far as these are given a sufficient expression in legal form. Law
exists, it is said, to serve a social need; but precisely for that
reason it can do so only through and within the limits of its own
discipline. Otherwise, it is not a legal service that would be
rendered.
...Humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational
basis for rules of law, just as, for instance, the preambular parts
of the United Nations Charter constitute the moral and political
basis for the specific legal provisions thereafter set forth. Such
considerations do not, however, in themselves amount to rules
of law. All States are interested - have an interest - in such
41
42

Cf. A. M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 175
(1970).
Advisory Opinion on the Effects of Awards of Compensation by the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 57. See also
Judge Read's dissenting opinion in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., [1952] I.C.J.
Rep. 143-44.
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matters. But the existence of an 'interest' does not of itself entail
43
that this interest is specifically juridical in character.

It has been suggested earlier that transempirical imperatives
which stem from reified concepts of the Court's institutional
identity are apt to become the sleeves of judicial legerdemain.
The preceding excerpt is an example of a jurisprudential habit
which has lingered on without any regard for a change in
juridical environment. For if one simply accepts its appropriateness in the world community, and if its logic is to be taken
at its word, then in the absence of an authoritative legislature of international law even the most widely-shared comprinciples, standards, goal-objecmunity expectations -rules,
tives-will be unlikely to possess "sufficient expression in
legal form," until they have been translated into non-preambular treaty prescriptions. Yet, one knows that the Court does
not-under

Article

38(1)

of

its

Statute it

cannot-ignore

custom or general principles of law recognized internationally.
The Court's invocation of presumed juridical imperatives thus
only serves to conceal how the individual judges go about
deciding which community expectations should be judicially
supported, which expectations should qualify as sufficiently
important or fundamental to be vindicated against what are
44
presumed to be natural limits of the judicial process.
45
(b) The Namibia Opinion
Professor Falk has suggested that some members of the
Court may have been subconsciously reacting to the experience
4
of the Court's Certain Expenses opinion and decided that it
was better for the Court not to decide at all than to decide
and then have its decision ignored:

In essence, the Fitzmaurice-Spender view of the ICJ role, which
carried the day, opposed entrusting any role to the Court which
of the political organs
might make it carry out judicially the will
47
of the U.N.; better not to decide at all.

In any case, following the announcement of the Court's decision,
the General Assembly took matters into its own hands, passing
a resolution 48 which declared that:
South Africa has failed to fulfill its obligations in respect of the
administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral
43

[1966] I.C.J. Rep. 24.

44 Cf. BICKEL, supra note 17, at 55.

Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 16.
46Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. at 155-56.
47 Falk, supra note 37, at 317-18.
48 G. A. Res. 2145 (XXI); 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 649 (1967).
45
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and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa, and has, in fact, disavowed the
Mandate.

and decided that:
the Mandate conferred upon his Britannic Majesty to be exercised
on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa
is therefore terminated, that South Africa has no other right to
administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa
comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations.

The General Assembly continued to pursue the matter, implementing the foregoing resolution with one establishing a United
Nations Council for Namibia to administer the Territory until
49
independence.
It is worth recalling that the General Assembly did not ask
the Court for assistance in determining the lawfulness of South
Africa's administration of the Territory. Professor Dugard noted
at the time"° that the General Assembly had refrained from
doing so because (1) the Court might have declined to give
an opinion in accordance with the ruling in the Eastern Carelia
Case5 ' that its advisory machinery should not be used for obtaining a decision in an actual dispute between States; (2) after
the 1966 decision the Assembly was reluctant to send the matter back to the Court at all; (3) advisory opinions are not binding and South Africa had refused to accept the three earlier
ones; and (4) an advisory opinion dealing with South Africa's
compliance with the Mandate could do no more than augment
the judicial guidance the Assembly had already received in the
separate opinions of those judges who, in 1966, did direct their
attention to the ultimate merits of the dispute. Of the six
judges (out of fourteen) who examined the compatibility of
South Africa's administration of the Mandate in terms of the
obligation "to promote to the utmost" the welfare of the inhabitants of the Territory, only the South African, Judge ad hoc
52
Van Wyk, found in favor of South Africa.
The General Assembly, accordingly, arrived at its own findings and enlisted the cooperation of the Security Council,
which thereupon proceeded on the basis of the Assembly's
resolution. On March 29, 1969, the Council called upon South
Africa to immediately withdraw its administration from the
G. A. Res. 2248 (s-v), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6657
(1967). See generally, Dugard, supra note 38; and Engers, The United
Nations Travel and Identity Document for Namibians, 65 AM. J. INT'L L.
571 (1971).
5 Dugard, supra note 38, at 82-83.
51 Eastern Carelia Case, [1923] P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 5.
52 [1966] I.C.J. Rep. 140-193.
41)
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Territory;5 3 on August 12, 1969, it once again called upon South
Africa to withdraw, "in any case before 4 October 1969;" ' on
January 30, 1970, it decided inter alia to establish an ad hoc
sub-committee to study, in consultation with the SecretaryGeneral, ways and means by which the relevant resolutions of
the Council could be effectively implemented;;- and, finally, on
July 29, 1970, the Council adopted a recommendation of the
sub-committee and requested the Court to render an advisory
opinion on the question:
What are the legal consequences for States of the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security
Council resolution 276 (1970)?5"

Nearly a year later, on June 21, 1971, the Court handed down
an opinion in which it found (1) (by a vote of 13 to 2) that
the continued presence of South Africa in the Territory being
illegal, South Africa is under an obligation to withdraw its
administration therefrom immediately and thus put an end to
its occupation of the Territory; (2) (by a vote of 11 to 4) that
Members of the U.N. are under an obligation to recognize the
illegality of South Africa's presence in the Territory and the
invalidity of its acts on behalf of the Territory, and to refrain
from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of,
or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration. The latter conclusion was supplemented with one which
found it incumbent upon States which are not members of the
U.N. to give assistance, within the scope of the foregoing, in
the action which has been taken by-the U.N. with regard to the
57
Territory.
Once it decided to render an opinion, the Court was obliged
to deal with two substantive issues: first, the competence of
the U.N. to supervise the Mandate; and second, the liability
of the Mandate to (unilateral) revocation. 58 With respect to
the first of these, the Court relied heavily on its 1950 opinion,
observing that the well-being and development of the inhabitants of the mandated territories formed a "sacred trust of
civilization." The best method of giving practical effect to this
53 S.

C. Res. 264 (1969).

54 S.

C. Res. 269 (1969).
Res. 276 (1970).
Res. 284 (1970).

55 S. C.
56S. C.
.7
58

[1971] I.C.J. Rep. 31-32.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Fitzmaurice writes that in respect of both
these issues, "[T]he findings of the Ceurt involve formidable legal difficulties which the Opinion turns rather than meets, and sometimes hardly
seems to notice at all."
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principle, the Court said, quoting from Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, was for "the tutelage of such peoples ...
[to] be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their
resources, their experience or their geographical position can
best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept
it. . .

."

The acceptance of a mandate on these terms consti-

tuted the assumption of a binding legal obligation, the Court
found, and the question of quis custodiet ipsos custodes? had
been given in terms of the Mandatory's accountability to international organs. Annexation of the mandated territories, towards
which the Court felt South Africa was hinting, was deemed
fundamentally at odds with the foregoing principles.
South Africa had suggested that if it were maintained
the Mandate had lapsed, then she - South Africa - would have
the right to administer the Territory by reason of a combination of factors: its original conquest; its long occupation; the
continuation of the sacred trust basis agreed to in 1920; and
"because its administration is to the benefit of the inhabitants
of the Territory and is desired by them."51 This latter point
was supported, in effect, by two offers made by South Africa
during the hearings. The first of these, deferred by the Court
at the time (March, 1971), but subsequently rejected in light
of its findings, proposed the holding of a plebiscite in the Territory under the Court's supervision, to determine whether it
was the wish of the inhabitants "that the Territory should continue to be administered by the South African Government or
6
should henceforth be administered by the United Nations." 0
The second proposal, disposed of in an identical way by the
Court, was for the Court to permit South Africa to present
material bearing on the actual state of well-being and development of the inhabitants. In deferring action on the two proposals, the Court had said it did not want to anticipate, or
appear to anticipate, its decision.
The problem which the proposals posed for the Court was
that either of them would have put it into competition with
the General Assembly, since that body had presumably borne
in mind the administration of the Mandate in reaching its findings. It will be recalled that the Security Council had not asked
the Court to review the Assembly's findings and that the
Court's 1966 decision had left the distinct impression that the
Court prefers to leave such matters to other organs of the U.N.
When the Court ultimately came to reject South Africa's two
[1971] I.C.J. Rep. 43.
6OId. at 20.
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proposals, therefore, it did so on the grounds that
determined that the Mandate had been validly
the General Assembly and that "in consequence
presence in Namibia and its acts on behalf of
Namibia are illegal and invalid."' 1

it had already
terminated by
South Africa's
or concerning

Several governments had challenged the Assembly's adoption of resolution 2145 on the grounds that it had acted ultra
vires. The Court was thus confronted with the problem of
whether to assume the validity of the Assembly's action or to
subject it to judicial review. The canons of interpretation open
to the Court were rife; it could find support for the proposition
that, on the one hand, it completely lacked authority to review
actions taken by other organs of the U.N. without their specific
request to do so or, on the other hand, that judicial review was
implicitly authorized in the Security Council's request for an
advisory opinion (since it must have foreseen that no legal
organ would find legal consequences in attion which had been
invalid ab initio).
What the Court chose to do was to say one thing and do
another; that is, to first declare itself without authority to
initiate judicial review, and, having satisfied one and all on that
score, to immediately thereupon declare it would undertake
such a review in the exercise of its judicial function:
Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review
or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations
organs concerned. The question of the validity or conformity with
the Charter of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) or of related Security Council resolutions does not form the subject of
the request for [this] advisory opinion. However, in the exercise
of its judicial function and since objections have been advanced
the Court, in the course of its reasoning, will consider these obany legal consequences arising from
jections before determining
62
these resolutions.
In context, "will consider" appears to be a euphemism for "has

already decided to reject" and "in the course of its reasoning"
seems to mean "in rationalizing conclusions it has arrived at
through other determinants." In political terms, the Court was
saying that it recognized itself to be without authority to review
or act as appellate court from actions taken by other principal
organs without their specific request to do so, but that no harm
would be done by its undertaking the forbidden review in the
instant case. And no harm was done, the Court upholding the
validity of both the Assembly's and the Council's actions.
61 Id. at 57-58.
62

Id. at 45.
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The Council's action was relatively easy to identify as being
in furtherance of its responsibilities under Chapter V of the
Charter. The Assembly's action was held to be a termination
of a relationship on account of "a deliberate and persistent
violation of obligations which destroys the very object and purpose of that relationship." To the contention that, since the
Covenant had not explicitly conferred upon the Council of the
League the right to terminate a mandate for misconduct of
the mandatory, the U.N. could not have succeeded to any such
power, the Court responded by invoking a general principle of
law that a right to terminate on account of breach must be
presumed to exist in all treaties, except-the Court remembered its 1950 finding that South Africa could not unilaterally
modify the status of the Territory - as regards provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties
of a humanitarian character. Thus, in the Court's view, the
revocability of the mandates by the supervisory power had been
envisaged from the outset of the mandate system.
It had been maintained that the Assembly, not being a
judicial organ and not having previously referred the matter
to such an organ, was not competent to make its findings as to
the status of the Mandate. Referring for the only time in its
opinion to its 1966 decision, the Court recalled that the applicants had been told in that case that they lacked the right to
require the due performance of the sacred trust and that any
divergencies of view concerning the conduct of a mandate had
their place in the political field, the settlement of which lay
between the mandatory and the competent organs of the League.
To deny to a political organ of the United Nations which is a successor of the League in that respect the right to act, on the argument that it lacks competence to render what is described as a
judicial decision, would not only be inconsistent but would amount
to a complete denial of the remedies available63 against fundamental breaches of an international undertaking.

That, and little more, is the gist of the opinion. If the Court
in 1966 saw fit to deny a judicial remedy, the Court in 1971
was not going to forbid a political one, for such a double denial
would amount to denying that the inhabitants of the Territory
could be protected under international law; in other words,
that their human rights were recognizable as legal ones. Correspondingly, the 1971 opinion should probably be read as
putting national sovereigns on record that they are answerable
c. Id. at 49. The Court also rejected an argument that resolution 2145
was invalid as a transfer of territory. Id. at 50.
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at law for deprivations of human rights when they are acting
in an international fiduciary capacity.
One aspect of the Court's handling of the case certain to be
criticized long after the furor of the dispute has subsided is
its insensitivity to charges of juridical bias, specifically directed
against the Republic of South Africa, its Government and its
representatives. Several of the separate opinions went out of
their way to commend the presentation of South Africa's case,
perhaps in recognition of the sometimes preemptory way in
which its various objections and requests were denied. Throughout the history of the Court, and its predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, the fact and appearance of impartiality have been scrupulously maintained by the Court.
Article 17(2) of the Statute provides that
No member [of the Court] may participate in the decision of any
case in which he has previously taken part as agent, counsel, or
advocate for one of the parties, or as a member of a national
or international court, or of a commission of enquiry, or in any
other capacity.
Paragraph 3 of Article 17 leaves to the Court the resolution of
any doubts as to the applicability of the provision in a given
instance, but the substance, clearly, puts a burden of proof on
a judge accused of violating the provision. In the South West
Africa Cases, as noted, Judge Zafrullah Khan had reluctantly
recused himself from sitting, a circumstance which has never
been publicly explained, but one nonetheless which hindsight
shows to have been decisive in the outcome of the judgment.
In Namibia, Zafrullah Khan was the President of the Court.
In Namibia, South Africa had objected to the participation
of three of the judges: Zafrullah Khan, Padilla Nervo and
Morozov. In each case, the objection was based upon what had
allegedly been statements and active participation by the judge
in the South West Africa dispute in his former capacity as representative of his government at the U.N. during the pendency
of the debates over the dispute. In Judge Morozov's case, these
activities allegedly continued through the period in which the
General Assembly was taking its substantive action upon which
the Security Council's request for an advisory opinion was based.
In Judge Zafrullah Kahn's case, attention was also drawn to
his having been named as ad hoc judge by Ethiopia and Liberia
in the South West Africa Cases, prior to his election as a regular member of the Court. 4
64 See Statement of the Government of South Africa dated November 19,
1970, at 121-26 and Annexes B, C, D and F to ch. IV thereof [hereinafter
cited as 1970 statement].

86

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 1

The Court rejected all three objections, citing its refusal
to accede to a similar objection to the composition of the bench
by South Africa in the South West Africa Cases65 (but neglecting to point out that the vote to deny South Africa's objection
in that instance had been a mere 8 to 6), and also citing four
PCIJ "precedents" which, presumably, bear on the point at
issue. 6 The Court took no note of Zafrullah Khan's having
recused himself in 1966.
The present writer must acknowledge his inability to comprehend the similarity between the situations involved in the
precedents and the statements and activities complained of
by South Africa in extensio. One of the precedents, in fact,
turned on a specific finding that the previous functions whose
compatibility was in question (the judge himself having asked
the Court for guidance) were not objectionable "since they had
been exercised before the dispute actually before the Court had
arisen. 0 6 7 Inasmuch as the Court's opinion in Namibia integrates the General Assembly's action in adopting resolution
2145 with the subsequent Security Council action leading to
the request for an advisory opinion, it is difficult to see how the
precedent applies, particularly in the case of Judge Morozov.
The Court must have regarded the instances it cited as
verification of the principle that service as a representative of
one's government does not in itself bring Article 17 into play.
However, the judges to whom South Africa had objected were
ones who it maintained had played such leading and outspoken
roles in the attacks on South Africa as to far exceed the
normal bounds of representative advocacy. Indeed, it is difficult
to perceive the rational basis on which the Court was able to
conclude that previous activities of the three judges did other
than cast doubt on the impartiality of the judges themselves
and, for that matter, on the bench as a whole. It is possible, of
course, that the Court drew upon material not available to the
public, in which case it would have been more candid to reveal
the existence of such sources than to cite previously decided
instances of dubious comparability. It should be noted that five
judges expressed serious reservations about the Court's rejection
of South Africa's objections to the composition of the bench.
South Africa's request for the appointment of an ad hoc
65 Order dated 18 March 1965.
66 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 1, at 11; P.C.I.J. ser. C, No. 84, at 535; P.C.I.J. ser. E,
No. 4, at 270; P.C.I.J. ser. E, No. 8, at 251.
67

P.C.I.J. ser. E, No. 4, at 270. See also P.C.I.J. ser. E, No. 6, at 282; and

compare P.C.I.J. ser. E, No. 7, at 287.
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judge was also rejected. 8 From the Court's opinion, it appears
that this denial resulted from a finding that the Court was not
acting "upon a legal question actually pending between two or
more States," these being the words of Rule 83 of the Court's
rules of procedure which brings into play Article 31 of the
Statute (that being the provision for the appointment of ad hoc
judges). South Africa, recalling the 1962 decision, contended
that if it had been correctly decided, then the relevant legal
question before the Court did indeed relate to an existing dispute between South Africa and other States"6 The existence of
such a dispute was also relevant to South Africa's claim that
the Court, in the exercise of its discretion under Article 65(1)
of the Charter, ought to decline to give an opinion.
South Africa advanced two sets of factors for the Court to
bear in mind in deciding whether or not to entertain the question posed by the Security Council. The first was the immensity
of the political pressure to which the Court had been subjected
as a result of its 1966 decision and the continuing pressure it was
allegedly under to "make amends" by deciding against South
Africa in the instant case. 0 The Court replied in the imperative:
It would not be proper for the Court to entertain these observations, bearing as they do on the very nature of the Court
as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, an organ
which, in that capacity, acts only on the basis of the law, inde-

pendently of all outside interference or interventions whatsoever,
in the exercise of the judicial functions entrusted to it alone
A court functioning as a court of
by the Charter and its Statute.
71
law can act in no other way.
Self-righteous indignation often, as here, is a diversionary tactic,
avoiding the question by pretending that it is so preposterous
that its mere consideration is an unworthy enterprise. Nevertheless, say what it will, the Court had been put on notice and publicly, too - that its choice was between coming into
harmony with the attitude toward South Africa prevailing in
the General Assembly and Security Council, on the one hand,
and going out of existence, on the other.7 2 The correct response
Order dated 29 January 1971.
69 1970 statement, supra note 64, at 101.
70 Id. at 104 passim.
71 [1971] I.C.J. Rep. at 23.
68

72

Even in the General Assembly's Sixth Committee (Legal), the Court
was under attack. An initiative in that Committee to study ways of
enhancing the role of the Court evoked little enthusiasm other than
from its twenty initial sponsors, some outright hostility- mostly from
the Soviet Union, which maintains that the existing allocation of com-

petence among the U.N.'s organs ought not be reconsidered

-and

fairly widespread apathy. Sponsors of the initiative were obliged
to seek safety in a compromise resolution postponing until the twentysixth session of the General Assembly consideration of the question
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for the Court to have given would have consisted of an examination of its collective predispositions, to determine whether
the circumstances in which the question came before the Court
precluded its impartial adjudication. The statement that courts
of law, by their very nature, act independently of all outside
interference or interventions whatsoever is simply untenable;
they do not always do so, and as South Africa maintained,
ought to decline to hear any case presented in which the judiciary's collective impartiality or freedom from outside interference is seriously in doubt. In the international arena, that
doubt may be resolved in the first instance by the Court itself,
and in the final analysis by the political process which transforms the Court's rulings into social action. The Court, in
effect, chose to leave the matter entirely to the political process.
If you doubt our integrity, it appeared to say, that is too fundamental an objection for us to consider ourselves.
South Africa had put forward a second combination of
factors which, it said, compelled the conclusion that, even if
the Court were entitled to render an advisory opinion, it should
as a matter of judicial discretion decline to do so. Article
65(1) of the Statute authorizes the Court -but does not require
it - to give an advisory opinion on "any legal question" asked
of it by an authorized body. South Africa conceded that there
is no precise line between "legal" and "political" questions and
that a "political" question may also be a "legal" one.7 3 However, it felt that the question posed by the Security Council
was so intertwined with political issues and had a political
background in which the Court itself had become so embroiled
that the proper exercise of the Court's judicial functions was
seriously compromised. Moreover, South Africa contended, the
relevant legal dispute related to an existing dispute between
South Africa and other States, a circumstance which the Permanent Court, in the Eastern Carelia case, had regarded as rendering the advisory machinery of the Court inappropriate.
Finally, South Africa argued, in order -to answer the question
posed by South Africa the Court would have to decide legal
and factual issues which were actually in dispute, a circumof whether to establish an ad hoc committee to study the role of the

Court. Those who maintain hope for the prospects of international
adjudication will seek to enlist enough diplomatic support to establish
the committee, but even now the prospects for any substantive recommendations the committee may ultimately make are regarded as uncertain. Had the Namibia opinion gone in favor of South Africa, uncertainty might have become improbability.
73 1970 statement, supra note 64, at 102.
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stance which Eastern Carelia also noted as a factor leading to
its conclusion not to hear the question therein posed.
In that case, the Council of the League had requested an
opinion on whether the Peace Treaty of October 14, 1920
between Finland and Russia and an annexed Declaration thereto
by the Russian Delegation regarding the autonomy of Eastern
Carelia placed Russia under an obligation to Finland to carry
out the Treaty's provisions with respect to that region. Russia,
not a Member of the League, had categorically refused to take
part in the League's consideration of the dispute and had objected to the Court's hearing the case on the further grounds
that it was a matter falling within Russia's own domestic
jurisdiction.
Article 14 of the Covenant of the League, in effect at the
time of the Eastern Carelia case, authorized the Permanent
Court to render an advisory opinion on "any dispute or question
referred to it" by an authorized organ. The difference in language
between this Article 14 and Article 65 of the Statute has had the
effect, inter alia, of encouraging the Court to emphasize that
74
treaty interpretation, for example, is a distinctly judicial task;
however, as South Africa rightly maintained in its Statement,. 5
this did not mean that the interpretation of an international
instrument was invariably a task the Court ought to undertake.
In Eastern Carelia, the Court had declined to give an advisory opinion on several grounds, the first being that the
opinion bore upon an actual dispute between Finland and
Russia and that
It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other
States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind
of pacific settlement. 76
In addition, the Permanent Court had felt it inexpedient to
attempt to deal with the question because it turned upon a
determination of factual issues which the Court, in the absence
of Russia's cooperation, would be at a disadvantage in making.
In dicta for which the case has become noted, the Court then
said:
The Court is aware cf the fact that it is not requested to decide
a dispute, but to give an advisory opinion. This circumstance,
however, does not essentially modify the above considerations.
The question put to the Court is not one of abstract law, but concerns directly the main point of the controversy between FinSee Gordon, supra note 3, at 800.
75 1970 statement, supra note 64, at 101.
76 P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 5, at 27.
74

90

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VoL. 1

land and Russia, and can only be decided by an investigation into
the facts underlying the case. Answering the question would be
substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the
parties. The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding
77
[its] activity as a Court.

Distinguishing Eastern Carelia, the Court in Namibia pointed
out, inter alia, that South Africa had been a Member of the
United Nations, had been bound by the decision of its competent
organ to request an advisory opinion, and had actually appeared
before the Court and addressed itself to the merits. The Security Council's request did not relate to a legal dispute actually
pending between two or more States (or, for that matter, between South Africa and the U.N.):
It is not the purpose of the request to obtain the assistance of the
Court in the exercise of the Security Council's functions relating
to the pacific settlement of a dispute pending before it between
two or more States. The request is put forward by a United
Nations organ with reference to its own decisions and it seeks
Court on the consequences and implications of
advice from the
78
these decisions.

Some fact-finding is inherent in all advisory opinions, the Court
noted, adding that this had been true of the three previous
advisory opinions on South West Africa in which South Africa
had not seen fit to question the propriety of the Court's giving
Recalling its Genocide Convention opinion, 79 the Court oban opinion.
Recalling its Genocide Convention opinion, 79 the Court observed that a "reply to a request for an Opinion should not, in
principle, be refused."80 It found no compelling reasons to refuse
to do so in the instant case:
Moreover, [the Court] feels that by replying to the request it
would not only 'remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial
character' . . . , but [would] also discharge its functions as 'the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations'. ...81

The point the Court chose not to stress, once again, was
that the international law prevailing in the days of the Eastern
Carelia case (1923) was sovereignty-oriented, that the Premanent Court's dicta grew out of the notion that it could not
compel Russia to reach a pacific settlement. In other parts of
its Namibia opinion, the Court gave a detailed account of the
77 Id.

at 29.
7N[1971] I.C.J. Rep. at 24.

79 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. at 19.
80 [1971] I.C.J. Rep. at 27.
81 Id. The reference to remaining faithful to the requirements of its judicial character alludes to the Court's Advisory Opinion on the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Consultative Organization, [1960] I.C.J. Rep. at 150.

OLD ORTHODOXIES AMID NEW EXPERIENCES

changes in international law since the Mandate's origin, observing at one point that
its interpretation [of the Mandate] cannot remain unaffected by
the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the
United Nations and by way of customary law....

In this domain,

as elsewhere, the corpus juris gentium has been considerably enif it is faithfully to discharge its funcriched, and this the Court,
2
tions, may not ignore.6
In Namibia, unlike the South West Africa Cases, the Court
saw as its duty, or perhaps as its only life-sustaining choice,
following the political lead of the General Assembly and the
Security Council. From the standpoint of institutional wisdom
the Court's conclusion was understandable. Whether or not it
will serve the Court in the long run, however, remains to be
seen, for the Court is not apt to be judged favorably, in Hottelet's terms of reference, for merely surviving.
Nor, after the current anti-South Africa sentiment has gone
its historical way, is the Court's too avid rejection of that government's every claim likely to impress future analysts of the
principal judicial organ. Denunciation of South Africa's racial
policies may indeed be called for and one may not reasonably
doubt that the Mandate has been abused in this respect. That
the Court accepted as its own concurrent responsibility such
denunciation may be laudable in its own right, but does not
entirely redeem an otherwise uninspired judicial performance.
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The South West Africa litigation presented the Court with
prodigious problems, not so much because of the nature of the
dispute, as is often maintained, but because the dispute's history
attaches to two distinct periods in the modern development of
international law, periods which have been accompanied by corresponding changes in the nature of adjudication generally, and
the adjudicative process of the Court in particular. What distinguishes the South West Africa Cases from the Namibia opinion, as much as the specific holdings themselves, are the divergent expectations concerning the nature of the Court as a
decision-making process, the juridical relevance of the objectives
of the Charter and the social outcome of the Court's judgments,
and the role the Court should play within the larger political
process of which its decision-making is a part. These divergent
attitudes must be inferred; neither of the two judgments pauses
to consider them rationally.
82

[1971] I.C.J. Rep. at 31.
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Were the judges to have adopted an attitude of existential
.responsibility for developing the institution, in accordance with
the requirements of international life, then the troublesome
litigation discussed herein by now would have served the purpose of enhancing the potential utility of the Court to the world
community. However, beset by a decline in popular enchantment with international adjudication as a dispute settlement
modality, the judges have instead chosen to cling publicly to
outworn jurisprudential banners and to accept the verity of
reified concepts which, for the most part, are alienated from
rational and empirical judicial analysis. Dancing to rhythms the
band is no longer playing, the Court remains inelegantly out of
step, its latest judgment more popular than its earlier one, but
no less an attempt to vindicate old orthodoxies in the face of
new experiences.

FREEDOM OF EXPLORATION

AND USE IN THE

OUTER SPACE TREATY:

A

TEXTUAL ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION*
STEPHEN GOROVE**

The principle of freedom of exploration and use is a fundamental principle of the law of outer space.' It was enunciated
and unanimously approved by the United Nations2 and has
become a key provision in the Outer Space Treaty.3 Even a
cursory glance at this vital freedom suggests a number of significant questions. Who may exercise this freedom? What is its
scope and meaning? What does exploration and use involve?
What limitations are placed upon this freedom? Who must
observe its limitations?
I. WHO MAY EXERCISE THE FREEDOM?

The Outer Space Treaty provides that outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use. 4 One of the initial questions that comes to
*This article is an elaboration of the author's remarks before the XXI
Congress of the International Astronautical Federation on October 8,
1970, in Constance, Germany.
• Chairman of the Graduate Program of the School of Law and Professor
of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law.
1 There has been a steadily growing literature on the law of outer space.
The leading book on the subject is M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I.
VLAsIc, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE (1963). See also Christol, The
InternationalLaw of Outer Space, in 55 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1962 (1966); G. GAL, SPACE LAW (1969); C. JENKS,
SPACE LAW (1965); S. LAY, H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATLNG TO AcTViTIES OF MAN IN SPACE (1970).

2G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR 15, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.331 and Corr. 1
(1963); see also G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N. GAOR 6, U.N. Doc. A/1500
(1961).
3 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (hereinafter referred to as "Outer Space Treaty" or, simply
"Treaty") January 27, 1967, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 (effective October 10, 1967). For discussions of the Treaty, see for instance,
Adams, The Outer Space Treaty: An Interpretation in Light of the NoSovereignty Provision 9 HARv. INT'L L. J. 140 (1968); Dembling and
Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 32 J. AI L. & COM. 419
(1967); Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37
FoRDHAM L. REV. 349 (1969); Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary

Evaluation, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 507 (1967).
4 The full text of Article I of the Treaty which inter alia refers to free
exploration and use reads as follows:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefits and in the
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or
scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall
be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination
of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial
bodies.
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mind relates to the right to exercise this freedom. Who is
entitled to it: the signatory states or other states as well? The
language of the provision refers to "all" states and, for this
reason, there can be little doubt concerning the intention of
the parties.5
A further question concerns entities other than states, such
as international governmental organizations, nongovernmental
organizations and individuals. Does the reference to all "states"
preclude the exercise of this circumscribed freedom by international organizations? The answer to this question appears to be
in the negative. Had it been the intention of the drafters to
preclude entities other than states they could have inserted the
word "only" to make the phrase read "only by states." Even
then the effect of such stipulation would remain somewhat
uncertain unless international governmental organizations were
also made parties to the Treaty. The conclusion, that international governmental organizations are not precluded from the
exercise of this limited freedom is also reinforced by the Treaty
provision that when activities are carried on in outer space,
including the moon and celestial bodies, by an international
organization, responsibility for compliance with the Treaty is
to be borne both by the international organization and by the
states parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.,
The next question is whether or not nongovernmental organizations and individuals could invoke and benefit from the
principle and whether the restrictive connotations which are
spelled out in relation to states would be binding on them. The
fact that there is no "right of adventure" assured in the Treaty
for individuals is perhaps a negative expression of the intention of the drafters. The inclusion of such a right would likely
have gone well beyond the desires of those who regard private
initiative and enterprise as an important potential contributor
to the exploration and development of celestial bodies. While
some of the restrictions which limit the freedom of exploration
and use are clearly applicable only to states, the stipulation
that states bear international responsibility for national activities of nongovernmental entities underscores the idea of continued jurisdiction of states over nongovernmental entities,
including individuals and organizations. 7 Hence, the states
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space,

including the moon and cther celestial bodies, and states shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigation.
5 Treaty, Art. I.
6 Id., Art. VI.
7 Id.
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would be entitled to regulate extraterrestrial national activities
and exact from individuals and private organizations such
attitudes which they regard as essential and which correspond
to their Treaty obligations.
II.

SCOPE AND MEANING OF FREEDOM

Another initial but equally basic question which may be
raised in relation to freedom of exploration and use is whether
this freedom includes the option or choice not to exercise it.
In other words, could any state refrain from participating in
the exploration and use of outer space and thereby not avail
itself of this freedom? This question is not entirely hypothetical inasmuch as the Treaty stipulates that the parties "shall
carry on" activities in the exploration and use of outer space
in accordance with international law.8 The quoted phrase
"shall carry on" could be interpreted in two different ways.
It may mean simply that the activities of the signatories, whenever undertaken, must be in accordance with international law,
or possibly, it could mean that all parties to the Treaty pledge
themselves to carry on such activities in the described manner.
In the second case the parties would in fact obligate themselves
to carry on such exploratory activities and would not be free
not to engage in exploration and use. While the language of
the Treaty could have been phrased in such a way as to exclude
the second interpretation simply by stating that activities in
the exploration and use of outer space must be carried on in
accordance with international law, the first interpretation is to
be preferred since many signatories - at least for some time
not have the technological capability of engaging
to come -will
in extraterrestrial exploration and use.
III.
A.

EXPLORATION

AND USE

SCOPE OF CONCEPT

The first question that comes to mind with respect to the
phrase "exploration and use" relates to its coverage and scope.
How broad a concept is exploration and use? Is it possible to
visualize any human behavior in relation to celestial bodies or
other parts of outer space which would not constitute some
form of exploration or use? Could there be such a thing as
discovery of some fact which would not necessarily constitute
exploration and use? Perhaps not strictly speaking, because
even a perfunctory glance at the stars may involve some meas8 Id., Art. III.
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ure of exploration, very much like dreaming about the moon
may involve some indirect use in a very broad sense of the
term. However, in a more legalistic vein, exploration and use
would involve something more than mere gazing at the stars
or dreaming about the moon since the latter could hardly be
regarded as having to be carried out for the benefit of all countries. Also, such processes as thinking or dreaming would not,
by reasonable interpretation, be regarded as exploration or use.
A further question relating to scope and coverage is
whether or not every exploration and use necessarily involves
"activities." This is important inasmuch as Article I of the
Treaty speaks of "exploration and use," whereas Article IV
refers to "activities in the exploration and use." Since different terms were used, the question arises whether different
meanings are to be attached to the respective terms and, if so,
how they are to be differentiated. If there is no difference
between "exploration and use" and "activities in the exploration and use" why were different terms used? The question
is of some importance since, for instance, "exploration and
use" must be "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries," "without discrimination of any kind," and "on a basis
of equality"9 whereas "activities in the exploration and use"
must be carried on "in the interest of maintaining international
peace and security and promoting international cooperation and
understanding." 10
Furthermore, does the word "activities" have both the positive and negative connotations? Is a negative "act" a negative
"activity"? If negative act refers to what is commonly known
as an "omission," could such a negative act be equated with
negative "activity"? If Article III is interpreted as a mandatory
obligation on all parties to carry on activities in exploration
and use, then the question of negative meaning in relation to
the word "activity" could not even arise. However, since such
interpretation could not reasonably find much support, the question of interpreting activities in a negative sense would still
come up.
Upon reflection, it would appear that exploration and use
could hardly be visualized in terms of negative activities. If
the term "activity" has only positive connotations, can exploration and use take place without such positive activity? It would
seem that all exploration and use, by the very meaning of
9 Id., Art. I.
10 Id., Art. III.
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these terms, carries with it the implication of some activity or
activities. This line of reasoning would suggest a lack of precision by the drafters or a distinction almost without meaning.
However, it could possibly be argued that exploration and use
intended to cover the total human effort, or outcome involved,
whereas "activities" was referring more to the individual
sequences of acts making up the total results. Thus the drafters
may have intended to refer not to the whole broad area of
exploration but to the independent components. Should this
line of thought be correct, it could be argued that the independent components described by the word "activities" would not
necessarily have to be for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries and that the requirement of nondiscrimination and
equality would not be applicable to them. While this construction is admittedly somewhat artificial it may serve to explain
the use of a nomenclature which otherwise would be hard to
justify.
Does exploration and use constitute a singular concept or
does it mean to convey two separate ideas, distinct from one
another? Must use be preceded by exploration or must exploration be followed by use to be subject to the limitation that it
must be for the benefit of all countries? If exploration and
use denotes a single concept, then exploration without use, or
use without exploration would not have to be carried out for
the benefit and in the interests of all countries. However, by
reasonable interpretation, it does not appear that the Treaty
intended to create a single concept. Therefore, both "exploration" and "use," even if they do not go hand in hand, must
be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries.

B.

MEANING OF EXPLORATION

AND USE

Does "exploration" mean the same thing as the word "use"?
If exploration and use were to mean the same thing, their joint
use in the given context would be redundant. If exploration
and use mean two different things it would be possible to engage in exploration without use or in use without exploration.
The manner and way in which this can be done must be clarified further with respect to the meanings of exploration and
use.
What does exploration mean? Does a casual sighting and
observation constitute exploration? Does anything else apart
from sighting constitute exploration? Does exploration refer to
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exploration by men or to exploration by instruments? In answer to these questions it would seem that. exploration covers
a wide range of human activities irrespective of whether such
activities are carried out directly by man or indirectly through
the use of his instruments. Exploration includes any purposeful
inquiry or observation whether by seeing, hearing, or by other
senses whether done directly by a person or through the use
of his instruments, or by a combination of both.
In addition to the question of the meaning of exploration,
there is also the question of the meaning of the term "use."
The term "use" in the legal sense refers to the enjoyment of
property which -usually results from the occupancy, employment, or exercise of such property. Usually also there is an
element of profit, benefit, or some other measure of advantage accompanying the use. It may be assumed that the word
"use" in the Treaty denotes a legal concept rather than an
everyday expression and should be interpreted in that light.
Does the term "use" mean any type of use, including a
temporary or casual use, or does it only refer to use of a more
permanent nature? It is reasonable to assume that there will
be many types of uses of the moon and other celestial bodies
and other parts of outer space much the same as there are many
different uses of the earthly environment. Such uses may
cover a wide range of activities including economic, scientific,
military, propaganda, and other political activities. Some of
these activities or uses are specifically outlawed, while others
are specifically "not prohibited."11
Does use mean direct or indirect use? If, for instance, the
rays of the sun are used to illuminate a celestial body, does this
mean a use of outer space in the sense that the sunrays are used
for the purpose of seeing? The same question could also be asked
with respect to the use of the void for purposes of travel and
communications. Would it be too much of an insistance on literal
interpretation of the Treaty to say that radio messages sent
11

Thus, for instance, any use amounting to national appropriation or the
establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications on the
moon and other celestial bodies is prohibited. Also, there is a pledge by
the parties not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, install
such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space
in any other manner.
On the other hand, the use of military personnel for scientific research
cr for any other peaceful purposes is not prohibited. The use of any
equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon
and other celestial bodies is also not prohibited. rd., Arts. II and IV.
For a comprehensive discussion of these provisions, see Gorove,
Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L. REv.
349 (1969); Gorove, Arms Control Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty:
A Scrutinizing Reappraisal,1 GEORGIA J. OF INT'L AND COMP. L. 259 (1971).
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through outer space or the movements of man-made objects
must be for the benefit and in the interest of all countries?
It is doubtful that the outer space Treaty's reference to
"use" was intended to include the use of the sunrays for everyday seeing. However, it is likely that the more specific or direct use of the sun's energy in outer space, especially in spatial travel or experiments, such as for propulsion, heating, etc.
would constitute use in the sense of the Treaty.
A further question with respect to the meaning of exploration and use is whether or not the concept involves exploration and use of outer space only in outer space or also on earth.
In other words should the location of the investigator or the
investigating instrument make a difference? Does the manufacture of space rockets on earth or a telescopic exploration of
outer space from the earth constitute activities in the exploration and use of outer space under the Treaty?
If one looked at the purpose of the activity, it would not
be illogical to say that such activities may refer to activities
either in outer space or on earth. However, inasmuch as the
Treaty speaks of activities "in" and not "for" the exploration
and use of outer space, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
manufacture of space rockets on earth is not within the meaning of the discussed provision. But, what if the rocket is sent
into outer space but explodes in the airspace? Is this such an
activity? From Article VII which provides for international
liability of the state that launches or procures the launching
of an object into outer space for damage to another party to the
Treaty by such object on the earth, in the airspace, or in outer
space, it could be argued that once an object is launched, it is
considered an activity in the exploration and use of outer space.
The question whether or not the activities in the exploration and use would have to be conducted in outer space is
also significant inasmuch as a negative answer to it would impose a duty on all telescopic investigations and studies conducted here on the earth to be in the interests of all countries.
It is doubtful that such a result was either intended or envisioned by the Treaty. This is not to say, however, that observation from the earth is of no relevance in the context of the
Treaty. In fact, the Treaty stipulates that the signatories must
consider on a basis of equality any requests by other parties to
be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of their space
objects. 12 The nature of such an opportunity for observation
12

Id., Art. X, Para. 1.
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and the conditions under which it could be afforded must be
13
determined by agreement between the states concerned.
IV.

LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF EXPLORATION

AND USE

The principal of freedom of exploration and use in the
Outer Space Treaty is a general principle, the application of
which is limited by a number of both general as well as
specific provisions. The former include the requirements that
the exploration and use must be carried out "for the benefit
and in the interests of all countries," "without discrimination
of any kind," "on a basis of equality," "in accordance with international law" and that it shall be "the province of all mankind.' 1 4 The latter involve, for instance, the prohibition of
national appropriation, 15 limitations on military uses1" and
avoidance of harmful contamination. 1 7 Within the context of
our inquiry and by way of example we shall now scrutinize the
first and perhaps most importation limitation, namely the requirement that the exploration and use of outer space must
be carried out "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries."

A.

BENEFIT AND INTERESTS
1.

SINGLENESS

V. DUALITY

The exploration and use of the moon and other celestial
bodies, much as that of outer space, must be carried out "for
the benefit and in the interests of all countries."' 8 The Treaty
contains no clue as to what constitutes "benefit" and "interest."
Presumably the two terms are not identical in their meanings.
If they were, a repeated reference to the same term would be
clearly redundant. Also, it is unlikely that a joint concept of
"benefit and interest" was meant, that is, that "benefit and interest" would mean something different from either "benefit"
or "interest" alone. This is apparent from the fact that the
word "interest" is used in the plural and from the additional
fact that it is separated from the word "benefit" by the words
"and in the." If the terms "benefit" and "interests" mean two
different things, what connotations can be assigned to each of
these phrases?
13

14

Id., Art. X. Para. 2.
Id., Art. I.

15 Id., Art.
16 Id., Art.
17 Id., Art.
18 Id., Art.

II.
IV.
IX.
I.
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2.

MEANING

"Benefit" normally refers to some advantage or indulgence,
as opposed to detriment or deprivation. While the word "interest" has similar connotations, it has been defined as a pattern of demands and its supporting expectations.1 9 Normally,
something that is in line with a nation's demands and expectations would be expected to convey some benefit to that nation.
Such benefit may involve not only actual but also potential
benefit, that is, a chance for some future benefit.
The quantity of benefit required may give rise to certain
questions. Would an infinitesimal benefit be sufficient? It
could be argued that the word "benefit" means something more
than the words "some benefit." Perhaps it does not require
as much, however, as the words "full benefit." So long as there
is some tangible or substantial benefit, it appears that the requirement has been satisfied. There is no indication that the
benefit must be either material or direct. An indirect benefit
may be sufficient.
The phrase "for the benefit" does not have the same meaning as "not for the detriment." The latter phrase carries a negative implication, whereas the former phrase has definitely positive connotations. Therefore, it is insufficient that the particular
exploration and use be not for the detriment of other peoples.
On the contrary, such exploration and use must be constructively beneficial.
Furthermore, the exploration and use must be in the "interests" of all countries. The plural term "interests" seem to indicate that more may be involved than just the vague, general
"interest" of all countries. In a sense the plural phrase may
perhaps be regarded as a victory for the less developed countries which entertained strong hopes of receiving benefits from
man's exploration and use of outer space.
What is or is not to the benefit and in the interests of all
countries may not always lend itself to an easy determination.
Something which is thought to be of benefit to a country on the
basis of available information and criteria today, may be regarded on the basis of new information and criteria detrimental tomorrow. Also, who is going to determine whether or not
a particular exploration and use is in a given case for the
benefit of all nations? Since there is no provision in the Treaty
for the settlement of disputes, it is likely that each state - short
of an amicable disposition of the issue - would insist on its
19 H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SociETY 23 (1950).
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own interpretation with respect to the question of whether or
not the exploration and use is for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.
The Treaty does not specify the types of benefit that must
inure to all countries from the exploration and use of outer
space but it seems safe to assume that they may include material, political, psychological, propaganda, military and other
benefits and interests. A related question is what kinds of
exploration and use or results derived therefrom would be
beneficial to all countries? It could be pointed out that if the
exploration and use furthers the maintenance of international
peace and security and promoted international cooperation and
understanding - something which the signatories are pledged
to do anyway in all their spatial activities 0 - it would be for
the benefit and in the interests of all countries. Perhaps another way in which the exploration and use could be carried out
for the benefit of all countries would be to release information
regarding such exploration and use. However, it may not be
easy to determine what constitutes a benefit in any given situation. Does the keeping of a fact as a secret from.the rest of
the world constitute a benefit to all countries or would the disclosure of any fact be beneficial to all nations? It may depend
on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
Whether or not only the "exploration and use" must be
beneficial to all countries or also the "results," that is, the benefits derived from such exploration and use, is a further very
important question. While this distinction may seem somewhat artificial, it points up the fact that such a distinction is
possible. If so, the results of exploration and use would not
necessarily have to be for the benefit of all countries, inasmuch
as the Treaty speaks only about "exploration and use. ' 21 On
the other hand, how exploration and use, in and by itself (without the results of such exploration and use), could be of benefit,
is rather difficult to see.
Assuming then for a moment that the "results" of exploration and use were meant, the question arises whether or
not "all" such results or benefits were intended and, if so, must
all such results be "shared" in order to constitute a benefit to
all countries? Thus, for instance, could a nation derive exclusive propaganda benefits from landing a man on Mars or
another celestial body? Furthermore, how could the actual
benefits be measured? Could propaganda and prestige benefits
20

Treaty, Art. VI.

21

Id., Art. I.
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be equated with material benefits, or on what basis should the
conversion take place? Assuming that a nation shares more
than fifty percent of the benefits derived from its exploration
and use of outer space, would this satisfy the requirement that
such exploration and use must be for the benefit of all countries? Suppose a nation takes 500 close-up pictures of a celestial body in the course of its exploration, the release of which
would benefit all nations. If the exploring nation releases only
50 pictures, would such release satisfy the requirement?
In connection with the sharing of information the Treaty
specifically requires that all signatories conducting activities in
outer space inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations
as well as the public and the international scientific community,
to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature,
conduct, locations, and results of such activities. 22 While this
provision requires that such information be given to the "greatest
extent," it qualifies this by the words "feasible" and "practicable." Thus the obligation to provide information seems broad
enough to be open for circumvention. For one thing, there
is no indication in the Treaty who would determine the feasibility and practicability of providing information, that is whose
standards of practicability and feasibility would apply. Will the
standards be applied by the United Nations, a few powerful
countries or the exploring nation? Most likely by the last one.
In this connection, it should be borne in mind that feasibility
and practicability may involve questions of cost. Also, political
and security considerations may enter the picture, if interpreted
by the body which is required to submit the information.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear from the text whether
the phrase "to the greatest extent feasible and practicable"
refers to the degree of dissemination of information or to the
degree to which the information has to be detailed. Thus, for
instance, an exploring nation may report that it engaged in a
human exploration of the far side of the moon conducted by
three of its astronauts and report that the results of the exploring activities were successful. Would such a brief report
without giving details regarding the more precise nature, conduct, locations, and results of exploratory activities or other
activities involving use be regarded as sufficient to satisfy the
above requirements? Under a reasonable interpretation, the
phrase "to the greatest extent feasible and practicable" should
not be permitted to be circumvented by providing scanty in22

Id., Art. XI.
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formation regarding the nature, conduct, location and results
of space activities. At the same time, it would also appear that
exploring states
under a strict interpretation -the
-even
would not be obligated to release all information and results
of their space activities for the simple reason that the Treaty
does not specifically require them to do so. Under the current
practice of the space powers there has been no full sharing or
exchange of information and it is unlikely that this situation
will change in the foreseeable future..2 ' Furthermore, it may be
pointed out that a state could take the position that release of
certain information resulting from its spatial exploration would
not be to its benefit, in which case it would not have to share
the results of its exploration since such sharing would not be
then for the benefit of "all" countries. Also, it would seem impossible to share propaganda benefits with all nations, unless
all nations have participated or contributed in some form to the
particular space exploration. Even then the nations which contributed the smallest effort to the success would likely gain the
least propaganda benefits. In other words, an equal sharing of
such benefits would more or less presuppose equal effort and
participation on the part of all nations, an eventuality which is
hard to visualize under present world conditions. In sum, it does
not appear that a strict interpretation could be given to the
effect that propaganda or prestige benefits derived from spatial
exploration and use must inure to all nations.
The problem of distribution of benefits and implementation
of a "share and share alike" policy will become particularly
troublesome if valuable minerals and other natural resources
are found on the moon and other celestial bodies. Thus it would
appear that appropriate international agreements would have to
be concluded before equal enjoyment of benefits could be regarded as more than a broad statement of general policy.
B.

"ALL" COUNTRIES

The exploration and use of the moon and other celestial
bodies for the benefit and in the interests of "all" countriesmaking it a "province of all mankind"-in a sense presupposes
the ideological if not also the political unity of mankind, a condition which is likely to remain an all too distant goal for some
time to come. Undoubtedly, the drafters of the Treaty were
motivated by the lofty desire to move from the rift which sepOn the limited nature of US-USSR cooperation in space activities, see
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences. 92nd Cong.. 1st Sess., 30 (1971).
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arates one corner of the earth from another toward unity in the
spatial arena.
Strictly interpreted, the phrase "all" countries would include all states irrespective of whether such territory is recognized by another nation or is a member of the United Nations or is involved in a war, including the Korean or Vietnamese conflicts and the Cold War. Furthermore, the phrase
would seem to include not only a state party to the Treaty but
also any other nation. While universality appears clearly the
aim, the reference to "all" countries should be viewed as a
general statement of policy rather than a specifically enforceable obligation. Similarly, the phrase referring to the "province
of all mankind" is presently more of an expression of hope than
that of actual content. The provision as it stands seems to be
a compromise between the interests of the underdeveloped nations and those of the space powers. The phrase "for the benefit
and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree
of economic or scientific development" seems to have been in
line with the aspirations of underdeveloped nations because of
its specificity, while reference to the "province of all mankind"
appears to have suited the space powers because of its vagueness. The initial reading of the phrase "irrespective of their degree of economic scientific development" may convey the idea
that the benefits must accrue to the undeveloped or underdeveloped countries who otherwise may not reap any benefits.
The wording may also suggest that other nations would have to
bear no part of the expense and that such benefits are free for
the asking, even though some states may well be able to bear
part of the expense of spatial exploration and use. However,
the word "irrespective" of the "degree of economic or scientific
development" would exclude no countries, not even a highly
developed country which would be as much entitled to the
benefits as the most underdeveloped nation.
Of course, one may wonder the wisdom of including the
phrase as an indirect qualifying sentence, following the general obligation that the exploration and use of outer space must
be for the benefit and in the interests of all nations. Specifically, one may ask the question whether the phrase should
also have included a reference to "political or military development," in addition to "scientific and economic development"?
Furthermore, one could also have referred to friendliness or cooperation and a number of other criteria. Does the singling
out of "economic or scientific development" mean to imply that
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in relation to such development there can be no differentiation
with respect to the benefits to be derived, whereas in relation
to other types of development such differentiation can be made?
It is doubtful that the Treaty intended such a result and the inclusion of the reference to "economic or scientific development"
should in no applicable way alter the general obligation that
the exploration and use of outer space must be carried out for
the benefit and in the interests of all countries.
V.

WHO IS

OBLIGATED?

If an astronaut or future space traveler lands on the moon
or another celestial body, is he required to use it for the
benefit and interests of all countries? Could John Doe, A.T.&T.
or an international organization use them in any manner which
would not necessarily be beneficial to all countries? In other
words, does the limitation that the exploration and use must
be for the benefit of all countries apply only to states
or to private and public organizations other than states and to
individuals as well? The sweeping language of the Treaty appears to make this obligation a general duty. However, it is
somewhat difficult to see how the Treaty could impose obligations on international organizations without their consent. Also,
with respect to individuals it is difficult to see how any individual exploration or use could be required to be for the benefit
of all countries. While the Outer Space Treaty does not make
any exceptions in relation to certain types of uses, the stipulation that the exploration and use must be carried out for the
benefit of all countries appears to be a limitation primarily on
states and only secondarily on private individuals, corporations
or international organizations. Were the provisions interpreted
and enforced more strictly, it could seriously undercut individual incentive and hamper further space explorations. On the
other hand, since the states parties bear international responsibility for all national activities in outer space, including the
activities of nongovernmental entities and for assuring that such
activities are carried out in conformity with the Treaty provisions and inasmuch as such activities require authorization and
continuing supervision by the state concerned, it could be
required to enforce the proviargued that the states would be 24
sion with respect to individuals.
By the same logic, since the Treaty provisions are applicable to the activities of all states parties to the Treaty even if
they are carried on within the framework of international inter24 Treaty, Art. VI.
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governmental organizations and since responsibility for compliance with the Treaty is borne both by the international organization and by the states parties to the Treaty participating in
such organization,'2 5 it could be argued that both would be required to enforce the provision in question. While this argument is sound, it does not necessarily resolve the question of
whether the provision was meant to be applied to individuals
and international organizations.
VI. CONCLUSION

The purpose of the preceding analysis of the principle of
freedom of exploration and use in the Outer Space Treaty has
been to subject it to a rather close scrutiny in an attempt to
clarify its meaning and focus on some of its legal implications.
Obviously, a great deal more could be added in further refinement of some of the comment and ideas incorporated in this
inquiry, particularly as they relate to the whole gamut of international and national decision making in the emerging earthspace arena. But enough has been said in a brief article to indicate the great many questions which may arise out of the
implementation of what at first sight appears to be a relatively
simple, though admittedly cardinal principle. It is hoped that
the present reappraisal will be of some assistance toward further clarification of the concept and its meaningful and rational
interpretation.

25
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THE RIGHT TO MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL
ABROAD: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE
U.N. DELIBERATIONS*
VED P. NANDA**

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has again postponed,
until its 28th Session in 1972, the consideration of the item
pertaining to "discrimination in respect of the right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and to return
to his country."' It should, however, be noted that for several
years now such postponement has become a routine practice
with the Commission, 2 for almost eight years have lapsed
3
since the major U.N. study on the subject was completed.
This study had offered specific proposals for national and
international action to ensure freedom and nondiscrimination
to an individual in the enjoyment of his right to movement
and travel abroad. 4 In addition, the study had proposed a
draft declaration of principles "which could exercise persuasive
force and moral authority by virtue of their adoption by a
'5
competent organ of the United Nations."
Since no U.N. action has yet been taken to study and implement these proposals, this lack of enthusiasm demonstrates that
the right to travel abroad is not a top priority item. Nonetheless, it is one of those basic human rights, the universal recognition of which is likely to be a major accomplishment in accepting the importance of the individual as a subject of international law. Moreover, its importance is not confined merely
to theoretical formulation and studies, for in various real life
settings, the extent to which the right is recognized, as well
as the nature of state limitations upon it, might have a proh is an adapted version of a paper presented at the World Peace
Through Law Conference in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, July, 1971.

"Professor, College of Law, University of Denver. Director, International
Legal Studies Program. The author gratefully acknowledges the research
assistance of Britt Anderson, a second year student at the University of
Denver College of Law.
1 The decision was taken at the 1136th meeting of the Commission, held
on March 25, 1971. See UNECOSOC, Fiftieth Session, Agenda item 5(a),
Summary Report of the Commission on Human Rights on its twentyseventh session, U.N. Doc. E/4949/ Summary, 1. April 1971, at 13.
2 See eg., UNECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, 27th Session, Note
by the Secretary-General:

Study of Discrimination in Respect of the

Right to Everyone to Leave any Country, Including His Own, and to
Return to His Country, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1042, 6 November 1970 [here-

inafter cited as 1970 Note by the Secretary-General], at 2-3.

3Jose D. Ingles, Study of Discrimination in Respect of the Right of
Everyone to Leave Any Country, Including His Own, and to Return to

His Country, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4.Sub.2/220/Rev.1 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Ingles report].
4 Id., at 67-70.
5 Id.. at 64-67.
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found impact upon individuals and groups. For instance, recent
alleged Soviet restrictions on the Jews wishing to emigrate
from the U.S.S.R., and the subsequent demonstrations and mass
meetings in several countries with claims and counter-claims on
the existence and the recognition of said right,6 point to the
seriousness of the situation.
Thus despite previous inaction the subject is of such significance so as not to be dismissed or even slighted. As such,
this paper will briefly examine (1) the nature of the right as
enunciated in the U.N. instruments; (2) the scope and implications of this right; (3) major problems likely to be encountered in the implementation of the right; and (4) state
practices in recognizing and limiting the right. The paper will
conclude with a section on appraisal and recommendations.
I.

THE NATURE

OF THE RIGHT AS

U.N.

RECOGNIZED IN THE

INSTRUMENTS

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, promulgated
on December 10, 1948, enunciates the right in article 13(2): "the
right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country."'7 This right, in fact, can be read as an
extension of the right enunciated earlier: "Everyone has the
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each state."'8 Several other articles of the Declaration have
an important bearing on this right.9 For instance, article 9 provides that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." 10 Article 14(1) provides that everyone has the
right "to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution."'" Article 15(1) provides that everyone has the
right to a nationality"2 and article 15(2) provides: "No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right
u3
to change his nationality.'
One could, of course, argue that the principles set forth
in the Universal Declaration reflect merely the "oughtness"
6 See, e.g., New York Times, March 6, 1971, at 14, col. 3; id., March 11,
1971, at 9, col. 1; id., March 30, 1971, at 14, col. 5; id., March 31, 1971,
at 10, col. 1; id., April 5, 1971, at 16, col. 1; id., June 1, 1971, at 34, col.
7; id., June 22, 1971, at 3, col. 2; id., June 24, 1971, at 2, col. 3; id., June
26, 1971, at 3, col. 5; id., July 14, 1971, at 3, col. 1; TIME, May 31, 1971,
at 39.

7 See U.N. Office of Public Information, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: A Standard of Achievement, U.N. Publ. No. 62.1.9
[hereinafter cited as Universal Declaration], at 35.
8 Id., Article 13 (1).
9 See Ingles report, at 9-12.
10 Universal Declaration, supra note 7, at 35.
11 Id.
12 Id., at 36.
13 Id.
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and are not enforceable.1 4 But with the adoption by the General
Assembly on December 16, 1966, of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, these principles have been transformed into enforceable international obligations. Article 12, paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights affirm the right to travel: "... 2.
Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
...4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter
his own country." 15
As early as 1952, however, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights initiated a study on the right set
forth in article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration.16 Subsequently approved by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
and the Economic and Social Council, the Sub-Commission
conducted a global study "with respect to all the grounds of
discrimination [in respect of the right of everyone as provided
in article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration] condemned by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights .... -17 The study,
which was carried out by Jose Ingles as the Special Rapporteur
of the Sub-Commission, took three years to complete (1960 to
1963), and contains valuable information on pertinent state practices. It also contains specific recommendations to ensure the
"full enjoyment" of this right. As mentioned earlier, the Commission has not had occasion thus far to study the proposals
and recommendations contained in the Ingles report.
However, in 1963, a U.N. Conference on International Travel
and Tourism, which met in Rome (from August 21, 1963 to
September 5, 1963) and was attended by 87 states and several
inter-governmental and non-governmental international organizations, considered the question pertaining to freedom of
movement in the light of the Ingles report. While the Conference noted the suggestion that "freedom of travel from
country to country should be the inalienable right of all," 18
But see id., at 12-32.
35 See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its 21st session, 20 September-20 December, 1966, U.N. General Assembly Official
Records, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 (A/6316) [hereinafter cited as 1966
Gen. Ass. resolutions], at 49, 54.

14

16 Ingles' report, at 74.
17 Id., at 75.
(Rome, 21
1s See U.N. Conference on International Travel and Tourism
August-5 September, 1963), Recommendations on International Travel
and Tourism, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 47/18 (1964), at 29.
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and recognized "however, that such a rule could not apply universally at the present stage," it nevertheless added that "its
implementation should be the aim of all countries, and the
Conference recommends that governments should, wherever
possible, avoid any kind of activity hostile to tourism and based
on arguments of a religious, racial or political nature. The Conference asked that its opinion on that point be communicated
to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights."' 19
The general resolution by the Conference affirmed the ideal,
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that
everyone has the right to freedom of movement, including
freedom of transit, and takes note of the report by the Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, on the right of
everyone to leave any country, including his own, and to re20
turn to his country.
It recommended that governments should "prevent, in the field

of tourism, any campaign of denigration or discrimination based
on religious, racial or political grounds."'2- The Conference further recommended that "travel for educational, scientific, cultural or official purposes should be specifically encouraged and
22
facilitated.
A notable recognition of the right is contained in article 5
of the 1967 International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination which obligates states parties
to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to
race, color or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the
law, notably in the enjoyment of the right to leave any country,
including one's own, and to return to one's country.
In addition, several international instruments have recognized these rights. 23 The most noteworthy in this context are:
(1) the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees;
(2) the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons; and (3) the 1961 U.N. Convention on the Elimination
or Reduction of Future Statelessness. The following provisions
of these conventions have a direct bearing on the right under
consideration: article 28 of the 1951 Convention on Refugees
obligates contracting parties to issue travel documents to refugees within their territory, especially to the ones who are unable to secure such documents from the state of their lawful
residence; article 28 of the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons
11)Id.
20 Id., at 20.
21
22
23

Id.
Id.
See generally Ingles report, at 5-7.
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similarly obligates the contracting parties to issue travel documents to stateless persons lawfully within their territory, while
paragraph 13 of the Schedule to the Convention entitles a stateless person who is the recipient of a travel document under
article 28 to re-enter the territory of the issuing state at any
time during the period of the validity of the document; the
1961 Convention contains several provisions to ensure that departing nationals do not lose their nationality on racial, ethnic,
religious or political grounds, unless they have in the meantime acquired another nationality.
It should be also mentioned that both the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations contain special provisions allowing
persons enjoying diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities respectively and members of their families to leave
the territory of the receiving state, even when armed conflict is
in progress.
Finally, various regional and bilateral arrangements aimed
at easing border requirements and facilitating international
travel are also in existence. Of special note are articles 2-4 of
the Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights
which embody, inter alia, the principles that everyone is free
to leave any country, including his own, and that no one is to
be deprived of the right to return to his country.
II.

SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS

The right to movement and travel abroad as expressed in
article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
fairly comprehensive. It encompasses such diverse groups as
tourists, refugees, immigrants and emigrants and stateless persons as well as those citizens within a state who are forced to
remain there due to discriminatory practices. But while the
right is broad, its scope in the light of past and present applications appears to be severely restricted.
Limitations are inherent, due to the stated exceptions (national security, public health and morals, safety, legal and military obligations and the public order)2 4 and the reaction of
nation states to what they might perceive to be an infringement
upon matters within their domestice jurisdiction. Notwithstanding some serious challenges to the sovereignty of the nation
state, a state's right and power to control its internal affairs is
-4 1966 Gen. Ass. Resolutions, at 49-54.
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still widely accepted.25 Thus while the individual claims the
right to international movement, the state claims the right to
Impose certain restrictions.
Accepted state restrictions include such activities as limiting
travel to members of subversive organizations, 2" immigration
policies seeking "skilled" employees, 21 and the imposition of
medical and health qualifications.28 However, if the right were
to be interpreted literally, cause might exist for increased concern over its possible application to population shifts.
This concern is already being expressed with regard to
social tension that urban areas have experienced in connection
with immigration policies. 2 Thus in deciding future application
of 13(2) it is important that a balance be achieved in immigration policies between the social costs incurred and the profits
received in both developing and developed nations. Beyond this
economic balance are also problems of national identity. A
homogeneous population is desired by many states as a means
of achieving identity and reducing cultural tensions. But, while
the ideal of homogeniety is appealing, its feasibility is not great,
especially in the developing countries of Asia and Africa. The
legal and technical problems beyond the moral, sociological and
cultural problems of shifting borders and populations to achieve
a homogeneous population place the ideal far beyond practicality.
Still, given the above considerations, it can be argued that
a state cannot impose restrictions aimed specifically at a group,
race, nationality, etc., with a view to denying them the right to
move freely among countries on a discriminatory basis.
It must be noted here that the problems being dealt with
are not unique to 13(2). They affect all human rights. Discrimination is an illusive concept. First, it is difficult to define since
it must depend in large part upon the situation in which it
occurs. Second, once it is defined such discrimination is often
difficult to "prove." Perceptions of situations differ greatly.
And since discrimination is a social, cultural, or as some say an
innate pattern of behavior, a listing of basic human rights can
only deal with the manifestations of discrimination. Actual discrimination cannot be dealt with by international covenants.
But these covenants can lessen the areas in which the mani25

See generally, W.M.
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1-2 (1968); A.F.K.

1968),; J. STOESSINGER, THE MIGHT OF NATIONS
20 New York Times, July 14, 1970, at 3, col. 4.

- Id., Sept. 5, 1970, at 3, col. 1.
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2, Id., Aug. 2, 1970, at 1, col. 7.

POLITICS

IN

ORGANSKI, WORLD POLITICS
8-10

(1965).

A

REVOLU-

21 (2d ed.

1971

THE RIGHT TO MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL ABROAD

115

festations of discrimination are acceptable. The problems of
determining discriminatory behavior are then alike for all
human rights.
A state's denial to its citizens of access to other countries
and its refusal to accept citizens of other states within its borders, may not in and of itself be discriminatory. Imposing
restrictions such as visas, health controls, monetary payments,
etc., can be appropriate in one situation and perhaps discriminatory in another. Promotion of trade and travel and the ensuing economic benefits are a part of this picture as are travel
regulations for refugees, migratory laborers and stateless persons. What are appropriate formalities and requirements? Are
there time limitations? What are the grounds for rejection? Once
issued, can a state refuse to honor such documents? Can a state,
after permitting travel, deny re-entry? Do the same rules apply
to citizens and foreigners or resident aliens? Should treatment
accorded individuals be different from that accorded groups?
If so, in what way? How should one view this freedom in terms
of population growth? What is the relation to economic viability?
These factors and considerations, social, economic, political,
must be part of the input into a discussion on the implementation of the right of movement and travel abroad. Each situation
puts forth a myriad of complex and sometimes contradictory
aspects. But implementation, to be successful, must be viewed
in the broadest of contexts. The scope here is all encompassing
within the perspective of restrictive measures whose purpose
is to effectuate discriminatory policies.
III.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT

It is this broad and rather illusive perspective, and its variety of credible and varying interpretations which tend to make
this right appear ambiguous and, therefore, difficult if not impossible to implement. This, together with the differing criteria a
state may apply to determine the nature and extent of these
rights- that of a national to leave his country and that of a
foreigner to leave the country of his sojourn - and that it might
treat both these rights differently from the right of its national
to return to his country reinforce the difficulties of implementation. Another equally important problem is the existence of
direct and indirect state limitations on the enjoyment of this
right, limitations which are hard to substantiate because
administrative procedures granting, denying or restricting this
right might be so discretionary as to allow little or no recourse
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to further appeal or judicial review. Thus a de jure existence
of the right would certainly not imply that it does exist de
facto as well. Furthermore, a state might couch its discriminatory practices in legalistic framework. Therefore, although the
state practice would amount in fact to "discrimination" in the
enjoyment of the right as provided in articles 2 and 29(2) of the
Universal Declaration, it would be hard to prove, due to indirect restrictions administered under regulations and procedures
which provide for nondiscriminatory application but are in
reality administered in a discriminatory fashion.
It is appropriate at this point to note that article 2 of the
Declaration provides in its relevant part: "Everyone is entitled
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status. '30 ) Article 29(2) provides:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recogniticn and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfate in a
31
democratic society.

While article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights is identical in content to article 2 of the
Declaration, article 12(3) of the Covenant provides:
The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to. any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to
protect national security, public order (ordre public), public
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present

Covenant.

32

Of note are the additions of national security, ordre public
and public health in article 12(3) of the Covenant to the limitations already mentioned in article 29(2) of the Declaration,
and the deletion therefrom of the concept of "general welfare."
The civil law concept of ordre public is generally considered
broader in scope and more flexible than its counterpart in
common law, public order; while the former is closer to public
policy, the latter means absence of disorder.
Thus, while the right encompassed in article 12 of the Covenant is to be enjoyed without any distinction based on "race,
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status," there is ample
310Universal Declaration, supra note 7, at 34.
31 Id., at 38.
32 See supra note 24.
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reason to believe that any one or more of the bases of distinction enumerated here could be used by a state to prevent a
national from leaving his own country, to prevent a foreigner
from leaving the country of his sojourn, or to prevent a national
from returning to his own country. 33 For instance, passport
facilities could be denied to persons belonging to an ethnic
group or to a political party as has been the case in South
Africa. Similarly, restrictions could be imposed on persons for
various reasons, such as some special status- that of a married
woman or a divorcee- or on linguistic, religious or political
grounds- for example, alleged restrictions on Jews in the Soviet Union-or for reasons of national or social origin-for
instance, restrictions on American citizens of Japanese descent
during World War II- or on considerations based on property,
birth, or other status.
The Covenant allows a state to impose limitations on the
right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country, if such limitations are "provided by
law" and are necessary to protect national security, public order
(ordre public), public health or morals, or the rights and freedom of others. In his study Ingles discusses passport and visa
restrictions based on state interest, especially public emergency;
legal incapacity; nonperformance of legal obligations and professional skill.3 4 Among indirect limitations, Ingles discusses
economic measures such as forbidding or restricting the exportation of currency as well as the high cost of obtaining travel
documents. 3 5 Also, in some states, the procedures and conditions
for obtaining a passport might be so complex as to render the
3
exercise of the right to leave the country extremely difficult. ,
In addition, the exercise of the right to travel would be affected
by (1) administrative and legislative remedies available to an
aggrieved national who claims that his rights have been unduly
restricted, 37 and (2) the imposition of penal or other sanctions
upon the persons who might be found to have violated the
state requirements on international travel.38 As noted previously
in Section II problems of implementing sanctions on discriminatory actions are not unique here. Implementation can at best be
directed toward outward manifestations of discrimination.
33 See generally Ingles report, at 20-35.
34 See id., at 41-46.
35 Id., at 47-49.
38 Id., at 49-51.
3 Id., at 51-53.
88 Id., at 53-55.
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PRACTICES IN RECOGNIZING

AND LIMITING THE RIGHT

The 1963 Ingles study was prepared on the basis of an extensive survey resulting in responses from 90 countries as well
as information on 22 additional countries. Thus the study takes
into account as many as 112 states. In addition information was
solicited from selected non-governmental organizations in consultative status and specialized agencies. 39 The responses show
that about one-third of the countries explicitly recognize the
right in question. It is appropriate to cite the report:
(a) The right of a national to leave his country. In twentyfour countries the right is formally recognized in constitutional
texts or laws and in twelve countries by judicial, interpretation.
Fifty countries do not expressly recognize the right in their
legislation.
(b) The right of a national to return to his country. In twentyfour countries the right is formally recognized in constitutional
texts or laws and in twelve countries by judicial interpretation.
Forty-nine countries do not expressly recognize the right in
their legislation.
(c) The right of a non-national to leave the country of his sojourn. In twenty countries the right is formally recognized in
constitutional texts or laws and in four countries by judicial
interpretation. Fifty-six countries do not expressly recognize the
40
right in their legislation.

Of course, the conclusion is not warranted that the absence
of legal recognition negates the existence of the right, or conversely that formal recognition ensures its enjoyment. For while
a number of countries
which do not have any constitutional or legislative provision or
judicial precedent governing this question have stated that they
recognize it "in principle," "as a rule of law," "in general practice," "according to regulations," "as an enforceable right," "always," or that "there is no authority for denial." This is particularly true as regards the right of a national to return to his
39 The Secretary-General had in April 1960 sent a circular letter to all
governments of states members of the U.N. and members of specialized
agencies seeking their assistance in the preparation of the study, and
adding that the Special Rapporteur would appreciate "having any relevant material, including the texts of laws, administrative arrangements,
judicial decisions and statistical data," (Ingles report, at 77-78) as
well as information on specific points sought by the Special Rapporteur.
Two more circular letters, one in 1961 and the second in 1962, were sent
by the Secretary-General to all governments which had not responded
to the inquiry. The Director of the Division of Human Rights had in
April 1960 made a similar request for assistance to 117 selected nongovernmental organizations (Ingles report, at 76); this was followed
by another letter in March 1962 to those organizations which had not
responded to the first.
4
o Ingles report, at 4. In 4 countries on point a, in 5 countries on point b,
and in 10 countries on point c no information available.
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country, which has thus been informally recognized by sixteen
4
additional countries. 1

Since the report had not been considered by the Commission in several years, in June 1970, the Secretary-General, persuant to a request by the Sub-Commission, sent a note verbale
to governments of member states "requesting them to furnish
information on new developments in fields covered by the study
of discrimination in respect of the right of everyone to leave
any country, including his own, and to return to his country. "42
43
Of the replies received from 27 states until February 1971,
12 (Cyprus, 44 France,45 Guatemala, 46 Jamaica, 47 Lebanon,", Nic52
Singapore, 53
aragua, 4 Nigeria, 50 Poland, 51 Sierra Leone,
Syria, 54 and Turkey55) indicated that no new developments had
occurred since their earlier communications. Among others,
Austria 56 and Luxembourg 57 referred to their ratification of
Protocol 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights; Argentina 58 to its ratification of the 1967 International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and
Madagascar 59 to its accession to the 1966 Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Obviously, all these countries were stressing
the fact that since they were parties to the aforementioned conventions, they had therefore obligated themselves to the granting of the right.

Several countries referred to their constitutional provisions
41 Id., at 5.
42 1970 Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 2, at 6.
43 See 1970 Note by the Secretary-General, Annex [hereinafter cited as
Annex]; Note by the Secretary-General, Addendum, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1042/Add. 1, 25 Jan. 1971 [hereinafter cited as Add. 1]; and Note by the
Secretary-General, Addendum, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Add. 2, 15 February,
1971 [hereinafter cited as Add. 2].
44
Annex, at 2.
45 Add. 1, at 7.
46 Annex, at 3.
47 Add. 1, at 7.
48

Annex, at 5.

49

Id., at 6.

50 Id., at 7.

51 Add. 1, at 8.
52 Annex, at 7.
53

Id.

54

Add. 1, at 8.

55 Id.

Add. 2, at 2.
Annex, at 5.
58 Id., at 1.
39 Add. 1, at 7-8.
56
57
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62
61
guaranteeing the right. They include Barbados,60 Iraq, Kenya,
63
4
5
66
Malta, and Mauritius.6 Afghanistan and Swaziland referred
to their laws providing this right. Denmark 7 is the only country
that reported some added restrictions on travel in the case of
national servicemen who could be liable to be called up in case
of mobilization, while Austria, 8 Italy6" and Sweden 70 reported
special provisions for granting passports to aliens without travel
documents and to stateless persons.

Iraq 71 and Italy 72 mentioned "exceptional grounds" and "exceptional circumstances" respectively among the limitations on
the right to travel abroad; in the former case, the limitation is
on leaving the country, while in the latter, the limitation is on
the right to be issued a passport. In Afghanistan,7 3 the qualifications to a foreigner's right to enter Afghanistan, travel in
the country and leave it are stated thus: "[e]xceptions apply
only to undesirable persons in accordance with the law. The
principle of reciprocity, in accordance with international law, is
recognized." In Sierra Leone,7 4 the right to leave the country
is not included in the constitutional right guaranteeing freedom
of movement, although it was reported that "there has been no
judicial declaration on such a right" based on the constitutional
75
provision granting freedom of movement.

V.

APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS

State practice is varied in respect to granting the right, ensuring its enjoyment, imposing limitations on it and providing
remedies.76 It would certainly be desirable if some uniformity
were achieved in setting standards and providing remedies. Of
60 Id., at 3-5.

Annex, at 3-4.
Id., at 4.
63 Id., at 5.
64 Id., at 6.
65 Add. 1, at 2.
66 Annex, at 8.
67 Add. 1, at 6.
68 Id., at 2-3.
61
62

69

Add. 2, at 3-5.

70

Annex, at 8.

71
72

Article 6 of the Passport Law. See Annex, at 4.
Add. 2, at 3.
Add. 1, at 2.

73
74
75
76

Annex, at 7.

Id.
On state practices, two incisive articles are: Gould, The Right to Travel
and National Security, 1961 WASH. U. L.Q., 334 (1961); Redish, British
Immigration and International Protection of Human Rights, 10 I-Lv.
INT'L L.J. 150 (1969).
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course, the objective would be to move toward recognition of
the right by every state as well as adoption by states of means
for an effective implementation of the right.
It is realized that if the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights were to come into force and were ratified by a
vast majority of states, 77 the right would ipso facto be recognized by the states ratifying the Covenant. However, not only
78
but even were the
are the states slow in their ratification,
Covenant to be ratified universally and the right to movement
and travel be internationally recognized, the mere recognition
of the right might remain meaningless rhetoric, unless it were
to be accompanied by specific standards, criteria and remedies
for implementation.
The following international measures are proposed as necessary first steps in implementation. (1) The Human Rights Commission should find time at its next session in 1972 to consider
the Ingles report and the more recent developments since the
publication of the report in 1963. (2) A declaration of principles
should be recommended by the Commission to be adopted later
by the Economic and Social Council and finally by the General
Assembly. Such a declaration would offer a comparative set of
standards to every state and would provide an impetus to bring
a state's practice in line with the internationally agreed principles.
Such standards could be compiled through the gathering of
relevant statistics and an examination of at least formal governmental practices indicating customs procedures, costs of exit and
entry documents, length of time required to obtain such papers,
and information sought in such forms. A compilation of requirements representing the lowest common denominator should
be offered as a model for initial state compliance. (3) Dissemination of information on the nature of the right by the
utilization of all the U.N. resources and machinery, especially
through its advisory services and regional seminars, would be
77 Pursuant to article 27 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and article 49 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights re-

spectively, each of the two covenants will come into force three months
after the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession has been
deposited. As of December 1971, Bulgaria, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Ecuador, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Uruguay were the 9 states that had

either ratified or acceded to both these covenants. See Multilateral
Treaties in Respect of which the Secretary-General Performs Depository

Functions: List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc. as at 31
December 1970, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/4 (1971), a-t 78-82. On January 25, 1971, Iraq ratified the Covenants, becoming the 10th country
to be a party to the two covenants. See 7 UN Monthly Chronicle, No. 2,
Feb. 1971, at 23.
78 Id.
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useful in encouraging the exercise of the right. Similarly, periodic state reporting to the Human Rights Commission pertaining
to the enjoyment of the right would be desirable. Use of this
information should be made in the compilation of data on population patterns and growth of tourism, enumerating purposes
and lengths of international travel and movement and problems
encountered as a result.
(4) Finally, a draft convention on the subject should be
drawn up by the Commission, which could later be adopted by
the General Assembly. Similarly, regional and bilateral conventions facilitating international travel and movement should be
encouraged.
Though tacitly no country acknowledges discriminatory
practices of this nature the persistent denial by South Africa of
passports to blacks wishing to leave for study and travel should
not be ignored, nor can Soviet actions with regard to her Jewish
citizens. But both states have reacted to world pressures and
protests. This reaction indicates that pressure and opinion can
have significant effects and should be exploited for the purposes of implementation.
At this point, no international machinery is envisaged to
compel a state to grant this right to the individual. The encouragement of voluntary compliance by a state with the established standards should be the primary focus. The importance
of the right to movement and travel abroad should be given
urgent and immediate consideration at the United Nations as
well as at regional and national levels.

THE ROLE OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS IN

THE ARMS CONTROL DECISION PROCESS
THOMAS HOLTON*

One of the major international developments since the
founding of the United Nations in 1945 has been the phenomenal
increase in the number of nation-states. Most of these new
members belong to the Third World, and most have subscribed
to the global normative system which is centered in the Charter
of the United Nations. It is generally recognized, however, that
the entry of developing nations into the mainstream of the legal
process of the international community has been followed
by the feeling on their part that they have not enjoyed a proportionate share in the shaping of this process, which is so vital
to their interests, and instead their role has been one of accession to norms written by the developed countries.
It is encouraging to note, therefore, the indications of a
growing input by the developing countries into the evolving
normative structure of the community. One such indication is
evident in the decision process relating to arms control which
has been going on under the aegis of the United Nations, and,
in particular, in the evolvement of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was opened for signature
under the auspices of the United States, the Soviet Union and
the United Kingdom on July 1, 1968.1
In his statement on the Revised Draft of the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was presented
jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union to the
Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. Copyright is retained by the
author.
'T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 21 U.S.T. 483; done at Washington, London and
Moscow, July 1, 1968; entered into force March 5, 1970. Articles I and
II contain the following operative clauses:
Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any
way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon
State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons
or explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices.

*
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Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee 2 in Geneva on January 18, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson alluded to this influence with the acknowledgement that:
We have worked long and hard in an effort to draft a text
that reflects the views of other nations. I believe the draft presented today represents a major accomplishment in meeting these
3
legitimate needs.

The views of other nations which the American President
referred to would seem to include those expressed in the Joint
4
Memorandum on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This
document made reference to Resolution 2028(XX) which was
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
November 19, 1965, in which Resolution the Assembly "noted
with satisfaction the efforts of the eight delegations to achieve
the solution of the problem as contained in their Joint Memorandum" which had previously been submitted by them on
September 15, 1965 to the ENDC. The later Joint Memorandum (August 19, 1966) referred to the fact that the General
Assembly in its resolution calling upon the ENDC to negotiate
a nonproliferation treaty, laid down the principles inter alia
that such a treaty "should embody an acceptable balance of
mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and nonnuclear Powers

. .

." and "should be a step towards the achieve-

ment of general and complete disarmament and, more particuThe development of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament
(hereinafter referred to as ENDC) was as follows: As early as September 7, 1959, the foreign ministers of the United States, France, the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union announced in a joint communique (U.N. Doc. D.C./144, Sept. 8, 1959) their agreement to seek establishment of a ten nation committee for the general consideration of disarmament with the intention of making reports to the General Assembly and the Security Council. Proposal for an enlarged forum was
made on December 31, 1961 by the Soviet Union and the United
States jointly in a draft resolution (A/C. 1/PV. 1218 at 4-12) presented
in the First Committee of the General Assembly - to include eight
new members. This resolution was approved by the General Assembly on December 20, 1961 (G.A. Res. 1722 (QXVI)) with the recommendation that the Committee seek agreement on general disarmament under international control. On March 14, 1962, the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee opened discus--ions in Geneva with a
membership comprising France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union,
Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Roumania, Brazil,
Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab
Republic (ENDC/PV. 1, March 14, 1962). France has since been generally inactive. Now wth an enlarged membership, the Geneva body
is currently referred to as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
3 U.N. Doc. ENDC/212, Jan. 19, 1968.
4 Joint Memorandum on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, presented to the ENDC on August 19, 1966, by the eight national delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and
the United Arab Republic. U.N. Doc. ENDC/178.
5U.N. ENDC/158.
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larly, nuclear disarmament
randum stated:

."

Whereupon the Joint Memo-

The eight delegations note with satisfaction that during the
discussions which have since taken place in the Eighteen Nation
Committee on Disarmament, mainly on the draft treaties presented by the United States (ENDC/152 adn ENDC/152, add. 1)
and the Soviet Union (ENDC/164) the above mentioned principles have received further substantial support ...

Referring to the above quoted principles in the General
Assembly's resolution, the same Joint Memorandum added that:
The eight delegations consider the applications of the principles . . . to be of importance to all countries but particularly

to non-nuclear weapon countries which, through a treaty on
nonproliferation will have to refrain from the acquisition of
such weapons.

And that:
The eight delegaticns further trust that in connection with an
agreement cn nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, intentions
be explicitly stated that assistance to developing countries should
be increased in order to help accelerate their programmes of
development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes . . . also

express the hope that adequate steps will be taken to envisage
channelling important resources, freed by measures of disarmament, to the social and economic development of countries
hitherto less developed.

The influence of the non-nuclear states, and in particular
of those of the Third World, on the production of the Nonproliferation Treaty continued to be felt in the decision making
that transpired between the submission of the Joint AmericanSoviet Revised Draft Treaty in January 18, 1968 and the ceremonies for the signature of the finalized Treaty on July 1, 1968.
This influence is observable in a partial comparison of the January and July texts. Similarly, incremental concern for imple6 Thus Article IV, paragraph 2 reflects, in its revision, a progressive
recognition of the rights of the developing nations. The earlier text
had read:
2. All Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the
fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the
Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories
of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.
The final revision reads:
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and
have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the
Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing
alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories on
non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
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mentation of the rights of non-nuclear states is visible within
the development of Article V.7
Comparison of the two sets of versions discloses that the
later text of Article IV includes provision not only for the exchange of information but for the exchange of equipment and
materials, and makes explicit reference to "consideration for
the needs of the developing areas of the world." The later text
of Article V adds implementive content to the earlier one by
providing that negotiations to actualize the right of non-nuclear
states to obtain benefits from the peaceful applications of
nuclear explosions, pursuant to a special international agreement through an international body, should commence as soon
as possible after the treaty's entry into force.
In his comment on these textual changes as previewed in
the First Committee of the General Assembly on May 31, 1968,
Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, noted that
many representatives have quite rightly pointed to the particular interest of developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for accelerating their economic development and
improving the standard of living of their peoples. FrOm this
point of view a considerable amount of work has been done to
supplement the treaty on non-proliferation

. . . by including

7 The earlier revision had read:

Article V
Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate to insure
that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear
explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this
Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to
such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as
possible and exclude any charge for reasearch and development.
It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this
Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or
agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or
through an appropriate international body with adequate reppresentation of non-nuclear-weapon States.
The final revision reads:
Article V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate
international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful
applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to
non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the
explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude
any charge for research and development, non-nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate
representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on
this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty
enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to
bilateral agreements.
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corresponding provisions that would accommodate
s
of the non-nuclear states.

the desires

A specific instance of the input of a developing state
in the decision process culminating in the Nonproliferation
Treaty is that of Nigeria. In its "Working Paper Submitted
to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Additions
and Amendments for Inclusion in the Draft Nonproliferation
Treaty," dated February 28, 1968 as revised March 14, 1968,1
Nigeria asked for a change in the wording of Article IV. Referring to the January wording, Nigeria argued that the "words
'undertake to facilitate' should be substituted for the words
'have the right to participate in.'" The final text was changed
to reflect this demand. It reads: "Undertake to facilitate, and
"
have the right to participate in...
In seeking the motives leading the nuclear nations to accommodate the developing nations in their bid to participate
in the international decision process in its arms control phase,
one might tend to look first to considerations of physical power.
Though the discrepancy between the power positions of the two
groups of states would seem vast enough to argue against the
need for such accommodation in material considerations, one
possible explanation of the motivation is the remote prospect
of a developing nation's acquiring possession of nuclear weaponry with its threat to the security of the nuclear states themselves.
It is submitted, however, that an important part of the
explanation is the ethical thrust of the demand of the developing nations to participate in public decision making which is
going to affect their interests and which is going to entail sacrifices on their part which will not be required of the nuclear
states. Under the Nonproliferation Treaty, for example, it is
the non-nuclear signatory states which will be obliged to forego
the nuclear testing which would enable them to develop their
See also Brewer, U.N. Atomic Draft Revised
to Aid Smaller Countries, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1968 at 1, col. 2:
United States and the
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. May 31 -The

8 A/C.1/PV. 1577, at 62-73.

Soviet Union bowed today to pressure from smaller countries
and announced a series of changes in their proposed nuclear
treaty, which would halt the spread of nuclear weapons to
countries that do not now have them.
In essence the changes do the following:
Give stronger guarantees to the small countries that will bene-

fit through the peaceful uses of nuclear power.

Give the smaller countries a promise of more urgent efforts by

the big powers to end the world arms race.

Provide an agreement to reinforce the authority of the United

Nations charter against the use of force in general.
9U.N. Doc. ENDC/220/Rev.
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own nuclear independence, while the nuclear states will continue to have the right to conduct detonations. The ban on
acquisition does not apply to the latter under this treaty,
nor are they prohibited from conducting underground testing
by the Partial Test Ban Treaty. 10 The moral posture of the
non-nuclear group vis-a-vis the nuclear group was well summed
up in the ENDC by delegates of three different countries.
Representative Obi of Nigeria saw the issue:
A universal approach to the problem is not only essential but
desirable and inescapable. After all, the treaty on non-proliferation, should we achieve one, would impose heavier obligations on the non-nuclear Powers than on the nuclear Powers."
Representative Burns of Canada pointed out that:
* . . we have all made
it clear that there should be reciprocal
obligations of the nuclear powers and the States not possessing
nuclear weapons.12

And finally Representative Azeredo da Silveira of Brazil
stressed the right of all members of the community to share in

the power of decision:
For such is the kind of treaty to which we are looking forward:
not a text agreed privatel ybetween the superPowers and destined to massive accession by the rest of the
nations .... 1

As the community of nations continue to weigh the great
decisions about arms control: decisions about underground nuclear testing, about chemical and bacteriological warfare, about
the peaceful use of the sea bed and ocean floor, about the arms
race and safeguards to guarantee the effectiveness of control
agreements, and about the diversion of resources to develop-

10 T.I.A.S. 5433, 14 U.S.T. 1313; done at Moscow, Aug. 5, 1963; entered into
force Oct. 10, 1963.
'iU.N. Doc. ENDC PV. 235, Jan. 27, 1966 at 30.
12 U.N. Doc. ENDC PV. 306, June 20, 1967 at 4.
13 U.N. Doc. ENDC PV. 310, July 4, 1967 at 5.

THE ROLE OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

ment, the moral issue will be ever present. 4 And the voice of
the emerging consciousness of the developing countries will
continue to be heard. Their claims are not about to cease.
For the poor nations have a moral hold on powerful nations
that profess ethical ideals. Their voices can be ignored only at
a heavy cost in credibility. Such is the political weight of the
moral factor.

14

Cf. the Joint Memorandum of Sept. 15, 1965 (ENDC/158):
The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit
the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled
with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms
race ....

See also the statement of Lord Chalfont of the U.K., U.N. Doc.
ENDC/PV. 299, May 25, 1967, in part as follows:
...I see the non-proliferation treaty as simply the first but vital
element in a broad and comprehensive strategy-a strategy for
arms control, for disarmament and for international security,
and for the international control of nuclear energy for the uses
of peace. Certainly the treaty will not last, nor will it deserve
to last, if it is used simply as a device to preserve the existing order of things, to perpetuate the oligopoly of the nuclear
club. If we are to progress, as we should, from a non-proliferation treaty gradually to a more intelligent system of international security than the one we have at present it will be
necessary for the nuclear Powers to accept two simple and incontrovertible facts.
The first of those facts is that they cannot expect the nonnuclear Powers of the world to deny themselves the option of
possessing the most powerful military weapon the world has
ever seen unless they, the nuclear Powers, are prepared themselves to engage in serious and specific measures of nuclear
disarmament. ..
• . . if a non-proliferation treaty is not followed by serious attempts amongst the nuclear Powers to dismantle some of their
own vast nuclear armoury, then the treaty will not last, however
precise its language may be. There is in my mind no doubt that,
if the non-nuclear Powers are to be asked to sign a binding nonproliferation treaty, it must contain the necessary provisions and
machinery to ensure that the nuclear Powers too take their proper
share of the balance of obligation.

BOOK REVIEW
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POSTWAR FRENCH PRACTICE.
By Burns H. Weston.' (Volume 9, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series.) Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.
1971. Pp. xv, 237. $10.50.
The post World War II period, which marked the end of
colonialism, has also brought to the fore concomitant problems;
one such problem results from the nationalization of alien
property. Claims and counter-claims between the capital exporting countries and the countries taking over foreign properties have been settled by different means, the most frequent
of which at present is that of lump sum settlements, reached
under bilateral agreements. France, among other Western
powers, has in this manner settled the claims of her property
interests "damaged, destroyed or divested by nationalization,
and other deprivative measures '2 undertaken by other countries
(among these are several East European states, Cuba and
Egypt). In each instance, the French government established
a claims settlement commission to compensate the affected
French property interests. It is these commissions and their
decisions that Professor Weston studies and analyzes in his
work.
The study is unique, for this is the first serious attempt to
inquire into this important subject. But in this reviewer's
opinion, the significance of the study is further enhanced by
Professor Weston's technique in analyzing the French practice.
He provides a policy-oriented framework to bring order to this
otherwise unwieldly and highly confusing maze of commissions'
decisions.
This technique offers Professor Weston the use of an appropriate methodology to sift the material, treat it systematically and present it in such a fashion as to assist a researcher
and scholar as well as a decision maker in drawing useful comparisons over time, and thereby contributing to the development
of the "Law of International Claims." Additionally, it facilitates the performance of the essential intellectual tasks as enumerated by the "New Haven School": clarification of the goals
of decision; description of the trends; analysis of the conditioning factors; projection of probable future development; and
1 Professor of
2 B. WESTON,

Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS:

inafter cited as WESTON] 4 (1971).

POSTWAR

FRENCH PRACTICE

[here-

BOOK REVIEW

appraisal and recommendation of alternatives and strategies
that contribute to the realization of preferred goals. 3 More specifically, this approach allows Professor Weston to analyze the
commissions' decisions in the context of the claimant's objectives,4 base-values,5 strategies," situations affecting claimant eligibility, 7 and outcomes of the claims.8
Apparently an argument can be made that the uninitiated
might find it hard to follow the contents of the work, because
of what the editor of the Procedural Aspects of International
Law (PAIL) series, Professor Richard Lillich refers to as the
"possible hazards of specialized language and innovative organization."" But if the reader takes the necessary time with the
book (and it is no Love Story, nor was it conceived to be read
in one sitting), he will find the merit in Professor Weston's deliberate choice in (1) using functional, precise and relatively
norm-free terminology, thereby avoiding the ambiguities inherent in traditional legal vocabulary (although he almost always refers to traditional terminology as well); and (2) parting
with the traditional organization, which would have imposed
serious constraints on the author, especially in view of the disorganized nature of his material.
Professors McDougal and Lasswell, the co-founders of the
New Haven School have in a recent article 0 eloquently articulated the need for "a more configurative, hence viable, jurisprudence of international law." This suggests a more contextual
and multi-method framework for studying international legal
problems." A careful reading of Professor Weston's book should
reveal the usefulness of following their recommendations. It
provides a sharper focus for discussing pertinent issues such
as: what transpired; under what circumstances, why, with what
immediate outcome and the long range effects on international
legal order; and what alternatives should be recommended to
strengthen this order.
Professor Weston was handicapped in collecting the pertinent data for the book. There was an initial difficulty caused
For a recent articulation, see McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman, Theories
About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence,
8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188, 197 (1968).
4 WESTON at 95-147.
5Id. a-t 156-57.
3

6 Id.

at 158-59.

7 Id. at 147-56.

8Id. at 159-82.
9 Id. at viii.
lOMcDougal, Lasswell and Reisman, supra note 3, at 188.
11 Id. at 298-99.

132

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 1

by the policy of the French government not to publish the
qommissions' decisions. To this was added the non-accessibility
to the author of "a number of probative documents" on file
with the French Foreign Ministry.1" However, these hurdles
seem to have been overcome by the author's painstaking research extending over a period of three years, including two
summers in France, during which time he translated thousands
of commissions' unpublished decisions and interviewed a large
number of key figures, both government officials and private
practitioners. It seems that the author's hope of having caught
"sufficiently the spirit of French commission practice"'13 has
been amply fulfilled.
At the outset Professor Weston provides the necessary historical background,'1 4 followed by a discussion of the enabling
legislation establishing the commission, the "Statutory Instruments," and the rules of procedure of each commission, 15 and
finally, a thorough analysis of the commissions' decisions. 1 6 The
texts of the various lump sum agreements which are pertinent
to the study are translated and conveniently contained in the
17
Appendix.
Professor Weston's analysis leads him to the conclusion
that the commissions have performed "most of their basic missions generally with distinction," ' that they have displayed a
"generally unparochial perspective,"' 9 that their decisions are
remarkably uniform 20 and have been consistent with "customary international law, as well as with the comparative American and British practice. '21 He convincingly makes the point
that while these commissions obviously have been "instruments
of the French legal order," they nevertheless should be regarded as "decision-making agents of the international legal
order" 22 as well. In fact, it is primarily the latter function
which prompts us to pay special attention to these commissions
and other similar national or domestic instruments, whose decisions when placed "side by side . . . from country to country,
at 6.
Id.
Id. at 9-38.
15 Id. at 39-69.
16Id. at 71-182.
i7Id. at 191-224.
18 Id. at 187.
19Id. at 189.
20 Id. at 188.
21 Id. at 189.
22 Id.
at 183.
12 WESTON

13
14
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help form over time that synthesis which is in large measure
' 23
what we today call international law.
Professor Weston's criticism of the French practice mainly
concerns the commissions' procedures, specifically their emphasis
24
on secrecy with the resulting lack of public accountability
and their slow administration causing prolonged delays. 25 However, this reviewer would have liked to see Professor Weston
include in his appraisal an examination of how these commissions' decisions are likely to affect the world community expectations on the standard for compensation which traditionally
has been that of prompt, adequate, and effective payment. 26 He
would have also preferred more extensive comparisons, 27 and
further recommendations, with the author exploring in his own
words "the world order policy implications" of such recommendations. But perhaps this is beyond the scope of the present
work; hopefully, the author has saved such comparisons and
recommendations for the next study, which he has promised
us.

28

Most appropriately, this study, as volume 9 of the PAIL
series forms part of a broader project, which in the words of
its able director, Professor Richard Lillich, "involves a definitive examination of the lump sum compensation agreements
settling claims for the taking of private property rights which
have been included by Eastern and Western countries since
World War II. ....
-29 Works already completed and published
directly on this point include Professor Lillich's analysis of the
post-war British practice, 30 and those forthcoming include one
by Professor Isi Foighel surveying the post-war Danish practice,31 one by Professor Lillich on the practice of the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission of the United States,32 and one
co-authored by Professors Lillich and Weston, entitled International Claims: Their Settlement by Lump Sum Agreements. 33
23 Id.
24Id.

at 4.
at 184-85.
25Id. at 185-86.
26 However, see id. at 30-33 for Weston's discussion of the extent to which
the decisions of the French claims commissions conform to the traditional standard.
27 However, see, e.g., id. at 14-16, 39, 83, 89-90, 129, 177 for Weston's comparisons of the French practice with similar practices of Great Britain
and the United States.
28 Infra, note 33 and the text accompanying it.
29 Lillich, The ProceduralAspects of InternationalLaw Institute, 4 INT'L
LAwYER 740, 746 (1970).
30 R. LILLIcH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: PosTwAR BRITISH PRACTICE (1967).
31 Mentioned in WESTON at 5 note 13.
32 Mentioned in id. at 5 note 11.
33 Mentioned in id. at 38 note 134.
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The book is written in a clear style and given the tedious
nature of the material, it is no mean achievement that the
work is quite readable. This study, which Professor Lillich has
aptly described as being "so rich in material and so rewarding
in insights," 4 is a worthy addition to the growing literature
of both the New Haven School and the Procedural Aspects of
International Law Series.
Ved P. Nanda

34

Supra note 9.
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FIFTEEN MEN ON A POWDER KEG:

A

HISTORY OF THE

U.N.

SECURITY

COUNCIL. Andrew Boyd. New York: Stein and Day, 1971. 383
pp. $8.95. Andrew Boyd takes the reader on a fantastic voyage
through the channels and reefs of the ocean of power within
the United Nations, the mysterious Security Council. One begins to understand the apparent ambiguities of the actions of
the various members of the august body, the seemingly illogical
changes of position, the ever-moving balance of power. Beyond
this, there is an exceptional analysis of U.N. action and inaction in the major and minor crises of the last two decades,
and perceptive insights on the possible course of the planet
and its "governing" body in the coming years.
POWDER KEG

must be considered a primary reference point

for anyone professionally affected by the U.N. and a primer
for anyone interested in the politics and diplomacy of multinational existence.
REVOLUTION THROUGH PEACE.

Dom Helder Camara, A. McLean

translation. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. xix, 149 pp.
$5.95. This book is one in the series-World Perspectives. The
series is dedicated to defining the essential nature of man by
developing a new consciousness which will enable man to direct
his evolution toward fulfillment rather than destruction. Contemporary problems are studied in an effort to contribute to
an awakening and understanding of the interrelationship between man's knowledge and his existence.
This volume is a message by Archbishop Helder Camara
which calls for a peaceful revolution through reform of existing
social structures in Latin America and the International Community. His goal is human dignity in both the spiritual and
temporal order. A special call is pronounced urging youth
to commit themselves to the brotherhood of man, and to free
humanity from the madness of war and the madness that
widens the gulf between the developed and the underdeveloped
worlds.
Although the phraseology is consistently Christian, this
writing is not a religious book. It carries a Christian philosophy
but more than that, it offers specific and definitive objectives
pursuant to the goal of an integrated and developed Latin
America.
THIS ENDANGERED PLANET. Richard A. Falk. New York: Random
House, Inc., 1971. 495 pp. $8.95. The environmental crisis is not
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confined to the highly technological Western nations, but rather
has assumed global dimensions. Nor is technology the only
threat to the world. Mr. Falk enumerates four principal threats
to the planet Earth: (1) The war system; (2) Overpopulation;
(2) The depletion of natural resources; and (4) The deterioration of the entire environment, so that it is approaching the
point where it will on longer be life-sustaining.
The author, in recapitulating several of his earlier theories
concerning stability in international affairs, calls for an "ecological politics" in which "man in nature" will replace the image
of "man versus nature", which has motivated and encouraged
our abuse of the Earth.
Two alternate images of the future are presented to support
the need for radical changes in philosophical, economic and
political systems. One foresees a continuation of present values
and practices, in which we descend from "The Politics of
Despair" through "The Politics of Catastrophe" to "The TwentyFirst Century-An Era of Annihilation." The other image, predicated upon a world which has come to grips with the present
crises, foresees decades of "Awareness," "Mobilization," and
"Transformation" leading to "The 21st Century-The Era of
World Harmony".
CRIMES OF WAR.

Richard A. Falk, Gabriel Kolko, and Robert

Jay Lifton, editors. New York: Random House, Inc-, 1971. xvi,
575 pp. $10.00. This volume is a multifaceted exposure to the
element of responsibility in war crimes. The editors have presented the legal framework, the political setting, and the psychological and ethical context of the Vietnam War Crimes. The
book lends itself not to acceptance, but rather to an understanding of contemporary atrocities. It significantly probes present
realities that most often are viewed as history.
The section on legal framework covers treaties and documentation on prohibitions of war crimes dating from Petersburg,
1868 to Vietnam, 1970. Political documents focus primarily on
atrocities committed in Vietnam both in combat and prison
settings. The psychological and ethical context includes contributions by prestigious writers and concerns itself largely with
an examination of societal guilt and the agonizing experience of
atrocity.
The editors of this book have gathered an impressive collection of documents and sensitive writings (many firsthand
experiences) to illustrate the void of idealism and the senseless
struggle of the Vietnam War. It is in toto a plea for an intelli-
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gent commitment to humane government: but in relating so
vividly the crimes it decries, the reader is often benumbed by
the experience. However, it may well be necessary to experience the impact of the problem as being the first step in the
solution.
THE FUTURE OF THE OCEANS.

Wolfgang Friedmann. New York:

George Braziller, Inc., 1971. 132 pp. $5.95 (hard cover), $2.45
(paperbound). Seventy-one percent of the earth's surface lies
under the oceans. In the water, and on and beneath the ocean
floor there exists resources of food, oil, natural gas, and minerals in quantities to stagger the imagination. The U.N. General Assembly has resolved that these shall be the common
heritage of mankind and has called for an international regime
to administer the area. THE FUTURE OF THE OCEANS presents
basic concepts and data pertinent to this sea world, and in
readable fashion, surveys recent developments as nations reach
out to exploit these resources. The author, believing that "freedom of the seas cannot remain a laissez-faire freedom" urges
prompt action to reverse the current trend toward offshore appropriation by coastal nations. The work is an excellent checklist in preparation for the 1973 U.N. Conference on the Law
of the Sea, and includes a discussion of the draft convention
submitted by the United States to the United Nations Seabed
Committee in August 1970.
THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE.

S. Houston

Lay and Howard J. Taubenfeld. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1970. 333 pp. $17.50. The burgeoning space activities within the last decade have precipitated much interest in
the law of outer space. This study, written with the assistance
of the American Bar Association and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, analyzes the present law controlling
man's activities in outer space and on the celestial bodies. Although not intended as a draft code of law governing space
activities, it is a comprehensive look at the subject. Particularly useful is the chapter on "Natural Resources, Pollution,
and the Law of Activities in Space", which should have considerable effect on future policy making. The book is well
organized and should serve as a valuable reference on the law
of outer space.
THE

ART OF

MIDDLE EAST.

THE POSSIBLE:

DIPLOMATIC

ALTERNATIVES

IN

THE

M. Reisman. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton

University Press, 1970. 158 pp. $1.95. Professor Reisman reviews
briefly but with keen understanding the innumerable complexi-
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ties which beset the entire Middle East. He presents us with
a highly readable and extremely challenging analysis of the
present situation, setting out of his four-fold proposals for
achieving the minimum order so vital for the establishment of
peace. In the past, diplomacy has failed. But now, "within the
limits of feasibility and possibility, there is . . . room for
creative diplomacy. If the rewards for success are not great,
the penalty for failure may be enormous." The world today is
far too interdependent for any political conflagration to be
confined to a particular region, and a confrontation or collision in the Middle East could easily destroy the whole world.
Professor Reisman's approach is fresh and innovative; his alternatives challenging and provocative.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Charles S. Rhyne. Washington, D.C.: CLB

Publishers, 656 pp. $22.50. The review of a legal text is difficult at best, and even more so when the subject is international
law. Anyone who has ever endured such a course has little
desire to ever again see such a tome, and professors either prefer to write their own texts or find fault with any text in print.
However, please accept the heartfelt enthusiasm which follows.
To list the degrees and accomplishments of Professor Rhyne
would require several pages; instead his work in preparing
this text is eloquent testimony. The format follows the citation
system found in most state codes, forcing the neophyte to think
as a lawyer and permitting the professional to employ the text
efficiently. Without belaboring the point, the text covers fully
the historical context so essential in international law and gets
on to the present state of the art, covering in sufficient depth
the major treaties, documents, agencies, and trends affecting
international law today.
INTERNATIONAL LAW

must be considered imperative as a

text and important as a tool.
THE PENTAGON PAPERS. Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W.
Kenworthy and Fox Butterfield. New York: The New York
Times and Bantam Books, Inc., 1971. 677 pp. $2.95 (paperback).
In mid-1967, Robert S. McNamara, then Secretary of Defense,
commissioned the Pentagon papers. A massive top-secret history of the United States' involvement in Indochina, the Pentagon papers have been the subject of much controversy both as
to the actual content, and as to the legality of their printing.
The 47-volume study attempts to encompass American involvement in Indochina from World War II to the start of the
Paris peace talks in May, 1968.
On June 30, 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the news-
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papers to continue the publication of these papers, which had
been labeled by the Government as harmful and irreparably
injurious to the nation's defense and security.
Written by a team of anonymous government historians,
this compilation of the memoranda, cablegrams, and orders of
the principal actors shows the four-administration commitment
to a non-Communist Vietnam and an ultimate frustration in
doing so.
The history project was to be "encyclopedic and objective"
according to Mr. McNamara but the actual candid form which
evolved renders it most readable. The organization of this compilation is chronological but lacks consistency and an overall
conclusion. Perhaps one must read THE PENTAGON PAPERS iD
the encyclopedic manner for it is based on documentary records
and not a unified, cohesive story which would result from
combining interviews to fill the gaps in the documents. But
this also allows the documents to be revealed without the embarrassed rationalizations and interpretations so ever-present in
government policy matters.
This compilation obtained by The New York Times does
lack the four volumes on the secret diplomacy of the Johnson
administration. But despite this limitation it does in its printed
form disclose a vast amount of information concerning the
American commitment to South Vietnam and the manner of
operation of the United States government. The Pentagon account stated that at various times the highest administration
officials not only kept information about their real purposes
from the press and Congress, but at times actually misled the
public media on grounds of the necessity for secrecy and
expediency.
As an inside view of the decision-making process this work
merits considerable attention, but the approach of the various
chapters differs as the individual authors vary in style and
analysis. Although fragmentary, the effect is to give the public
a new source of information. In this respect it is more complete
and informative than any information the public has to date.
OF LAW AND MAN. Shlomo Shoham editor. New York: Sabra
Books, 1971. 387 pp. $8.95. This work is a compilation of writings in tribute to Justice Haim H. Cohn, an Israeli Supreme
Court Justice whose respect for law and human rights has
earned him international acclaim. The subject matter of the
selections varies from the philosophical or religious to the legal
particulars involved in international, civil, and criminal problems. There is an underlying directive throughout the book

140

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 1

which encourages better and more humane legal systems. From
the readings a great deal can be gleaned about the rules of law
and the practices of law which are employed by different
nations (especially Israel). Most often the essays treat the subject matter in an analytical fashion and for this reason are of
interest to those who are concerned with learning more about
international relations and politics as well as those who are
professional legalists.
AGGRESSION:

OUR ASIAN DISASTER.

W. L. Standard.

New York:

Random House, Inc., 1971. 228 pp. $6.95. The illegality of the
United States' involvement in the war in Vietnam is developed
clearly and logically with the documentation of United States'
violations under the U.N. Charter, the SEATO Treaty, the Nuremberg Principles, and the United States' own Federal Constitution and with numerous quotations and excerpts from public
pronouncements and writings. Included also is a brief survey
of campus unrest, domestic disapproval and the United States
world-wide military complex. With great forthrightness Mr.
Standard presents the view that the war in Vietnam can only
be endlessly protracted and that its only solution is the total
withdrawal of the United States from Indochina. The writing
is fresh and vigorous with a keenly aware factual analysis.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE.
THE JAMES EARL RAY EXTRADITION FILE.
New York: The Lemma Publishing Corp., 1971. 134 pp. $17.50.
Collected in this volume are the documents used by the U.S.
State Department to effect the extradition of James Earl Ray,
who was sought in the United States to stand trial for the
murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
The petitioning process is traced from Shelby County, Tennesee to Great Britain where Ray had fled. Included are 34
petitions, documents, and depositions developed to show sufficient cause for Ray's extradition. Affidavits from F.B.I. experts, statements of Memphis police officers, and eyewitness
statements, are supplemented by technical depositions taken
from the physician who performed the autopsy on Dr. King
and from a surveyor who mapped the bullet's trajectory. Also
included are the drawings, diagrams and photographs which
were appended to the various affidavits.
While much of the text consists of repetitious statements
and dry certifications, as might be expected from such a collection of documents, the publisher correctly points out that
since Ray pleaded guilty to the murder charge and therefore no
testimony was heard, the book represents "the most complete
file of evidence against him [Ray] published to date".

